The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might

by Daniel Byman , Matthew Waxman

• ISBN13: 9780521007801
• ISBN10: 0521007801
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2002-02-04
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Successful coercion should be relatively simple for the United States. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States is without rivals in military might, political influence, or economic strength. Yet despite the lopsided US edge in raw power, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. This book examines why some attempts to strong-arm an adversary work while others do not. It explores how coercion today differs from coercion during the Cold War. It describes the constraints on the United States emanating from the need to work within coalitions and the restrictions imposed by domestic politics, and it assesses the special challenges likely to arise when an adversary is a non-state actor or when the use of weapons of mass destruction is possible.

Author Biography

Daniel Byman is a policy analyst with the RAND Corporation and the Research Director of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy. Before coming to RAND, he worked as a political analyst for the U.S. government. Dr. Byman is the author of several books on international relations Matthew Waxman is an attorney and policy consultant in Washington, D.C. He has worked as a consultant on issues of American foreign and defense policy and international law at the RAND Corporation, and served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter and U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Joel M. Flaum

Table of Contents

Foreword	xi
Preface	xiii
Acknowledgments	xv
Introduction	1	(24)
Defining coercion	3	(6)
The role of inducements	9	(1)
Models of coercion	10	(4)
Coercion today: old wine in new bottles?	14	(4)
Challenges to coercion today	18	(3)
Structure	21	(4)
PART ONE: COERCIVE STRATEGY MAKING	25	(100)
The theory of coercion	30	(18)
Measuring coercion	31	(6)
Coercion as a dynamic contest: key analytic concepts	37	(9)
The path ahead	46	(2)
Coercive mechanisms	48	(39)
Commonly used mechanisms	50	(32)
Second-order coercion	82	(3)
Conclusion	85	(2)
Coercive instruments	87	(38)
Air strikes	88	(11)
Invasions and land grabs	99	(3)
The threat of nuclear attack	102	(3)
Sanctions and international isolation	105	(12)
Support for an insurgency	117	(3)
Combinations	120	(3)
Conclusion	123	(2)
PART TWO: THE CONTEXT OF COERCION TODAY	125	(102)
Domestic politics and coercion	130	(22)
Justifying force	132	(2)
U.S. casualty sensitivity	134	(3)
Sensitivity to adversary civilian suffering	137	(5)
U.S. political constraints and adversary counter-coercion	142	(6)
The asymmetry of constraints	148	(2)
Conclusion	150	(2)
Coercion and coalitions	152	(23)
Why coalitions?	154	(4)
Limits imposed by coalitions	158	(13)
Coalitions and adversary counter-coercion	171	(1)
Conclusion	172	(3)
Humanitarian coercion and nonstate actors	175	(26)
Humanitarian intervention and coercion	176	(1)
The decision to intervene	177	(4)
Common tasks during a humanitarian intervention	181	(2)
Constraints on humanitarian coercion	183	(7)
The challenge of nonstate adversaries	190	(4)
Nonstate actors and counter-coercion	194	(5)
Conclusion	199	(2)
Weapons of mass destruction and U.S. coercion	201	(26)
Understanding the danger	203	(9)
WMD and escalation dominance	212	(4)
Beyond the brink: how WMD use affects coercion	216	(2)
Implications for coercive contests	218	(6)
Conclusion	224	(3)
PART THREE: THE FUTURE OF U.S. COERCION	227	(14)
Challenges to strategy making	229	(5)
Why policy makers and analysts disagree	234	(2)
Coercion dynamics and credibility traps	236	(3)
Final words	239	(2)
Bibliography	241	(24)
Index	265