List of Tables and Figures | p. xv |
Preface | p. xix |
Introductory Concepts | p. 1 |
What is Law and Economics? | p. 1 |
Positive and Normative Analysis | p. 2 |
Is Efficiency a Valid Norm for Evaluating Law? | p. 3 |
Efficiency Concepts | p. 4 |
Pareto Efficiency | p. 4 |
Potential Pareto Efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency | p. 5 |
Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Exchange | p. 6 |
The Coase Theorem | p. 7 |
The Law in "Law and Economics" | p. 10 |
The Nature of the Common Law | p. 10 |
The Court System in the United States | p. 11 |
Conclusion | p. 12 |
Discussion Questions | p. 12 |
Problems | p. 13 |
Review of Microeconomics | p. 15 |
The Theory of the Consumer and Market Demand | p. 16 |
The Theory of the Firm and Market Supply | p. 20 |
Market Equilibrium | p. 23 |
Perfect Competition | p. 23 |
Monopoly | p. 25 |
Oligopoly and Game Theory | p. 27 |
Welfare Economics | p. 30 |
Welfare Theorems | p. 30 |
Market Failure | p. 31 |
Uncertainty and Imperfect Information | p. 32 |
Choice Under Uncertainty and Insurance | p. 32 |
Moral Hazard | p. 34 |
Adverse Selection | p. 36 |
An Economic Model of Tort Law | p. 38 |
What Is a Tort? | p. 38 |
The Social Function of Tort Law | p. 39 |
Elements of a Tort Claim | p. 39 |
Cause-in-Fact | p. 40 |
Proximate Cause | p. 41 |
Liability Rules | p. 41 |
An Economic Model of Accidents: The Model of Precaution | p. 42 |
The Unilateral Care Model | p. 42 |
Social Optimum | p. 43 |
Actual Care Choice by the Injurer | p. 43 |
Comparison of Strict Liability and Negligence | p. 45 |
Bilateral Care Model | p. 46 |
No Liability and Strict Liability | p. 47 |
Negligence | p. 48 |
The Hand Rule | p. 48 |
The Reasonable-Person Standard | p. 50 |
Contributory Negligence | p. 52 |
Negligence with Contributory Negligence | p. 53 |
Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence | p. 54 |
Further Topics | p. 55 |
Sequential Care Accidents | p. 55 |
The Injurer Moves First | p. 55 |
The Victim Moves First | p. 56 |
Last Clear Chance | p. 56 |
Comparative Negligence | p. 57 |
Causation and Liability | p. 59 |
Cause-in-Fact | p. 59 |
Proximate Cause | p. 61 |
Res Ipsa Loquitur | p. 63 |
Uncertainty over Causation | p. 64 |
Activity Levels | p. 66 |
Punitive Damages | p. 68 |
The Judgment-Proof Problem | p. 70 |
The Impact of Liability Insurance | p. 71 |
Litigation Costs | p. 72 |
Legal Error | p. 73 |
The Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits | p. 74 |
Intentional Torts | p. 74 |
Valuing Human Life and Safety | p. 75 |
Conclusion | p. 77 |
Discussion Questions | p. 77 |
Problems | p. 78 |
Applying the Economic Model of Tort Law | p. 80 |
Products Liability | p. 80 |
A Brief History of Products Liability Law | p. 82 |
An Economic Model of Products Liability | p. 84 |
Equilibrium Price and Output for a Dangerous Product | p. 85 |
Care Choices by Manufacturers and Consumers | p. 88 |
Consumer Perceptions of Risk | p. 89 |
A Note on Custom as a Defense | p. 91 |
Recent Trends | p. 92 |
Evidence on the Impact of Products Liability Laws | p. 92 |
Concluding Remarks | p. 93 |
Workplace Accidents | p. 93 |
Respondeat Superior | p. 94 |
Accidents in which the Victim Is an Employee | p. 94 |
Workers' Compensation Laws | p. 95 |
Liability for Environmental Damages | p. 96 |
Characteristics of Environmental Accidents | p. 97 |
Multiple Victims | p. 97 |
Causal Uncertainty | p. 98 |
Superfund | p. 100 |
Case Study: Asbestos | p. 102 |
Medical Malpractice | p. 103 |
Customary Practice and Informed Consent | p. 105 |
Do Physicians Practice Defensive Medicine? | p. 105 |
Conclusion | p. 106 |
Discussion Questions | p. 106 |
Problems | p. 107 |
The Economics of Contract Law I: The Elements of a Valid Contract | p. 109 |
Contracts and Efficient Exchange | p. 109 |
The Elements of a Valid Contract | p. 112 |
Reasons for Invalidating Contracts | p. 113 |
Mental Incapacity or Incompetence | p. 114 |
Coercion or Duress | p. 114 |
Mistake and the Duty to Disclose Private Information | p. 116 |
Purely Distributive Information | p. 118 |
Socially Valuable Information | p. 121 |
Casual Versus Deliberate Acquisition of Information | p. 122 |
Disclosure of Unfavorable Information | p. 123 |
Unconscionability | p. 124 |
Conclusion | p. 125 |
Discussion Questions | p. 126 |
Problems | p. 126 |
The Economics of Contract Law II: Remedies for Breach | p. 128 |
The Efficient Breach Model | p. 129 |
Money Damages and Efficient Breach | p. 130 |
Incentives for Efficient Reliance | p. 133 |
Mitigation of Damages | p. 137 |
Impossibility and Related Excuses | p. 138 |
Efficient Risk Sharing | p. 139 |
Commercial Impracticability | p. 142 |
Specific Performance | p. 144 |
Transaction Costs | p. 145 |
Subjective Value and Efficient Breach | p. 146 |
The Value of Consent | p. 147 |
Self-Enforcement of Contracts | p. 149 |
Liquidated Damage Clauses | p. 149 |
Product Warranties* | p. 150 |
Express Warranties | p. 151 |
Implied Warranties | p. 153 |
Long-Term Contracts* | p. 154 |
Conclusion | p. 157 |
Discussion Questions | p. 158 |
Problems | p. 158 |
The Economics of Property Law: Fundamentals | p. 161 |
The Nature and Function of Property Rights | p. 162 |
The Definition of Property Rights | p. 162 |
Property Rights and Incentives | p. 163 |
The Emergency of Property Rights | p. 164 |
Enforcement of Property Rights | p. 166 |
Fundamentals of the Economics of Property Law | p. 167 |
The Coase Theorem | p. 168 |
The Assignment of Rights and the Distribution of Wealth | p. 171 |
Examples of the Coase Theorem | p. 172 |
The Role of Transaction Costs | p. 175 |
Enforcement of Property Rights | p. 176 |
Property Rules and Liability Rules | p. 176 |
The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules | p. 177 |
Trespass and Nuisance | p. 179 |
The General Transaction Structure | p. 181 |
Consensual Transfers of Property | p. 185 |
The Legal Protection of Ownership | p. 185 |
Should the Law Protect the Possessor or the Claimant? An Analysis of Land Title Systems* | p. 187 |
Land Title Systems: Recording Versus Registration | p. 187 |
Land Title Systems in the United States | p. 190 |
Title Protection and Economic Development | p. 191 |
Limited and Divided Ownership | p. 192 |
Leasing | p. 192 |
The Lease: A Contract or Conveyance? | p. 193 |
Mitigation in Leases | p. 194 |
The Law of Waste | p. 194 |
Sharecropping | p. 196 |
Private Versus Group Ownership | p. 197 |
The Optimal Scale of Ownership | p. 197 |
Public Goods | p. 198 |
The Anticommons Problem and the Right to Partition* | p. 199 |
Time-Limited Property Rights: Intellectual Property | p. 199 |
Patents | p. 200 |
Copyrights | p. 202 |
Conclusion | p. 203 |
Discussion Questions | p. 204 |
Problems | p. 204 |
Involuntary Transfers and Regulation of Property | p. 207 |
Involuntary Transfers and Restrictions on Transfers Between Private Parties | p. 208 |
Adverse Possession | p. 208 |
The Mistaken Improver Problem* | p. 210 |
Inheritance Rules | p. 213 |
Primogeniture | p. 213 |
The Rule Against Perpetuities | p. 214 |
Government Acquisition of Property Under Eminent Domain | p. 214 |
The Eminent Domain Clause | p. 215 |
Public Use and the Scope of the Takings Power | p. 215 |
The Meaning of Just Compensation | p. 219 |
Case Study on the Determination of Just Compensation: "The Assassin's Bequest" | p. 221 |
Eminent Domain and Land Use Incentives | p. 222 |
The No-Compensation Result | p. 222 |
Arguments Against the No-Compensation Result | p. 224 |
Government Regulation of Property | p. 225 |
The Compensation Question | p. 226 |
Tests for Compensation | p. 226 |
An Economic Model of Regulatory Takings | p. 229 |
Implications of the Efficient Compensation Rule | p. 232 |
Investment-Backed Expectations: Does the Market Eliminate the Need for Compensation?* | p. 234 |
Regulation Versus the Common Law | p. 235 |
Conclusion | p. 238 |
Discussion Questions | p. 239 |
Problems | p. 239 |
The Economics of Dispute Resolution | p. 242 |
The Litigation Process | p. 243 |
Why Do Trials Occur? | p. 245 |
The Differing Perceptions, or Optimism Model | p. 246 |
The Asymmetric Information Model | p. 248 |
The Social Versus Private Incentive to Sue | p. 250 |
Procedural Rules and Litigation Costs | p. 252 |
Discovery | p. 252 |
The English Versus American Rule | p. 253 |
The English Rule and Settlement | p. 253 |
The English Rule and the Incentive to File Suit | p. 255 |
Evidence on the Impact of the English Rule | p. 256 |
Rule 68 | p. 257 |
Contingent Fees | p. 259 |
The Benefits of Contingent Fees | p. 259 |
Contingent Fees and Settlement | p. 261 |
Do Contingent Fees Promote Frivolous Suits? | p. 261 |
Frivolous Suits | p. 262 |
Court Delay | p. 264 |
Alternative Dispute Resolution | p. 265 |
Evolution of the Law | p. 266 |
Selection of Disputes for Trial | p. 267 |
Is the Common Law Efficient? | p. 268 |
Empirical Evidence on Legal Change | p. 270 |
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Change | p. 271 |
Decision by Precedent | p. 271 |
An Economic Model of Precedent | p. 271 |
Precedents as a Stock of Knowledge | p. 274 |
Procedural Responses to Legal Errors | p. 274 |
The Standard of Proof | p. 274 |
Appeals as a Means of Error Correction | p. 276 |
What Do Judges Maximize? | p. 277 |
Judicial Self-Interest and the Law | p. 278 |
Pragmatism and the Economic Approach to Law | p. 278 |
Conclusion | p. 280 |
Discussion Questions | p. 280 |
Problems | p. 281 |
The Economics of Crime | p. 283 |
Distinguishing Crimes and Torts | p. 284 |
Crimes Are Intentional | p. 284 |
Other Reasons for Public Enforcement | p. 284 |
Examples of Private Enforcement | p. 286 |
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Sanctions | p. 287 |
The Economic Model of Crime | p. 288 |
The Offender's Decision to Commit a Crime and the Supply of Offenses | p. 289 |
Optimal Punishment | p. 290 |
The Optimal Fine | p. 291 |
Gain Versus Harm-Based Fines | p. 291 |
Fines and Imprisonment | p. 292 |
Prison, Probation, and Parole | p. 294 |
The Probability of Apprehension Is Variable | p. 295 |
Why Are Fines Not Equal to Offenders' Wealth? | p. 297 |
Repeat Offenders | p. 301 |
Empirical Evidence on the Economic Model of Crime | p. 302 |
The Death Penalty | p. 303 |
Economics of the Death Penalty | p. 304 |
Constitutional Issues | p. 305 |
The Bail System | p. 305 |
Private Protection | p. 307 |
Plea Bargaining | p. 308 |
Economic Models of Plea Bargaining | p. 309 |
Plea Bargaining and Deterrence | p. 311 |
A Comparative Perspective | p. 312 |
Topics | p. 313 |
Crime and the Business Cycle | p. 313 |
Gun Laws and Crime | p. 315 |
Primitive Law Enforcement | p. 317 |
Some Constitutional Issues | p. 318 |
Free Speech | p. 318 |
The Rule Against Self-Incrimination | p. 320 |
The Right of Privacy | p. 321 |
Conclusion | p. 323 |
Discussion Questions | p. 324 |
Problems | p. 325 |
Answers to In-Chapter Exercises | p. 327 |
Notes | p. 337 |
Works Cited | p. 355 |
Index | p. 375 |
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.
The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.