The Federalist Papers

by Hamilton, Alexander (Author); Madison, James (Author); Jay, John (Author)

• ISBN13: 9780140444957
• ISBN10: 0140444955
• Edition: Reprint
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1987-11-01
• Publisher: Penguin Classics

Summary

Written at a time when furious arguments were raging about the best way to govern America, The Federalist Papershad the immediate practical aim of persuading New Yorkers to accept the newly drafted constitution in 1787. In this they were supremely successful, but their influence also transcended contemporary debate to win them a lasting place in discussions of American political theory. Acclaimed by Thomas Jefferson as 'the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written', The Federalist Papers make a powerful case for power-sharing between State and Federal authorities and for a constitution that has endured largely unchanged for more than two hundred years. In his brilliantly detailed introduction, Isaac Kramnick sets the Papers in their historical and political context. This edition also contains the American constitution as an appendix.

Table of Contents

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION	11	(71)
Note on the Text	82	(3)
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS	85	(404)
PREFACE TO THE 1788 EDITION	85	(2)
I INTRODUCTION	87	(3)
II CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE	90	(4)
III THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	94	(3)
IV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	97	(4)
V THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	101	(3)
VI CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES	104	(5)
VII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND PARTICULAR CAUSES ENUMERATED	109	(4)
VIII THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN PRODUCING STANDING ARMIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY TO LIBERTY	113	(5)
IX THE UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC FACTION AND INSURRECTION	118	(4)
X THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	122	(6)
XI THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO COMMERCE AND A NAVY	128	(6)
XII THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO REVENUE	134	(4)
XIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO ECONOMY	138	(2)
XIV AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF COUNTRY ANSWERED	140	(5)
XV CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES	145	(6)
XVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SAME PRINCIPLE	151	(5)
XVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES TO SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS RATHER TO ANARCHY AMONG THE MEMBERS THAN TYRANNY IN THE HEAD	156	(3)
XVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES	159	(5)
XIX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES	164	(5)
XX THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES	169	(3)
XXI FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION	172	(5)
XXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED	177	(7)
XXIII THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED	184	(4)
XXIV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH AN ANSWER TO AN OBJECTION CONCERNING STANDING ARMIES	188	(4)
XXV THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW	192	(4)
XXVI THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW	196	(5)
XXVII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW	201	(3)
XXVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONCLUDED	204	(4)
XXIX CONCERNING THE MILITIA	208	(4)
XXX CONCERNING TAXATION	212	(4)
XXXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	216	(4)
XXXII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	220	(3)
XXXIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	223	(3)
XXXIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	226	(5)
XXXV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	231	(4)
XXXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	235	(6)
XXXVII CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE CONVENTION MUST HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE FORMATION OF A PROPER PLAN	241	(6)
XXXVIII THE SUBJECT CONTINUED AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN EXPOSED	247	(7)
XXXIX THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES: AN OBJECTION IN RESPECT TO THE POWERS OF THE CONVENTION EXAMINED	254	(5)
XL THE SAME OBJECTION FURTHER EXAMINED	259	(7)
XLI GENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS PROPOSED TO BE VESTED IN THE UNION	266	(7)
XLII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED	273	(6)
XLIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED	279	(7)
XLIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED	286	(6)
XLV A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS	292	(5)
XLVI THE SUBJECT OF THE LAST PAPER RESUMED WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMPARATIVE MEANS OF INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS	297	(5)
XLVII THE MEANING OF THE MAXIM, WHICH REQUIRES A SEPARATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF POWER, EXAMINED AND ASCERTAINED	302	(6)
XLVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO THE MEANS OF GIVING EFFICACY IN PRACTICE TO THAT MAXIM	308	(4)
XLIX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW	312	(4)
L THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW	316	(2)
LI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH THE SAME VIEW AND CONCLUDED	318	(4)
LII CONCERNING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WITH A VIEW TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTORS AND ELECTED, AND THE TIME OF SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS	322	(4)
LIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW OF THE TERM OF THE SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS	326	(5)
LIV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH A VIEW TO THE RATIO OF REPRESENTATION	331	(4)
LV THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THE BODY	335	(4)
LVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SAME POINT	339	(4)
LVII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE SUPPOSED TENDENCY OF THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION TO ELEVATE THE FEW ABOVE THE MANY	343	(4)
LVIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE AUGMENTATION OF THE MEMBERS	347	(5)
LIX CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ELECTIONS	352	(4)
LX THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	356	(4)
LXI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED	360	(4)
LXII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE WITH REGARD TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS, THE MANNER OF APPOINTING THEM, THE EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION, THE NUMBER OF THE SENATORS AND THE DURATION OF THEIR APPOINTMENTS	364	(5)
LXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OF APPOINTMENT OF ITS MEMBERS	369	(6)
LXIV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES	375	(5)
LXV A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE IN RELATION TO ITS CAPACITY AS A COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS	380	(4)
LXVI THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED	384	(5)
LXVII CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A GROSS ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THIS PART OF THE PLAN DETECTED	389	(3)
LXVIII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE MODE OF APPOINTMENT	392	(4)
LXIX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK ON THE OTHER	396	(6)
LXX THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE UNITY OF THE EXECUTIVE, WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROJECT OF AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL	402	(7)
LXXI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OF THE OFFICE	409	(3)
LXXII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN REGARD TO THE RE-ELIGIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT	412	(5)
LXXIII THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE PROVISION CONCERNING SUPPORT AND THE POWER OF THE NEGATIVE	417	(5)
LXXIV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL FORCES AND THE POWER OF PARDONING	422	(2)
LXXV THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES	424	(4)
LXXVI THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED IN RELATION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT	428	(4)
LXXVII THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED, WITH A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT, AND A CONCISE EXAMINATION OF HIS REMAINING POWERS	432	(4)
LXXVIII A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TENURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR	436	(6)
LXXIX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS FOR THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGES	442	(3)
LXXX A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS	445	(5)
LXXXI A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS AUTHORITY	450	(8)
LXXXII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN REFERENCE TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS	458	(3)
LXXXIII A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TRIAL BY JURY	461	(12)
LXXXIV CONCERNING SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS	473	(8)
LXXXV CONCLUSION	481	(8)
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	489	(20)
Index	509