Dilemmas of Nuclear Strategy

by Kolkowicz,Roman

• ISBN13: 9780714632360
• ISBN10: 0714632368
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 1987-05-28
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Nuclear strategy and deterrence in their "golden age" -a nostalgically defined period sometime in the mid-1950s to mid-1960s - promised to harness and control the nuclear Moloch; hopes were high that the civilian strategists flooding into Washington would succeed in designing a new science of war that would safeguard national security, provide a stable international environment, and develop a rational decision-making process for the management of national interests in a hostile nuclear world. Three decades later, it is a commonplace that the erstwhile promises and pretensions of the nuclear "whiz kids" and the "wizards of Armageddon" have not lived up to expectations. Arms control has not curbed or slowed down the vast arms build-ups; crisis management has shown itself to be an imperfect and fallible policy instrument; and the centrepiece of this nuclear strategic science, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, is under assault from all quarters. Critics maintain that while the political andtechnological context of international politics and strategic relations has changed profoundly, our thinking about war and its prevention remains rooted in the past, ossified around a deterrence paradigm of over two decades ago. It was with this in mind that the editor of this volume invited a group of distinguished American and European scholars and specialists in strategic and international studies to a conference in December 1985 at Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy, and asked them to consider the following questions: what is the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines? In what ways have technological and policy changes in recent decades affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategy? Are there alternate ways for thinking about strategy in the contemporary nuclear context that might be more useful? This volume reflects the research and discussions for the Bellagio Conference, with a spcial emphasis on thedistinct perspective introduced by the Europeans on the issues of superpower strategic relations in general and on MAD and SDI in particular. Their views are shaped by concerns on how these broader issues might affect their own national security interests.

Table of Contents

Introduction: the rise and decline of deterrence doctrine

Nuclear deterrence -critical assessments: the not-quite-absolute weapon -deterrence and the legacy of Bernard Brodie

deterrence - the problem - not the solution

nuclear strategy - can there be a happy ending?

European perspectives: nuclear deterrence and European security - towards a not so happy ending?

the reception of American deterrence theory in the Federal republic of Germany and th German "nuclear debate" of th e1950s

after NATO's dual track decision of 1979 - where do we go from here?

Arms control and nuclear strategy: deterrence and arms control

arms and races and instability, Michael Intriligator

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