Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal

by Rescher; Nicholas

• ISBN13: 9781412808743
• ISBN10: 141280874X
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-02-15
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

What If? Book jacket.

Author Biography

Thought Experimentation in Philosophy Nicholas Rescher

Table of Contents

Preface	p. xi
Introduction	p. 1
The Nature of Free Will	p. 15
Requirements of Freedom: Preeminently Deliberation	p. 15
Free Will Requires the Absence of Thought-External Determination over Choices and Decisions	p. 21
Choice and Decision are Crucial	p. 23
Doing and Trying	p. 24
Free Action and Agent Causality	p. 29
Modes of Freedom	p. 33
Metaphysical and Moral Freedom	p. 33
Moral Freedom is Removed by Manipulation and Especially by Compulsion	p. 36
Intention and Moral Standing	p. 39
Moral Freedom of the Will Involves Agent Intent and Motivation	p. 40
Ramifications of Freedom	p. 45
Free Will Requires Up-to-the-End Revisability but This does not Gainsay Probabilistic Predictability	p. 45
Issues of Revision and Control	p. 47
The Counterfactual Dimension: "Could Have Done Otherwise"	p. 50
Problem Cases: Machines and Lunatics	p. 53
Free Will as Outside Causality but Compatible with It	p. 57
Averting the Zenonic Fallacy of Causal Regression	p. 57
Averting Predetermination (Contrasting Predetermination with Precedence Determination)	p. 61
The Crucial Contrast between Events and Eventuations	p. 63
Choices and Decisions as Terminating Eventuations	p. 67
Free Will Stands Outside the Stream of Natural Causality	p. 71
On Freedom and Causality	p. 73
Free Will Excludes Predetermination but Not Motive Determinism	p. 79
Motivational Determinism vs. Casual Necessitation	p. 79
Motivations and Motives	p. 82
Freedom from What? Certainly Not from One's Own Motives and Reasons: Freedom Demands Motivational Determination	p. 84
Free Will Requires Motivational Determinism	p. 86
Determination by One's Autonomous Motives is the Crux of Moral Freedom	p. 88
Compulsion vs. Impulsion	p. 89
Objections to Motive Determinism Can Be Met	p. 92
Freedom and Motivation	p. 101
Must an Agent Choose His Motives for a Decision to Qualify (Morally) as Free?	p. 101
Freedom Does Not Require Motivational Self-Construction	p. 105
Does Freedom Require Self-Understanding?	p. 110
On Willing to Will: Does Freedom Require the Will to Be Self-Endorsing?	p. 111
Does Freedom Require the Approval of Intellect and Reason?	p. 113
Does Freedom Require Self-Approved Motives?	p. 117
Buridan's Ass: A Random Willfulness is Not Freedom	p. 120
Compatibilism Regained: What Free Will Excludes is Not Agent Determination but Agent-Bypassing Nature Determination	p. 125
The Explanation of Free Acts through Agent Determination	p. 125
Freedom, Responsibility, and "Could Have Done Otherwise"	p. 128
Reasons and Motives Impel but Do Not Compel	p. 130
Compatibilism Again	p. 131
Mind-Matter Partnership	p. 135
A Two-Sided Coin	p. 135
The Issue of Initiative	p. 136
A Pivotal Duality	p. 142
Mind-Brain Interaction Works by Coordination, Not by Causality	p. 144
Does Free Will Exist? Deliberations Pro and Con	p. 147
On Evidentiating Free Will	p. 147
Is Free Will Unscientific?	p. 151
So Does Science Counter-Indicate Free Will?	p. 153
Free-Will Naturalism and Evolution	p. 156
Conclusion	p. 159
References	p. 165
Index of Names	p. 171
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