Epistemic Authority A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief

by Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus

• ISBN13: 9780199936472
• ISBN10: 0199936471
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2012-11-07
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities -- modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz -- and some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. We must ask: why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community; within that community, those claims are accepted and insulated from the outside; from the outside, the epistemic authority seems unjustified. Both views are undesirable. As Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques. Zagzebski investigates the way the problem of disagreement between communities or between the self and others is a conflict within self-trust, and describes the justification for any change in belief-by the conscientious judgment that the change will survive future conscientious self-reflection. Her book is partially based on the Wilde Lectures delivered at Oxford in the spring of 2010.

Author Biography

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski is Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion & Ethics and George Lynn Cross Research Professor at the University of Oklahoma. Her work focuses on epistemology, philosophy of religion, virtue ethics, and the metaphysics of fatalism. She is the author of many books including On Epistemology (2008), On Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction (2007), Divine Motivation Theory (2004),Virtues of the Mind (1996), The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (1991).

Table of Contents

Introduction

The rejection of epistemic authority

Authority, equality, and self-reliance in the epistemic realm

The epistemological case for epistemic self-reliance

Mistrust of taking beliefs from others

Self-reliance and the nature of knowledge: Plato and Locke

Self-reliance and Cartesian doubt

The case from ethics: self-reliance

Authority and autonomy in the intellectual domain

The value of reflective self-consciousness

Epistemic self-trust

The natural authority of the self

The natural desire for truth and the pre-reflective self

The desire for truth and the reflective self

Self-trust and the alternatives

The conscientious believer and the nature of reasons

Epistemic trust in others

Epistemic egoism

The need for trust in others

Why epistemic egoism is unreasonable

Epistemic egocentrism

Trust in others and the two kinds of reasons

The distinction between deliberative and theoretical reasons

The two kinds of reasons and parity between self and others

Epistemic universalism and common consent arguments

Trust in emotions

The rational inescapability of emotional self-trust

Trustworthy and untrustworthy emotions

Admiration and trust in exemplars

Trust in the emotions of others

Expanding the range of trust

Trust and epistemic authority

Authority in the realm of belief

The contours of epistemic authority: the principles of Joseph Raz

Pre-emption and evidence

The value of truth vs. the value of self-reliance

The authority of testimony

Conscientious testimony

Testimony and deliberative vs. theoretical reasons

Principles of the authority of testimony

Testimony as evidence and the authority of testimony

The parallel between epistemic and practical authority

Epistemic authority in communities

Epistemic authority and the limits of the political model

Authority in small communities

Justifying authority in small communities

Justifying epistemic authority in small communities

Communal epistemic authority

The epistemology of imperfection

Moral authority

The prima facie case for moral epistemic authority

Skepticism about moral authority

Skepticism about moral truth

Moral egalitarianism

Autonomy

Moral authority and the limits of testimony

Emotion and moral belief

Moral authority and understanding

Communal moral authority and conscience

Religious authority

Religious epistemic egoism

Religious epistemic universalism

Believing divine testimony

Faith and believing persons

Models of revelation

Conscientious belief and religious authority

Trust and disagreement

The antinomy of reasonable disagreement

Disagreement and deliberative vs. theoretical reasons

Self-trust and resolving disagreement

Communal epistemic egoism and disagreement between communities

Autonomy

The autonomous self

The norm of conscientious self-reflection

Autonomy from the inside and the outside

Attacks on the possibility of autonomy: Debunking self-trust

Epistemic authority from the outside

Self-fulfillment

Bibliography

Index

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