An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

by Michael Morris

• ISBN13: 9780521603119
• ISBN10: 0521603110
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-12-25
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice and Wittgenstein. Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, de re and de dicto necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning. The book will be invaluable to students and to all readers who are interested in the nature of linguistic meaning.

Author Biography

Michael Morris is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	p. ix
Introduction	p. 1
Locke and the nature of language	p. 5
Introduction	p. 5
What Locke says	p. 5
Meaning and signification	p. 9
Problems about communication	p. 10
Words and sentences	p. 14
Locke's less disputed assumptions	p. 18
Frege on Sense and reference	p. 21
Introduction	p. 21
Psychologism and the Context Principle	p. 22
Frege and logic	p. 26
Frege's mature system (i): reference	p. 28
Frege's mature system (ii): Sense	p. 32
Two further uses of the notion of Sense	p. 36
Questions about Sense	p. 40
Sense and the Basic Worry	p. 47
Russell on definite descriptions	p. 49
Introduction	p. 49
The problems	p. 50
Russell's solution in outline	p. 53
Russell's solution in detail	p. 55
Strawson on definite descriptions	p. 61
Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions	p. 63
Russellian defences	p. 66
Russell beyond descriptions	p. 70
Kripke on proper names	p. 74
Introduction	p. 74
Kripke's target	p. 76
Kripke's objections (i): simple considerations	p. 78
Kripke's objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations	p. 80
Defences of the description theory	p. 85
Sense and direct reference	p. 90
Conclusion	p. 92
Natural-kind terms	p. 94
Introduction	p. 94
A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version	p. 96
A Lockean view without individualism	p. 102
How can there be Kripke-Putnam natural-kind terms?	p. 105
How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators?	p. 108
Quine on de re and de dicto modality	p. 113
Introduction	p. 113
Quine's three grades of modal involvement	p. 114
Referential opacity and Leibniz's law	p. 118
Referential opacity and the three grades	p. 121
Quine's logical problem with de re modality	p. 126
Quine's metaphysical worries about de re modality	p. 130
Reference and propositional attitudes	p. 134
Introduction	p. 134
Quine's problem	p. 135
Quine's proposed solution	p. 138
Perry and the essential indexical	p. 145
The problems for Quine's solution	p. 147
Consequences	p. 150
The semantics of propositional attitudes	p. 152
Introduction	p. 152
Kripke, names, necessity and propositional attitudes	p. 153
Kripke's Pierre	p. 155
Referential solutions to the puzzle	p. 158
A Fregean response	p. 163
Davidson's proposal	p. 166
Can Davidson's proposal solve Kripke's puzzle?	p. 169
Davidson on truth and meaning	p. 173
Introduction	p. 173
Meanings as entities	p. 175
Tarski's 'definition' of truth	p. 179
Davidson's use of Tarski	p. 183
The obvious objections to Davidson's proposal	p. 187
Truth and the possibility of general semantics	p. 189
One final worry	p. 191
Quine and Davidson on translation and interpretation	p. 194
Introduction	p. 194
Quine and radical translation	p. 195
Davidson and radical interpretation	p. 198
Statements of meaning and prepositional attitudes	p. 202
Theories of meaning and speakers' knowledge	p. 205
How fundamental is radical interpretation?	p. 210
Quine on the indeterminacy of translation	p. 214
Introduction	p. 214
Two dogmas of empiricism'	p. 215
Indeterminacy and inscrutability	p. 219
Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways	p. 228
Austin on speech acts	p. 231
Introduction	p. 231
Performative utterances	p. 232
Towards a general theory of speech acts	p. 234
Truth and performatives	p. 239
Issues for a theory of speech acts	p. 242
Grice on meaning	p. 248
Introduction	p. 248
Grice's overall strategy	p. 249
Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of speaker-meaning	p. 253
Sympathetic objections to Grice's account of expression-meaning	p. 258
An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of expression-meaning	p. 261
An unsympathetic objection to Grice's account of speaker-meaning	p. 264
After Grice	p. 268
Kripke on the rule-following paradox	p. 271
Introduction	p. 271
The sceptical challenge	p. 272
The 'sceptical solution'	p. 277
A community-based response	p. 283
Can dispositionalism be defended?	p. 284
Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation	p. 287
Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture	p. 292
Introduction	p. 292
The Augustinian picture	p. 293
The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation	p. 295
The Quasi-Kantian interpretation	p. 299
Worries about these Wittgensteinian views	p. 308
Glossary	p. 312
Works cited	p. 316
Index	p. 323
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