9780815337638

Intuitions as Evidence

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780815337638

  • ISBN10:

    0815337639

  • Edition: 1st
  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2000-01-03
  • Publisher: Routledge
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Summary

This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge.

Table of Contents

Preface ix
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction xiii
The Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy
1(28)
The Nature of Philosophical Intuitions
29(24)
Empiricist Explanationist Skepticism About Intuitions
53(24)
Problems with the Empiricist Skeptical Argument
77(24)
Reliability, Epistemic Circularity, and the Undue Partiality of Empiricist Skepticism About Intuitions
101(24)
References 125(8)
Index 133

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