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Amid the fear following 9/11 and other recent terror attacks, it is easy to forget the most important fact about terrorist campaigns: they always come to an end--and often far more quickly than expected. Contrary to what many assume, when it comes to dealing with terrorism it may be more important to understand how it ends than how it begins. Only by understanding the common ways in which terrorist movements have died out or been eradicated in the past can we hope to figure out how to speed the decline of today's terrorist groups, while avoiding unnecessary fears and costly overreactions. InHow Terrorism Ends, Audrey Kurth Cronin examines how terrorist campaigns have met their demise over the past two centuries, and applies these enduring lessons to outline a new strategy against al-Qaeda.This book answers questions such as: How long do terrorist campaigns last? When does targeting the leadership finish a group? When do negotiations lead to the end? Under what conditions do groups transition to other forms of violence, such as insurgency or civil war? How and when do they succeed or fail, and then disappear? Examining a wide range of historical examples--including the anti-tsarist Narodnaya Volya, the Provisional IRA, Peru's Shining Path, Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, and various Palestinian groups--Cronin identifies the ways in which almost all terrorist groups die out, including decapitation (catching or killing the leader), negotiation, repression, and implosion.How Terrorism Endsis the only comprehensive book on its subject and a rarity among all the books on terrorism--at once practical, optimistic, rigorous, and historical.
Audrey Kurth Cronin is professor of strategy at the U.S. National War College in Washington, DC, and senior associate in the Changing Character of War program at the University of Oxford. She is the author of Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Defeating al-Qaeda and the coauthor of Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.
Table of Contents
|The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat||p. 3|
|A Word About Scope and Terms||p. 6|
|The Conceptual Framework||p. 7|
|Case Selection||p. 8|
|Overview of Chapters||p. 9|
|Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader||p. 14|
|what decapitation Means||p. 16|
|The Arrest of Top Leaders||p. 17|
|Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)||p. 18|
|Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party||p. 20|
|Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army||p. 22|
|Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo||p. 23|
|Assassination or "Targeted Killing"||p. 24|
|The Philippines' Abu Sayyaf||p. 27|
|Russia and Chechen Leaders||p. 28|
|Israel's "Targeted Killings"||p. 29|
|How Decapitation Ends Terrorism||p. 31|
|Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process||p. 35|
|why Government Negotiate||p. 36|
|Why Groups Negotiate||p. 39|
|Case Studies of Negotiations||p. 42|
|The Northern Ireland Peace Process||p. 42|
|Analysis of the Agreement||p. 47|
|The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process||p. 48|
|Terrorism and the Talks||p. 55|
|The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers)||p. 57|
|Analysis of the Failure||p. 61|
|Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiation||p. 62|
|Strong Leadership||p. 64|
|Suicide Campaigns||p. 66|
|Setting and Story||p. 70|
|How Negotiations End Terrorism||p. 71|
|Success: Achieving the Objective||p. 73|
|What Does "Success" Mean?||p. 74|
|Achievement of Objectives||p. 77|
|Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals||p. 77|
|Ending Terrorism: Strategic or"Outcome" Goals||p. 80|
|Cases of Success||p. 82|
|Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL)||p. 82|
|The African National Congress and Umkhonto||p. 85|
|Other Notable Cases||p. 89|
|How Success Ends Terrorism||p. 91|
|Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized||p. 94|
|Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse||p. 95|
|Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation||p. 95|
|Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups In The 1970S||p. 97|
|Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups In The 1990S||p. 98|
|Infighting and Fractionalization||p. 100|
|Loss of Operational Control||p. 102|
|Accepting an Exit||p. 103|
|Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support||p. 104|
|The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant||p. 105|
|Loss of Contact with "the People"||p. 107|
|Targeting Errors and Backlash||p. 108|
|How Failure Ends Terrorism||p. 110|
|Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force||p. 115|
|Analyzing The Strategies of Terrorism||p. 117|
|Case Studies of Repression||p. 122|
|Russia and Narodnaya Volya||p. 123|
|Peru and Sendero Luminoso||p. 125|
|Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party||p. 128|
|Uruguay and the Tupamaros||p. 129|
|Russia and Chechnya||p. 131|
|Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966||p. 137|
|How Repression Ends Terrorism||p. 141|
|Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi||p. 146|
|Criminality and Terrorism||p. 148|
|Colombia and the FARC||p. 149|
|The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf||p. 152|
|Insurgency and Terrorism||p. 153|
|Algeria and the G1A||p. 155|
|Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War||p. 157|
|India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups||p. 159|
|Outdates Paradigms, Practical Implications||p. 162|
|How War Ends Terrorism||p. 166|
|How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History||p. 167|
|Is Al-Qaeda Unique?||p. 168|
|Resilient Structure||p. 169|
|Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment||p. 171|
|Means of Support||p. 174|
|Means of Communication||p. 175|
|The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda: Applying the Framework||p. 177|
|Decapitation:Capturing or Killing the Leaders||p. 177|
|Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates||p. 179|
|Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives||p. 182|
|Failure through Implosion||p. 183|
|Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support||p. 187|
|Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force||p. 190|
|Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means||p. 191|
|Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise||p. 193|
|Understanding How Terrorism Ends||p. 201|
|Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns||p. 207|
|Selected Bibliography||p. 283|
|Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.|