What is included with this book?
Jeffrey Carr (Principal, GreyLogic) is a cyber intelligence expert, a columnist for Symantec's Security Focus, and an author who specializes in the investigation of cyber attacks against governments and infrastructures by State and Non-State hackers.
Foreword | p. xi |
Preface | p. xiii |
Assessing the Problem | p. 1 |
The Complex Domain of Cyberspace | p. 1 |
Cyber Warfare in the 20th and 21st Centuries | p. 2 |
Cyber Espionage | p. 4 |
Cyber Crime | p. 5 |
Future Threats | p. 6 |
Increasing Awareness | p. 7 |
Critical Infrastructure | p. 8 |
The Conficker Worm: The Cyber Equivalent of an Extinction Event? | p. 12 |
Africa: The Future Home of the World's Largest Botnet? | p. 13 |
The Way Forward | p. 14 |
The Rise of the Non-State Hacker | p. 15 |
The StopGeorgia.ru Project Forum | p. 15 |
Counter-Surveillance Measures in Place | p. 16 |
The Russian Information War | p. 16 |
The Foundation for Effective Polities' War on the Net (Day One) | p. 17 |
The Gaza Cyber War Between Israeli and Arabic Hackers During Operation Cast Lead | p. 19 |
Impact | p. 19 |
Overview of Perpetrators | p. 21 |
Hackers' Profiles | p. 22 |
Methods of Attack | p. 26 |
Israeli Retaliation | p. 28 |
Control the Voice of the Opposition by Controlling the Content in Cyberspace: Nigeria | p. 28 |
Are Non-State Hackers a Protected Asset? | p. 29 |
The Legal Status of Cyber Warfare | p. 31 |
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaties | p. 32 |
The Antarctic Treaty System and Space Law | p. 33 |
UNCLOS | p. 34 |
MALT | p. 34 |
U.S. Versus Russian Federation: Two Different Approaches | p. 34 |
The Law of Armed Conflict | p. 35 |
Is This an Act of Cyber Warfare? | p. 37 |
South Korea | p. 37 |
Iran | p. 37 |
Tatarstan | p. 37 |
United States | p. 37 |
Kyrgyzstan | p. 38 |
Israel and the Palestinian National Authority | p. 38 |
Zimbabwe | p. 38 |
Myanmar | p. 39 |
Cyber: The Chaotic Domain | p. 39 |
Responding to International Cyber Attacks As Acts of War | p. 45 |
Introduction by Jeffrey Carr | p. 45 |
Introduction | p. 45 |
The Legal Dilemma | p. 47 |
The Road Ahead: A Proposal to Use Active Defenses | p. 48 |
The Law of War | p. 48 |
General Prohibition on the Use of Force | p. 49 |
The First Exception: UN Security Council Actions | p. 49 |
The Second Exception: Self-Defense | p. 50 |
A Subset of Self-Defense: Anticipatory Self-Defense | p. 51 |
An Alternate Basis for Using Active Defenses: Reprisals | p. 52 |
Non-State Actors and the Law of War | p. 52 |
Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors | p. 53 |
Duties Between States | p. 54 |
Imputing State Responsibility for Acts by Non-State Actors | p. 55 |
Cross-Border Operations | p. 56 |
Analyzing Cyber Attacks Under Jus ad Bellum | p. 57 |
Cyber Attacks As Armed Attacks | p. 58 |
Establishing State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks | p. 61 |
The Duty to Prevent Cyber Attacks | p. 62 |
Support from International Conventions | p. 63 |
Support from State Practice | p. 64 |
Support from the General Principles of Law | p. 66 |
Support from Judicial Opinions | p. 67 |
Fully Defining a State's Duty to Prevent Cyber Attacks | p. 67 |
Sanctuary States and the Practices That Lead to State Responsibility | p. 68 |
The Choice to Use Active Defenses | p. 68 |
Technological Limitations and Jus ad Bellum Analysis | p. 69 |
Jus in Bello Issues Related to the Use of Active Defenses | p. 71 |
Conclusion | p. 74 |
The Intelligence Component to Cyber Warfare | p. 77 |
The Korean DDoS Attacks (July 2009) | p. 78 |
The Botnet Versus the Malware | p. 80 |
The DPRK's Capabilities in Cyberspace | p. 81 |
One Year After the RU-GE War, Social Networking Sites Fall to DDoS Attack | p. 83 |
Ingushetia Conflict, August 2009 | p. 85 |
The Predictive Role of Intelligence | p. 86 |
Non-State Hackers and the Social Web | p. 89 |
Russia | p. 89 |
China | p. 90 |
The Middle East | p. 91 |
Pakistani Hackers and Facebook | p. 92 |
The Dark Side of Social Networks | p. 93 |
The Cognitive Shield | p. 94 |
TwitterGate: A Real-World Example of a Social Engineering Attack with Dire Consequences | p. 97 |
Automating the Process | p. 99 |
Catching More Spies with Robots | p. 99 |
Follow the Money | p. 103 |
False Identities | p. 103 |
Components of a Bulletproof Network | p. 105 |
ICANN | p. 105 |
The Accredited Registrar | p. 106 |
The Hosting Company | p. 106 |
The Bulletproof Network of StopGeorgia.ru | p. 106 |
StopGeorgia.ru | p. 106 |
NAUNET.RU | p. 107 |
SteadyHost.ru | p. 108 |
Innovation IT Solutions Corp | p. 110 |
Mirhosting.com | p. 112 |
SoftLayer Technologies | p. 112 |
SORM-2 | p. 114 |
The Kremlin and the Russian Internet | p. 115 |
Nashi | p. 115 |
The Kremlin Spy for Hire Program | p. 117 |
Sergei Markov, Estonia, and Nashi | p. 118 |
A Three-Tier Model of Command and Control | p. 119 |
Organized Crime in Cyberspace | p. 121 |
A Subtle Threat | p. 125 |
Atrivo/Intercage | p. 125 |
ESTDomains | p. 126 |
McColo: Bulletproof Hosting for the World's Largest Botnets | p. 127 |
Russian Organized Crime and the Kremlin | p. 129 |
Investigating Attribution | p. 131 |
Using Open Source Internet Data | p. 131 |
Background | p. 132 |
What Is an Autonomous System Network? | p. 134 |
Team Cymru and Its Darknet Report | p. 137 |
Using WHOIS | p. 138 |
Caveats to Using WHOIS | p. 140 |
Weaponizing Malware | p. 141 |
A New Threat Landscape | p. 141 |
StopGeorgia.ru Malware Discussions | p. 141 |
Twitter As DDoS Command Post Against Iran | p. 144 |
Social Engineering | p. 146 |
Channel Consolidation | p. 148 |
An Adversary's Look at Linkedln | p. 149 |
BIOS-Based Rootkit Attack | p. 150 |
Malware for Hire | p. 151 |
Anti-Virus Software Cannot Protect You | p. 151 |
Targeted Attacks Against Military Brass and Government Executives | p. 152 |
The Role of Cyber in Military Doctrine | p. 161 |
The Russian Federation | p. 161 |
The Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP) | p. 163 |
"Wars of the Future Will Be Information Wars" | p. 165 |
"RF Military Policy in International Information Security" | p. 166 |
The Art of Misdirection | p. 169 |
China Military Doctrine | p. 171 |
Anti-Access Strategies | p. 174 |
The 36 Stratagems | p. 174 |
U.S. Military Doctrine | p. 176 |
A Cyber Early Warning Model | p. 179 |
Introduction by Jeffrey Carr | p. 179 |
The Challenge We Face | p. 179 |
Cyber Early Warning Networks | p. 180 |
Building an Analytical Framework for Cyber Early Warning | p. 180 |
Cases Studies of Previous Cyber Attacks | p. 183 |
Lessons Learned | p. 187 |
Defense Readiness Condition for Cyberspace | p. 188 |
Advice for Policy Makers from the Field | p. 191 |
When It Comes to Cyber Warfare: Shoot the Hostage | p. 191 |
The United States Should Use Active Defenses to Defend Its Critical Information Systems | p. 194 |
Scenarios and Options to Responding to Cyber Attacks | p. 196 |
p. 196 | |
p. 197 | |
p. 198 | |
p. 198 | |
In Summary | p. 198 |
Whole-of-Nation Cyber Security | p. 199 |
Afterword | p. 203 |
Index | p. 207 |
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