The Irony of Vietnam The System Worked

by Gelb, Leslie H.; Betts, Richard K.

• ISBN13: 9780815730712
• ISBN10: 0815730713
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1979-03-01
• Publisher: Brookings Institution Press

Summary

Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system --the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures --was designed to do, and it did it."The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(8)
PART ONE Decisions: Getting into Vietnam
Patterns, Dilemmas, and Explanations	9	(18)
Patterns	9	(2)
Dilemmas	11	(3)
A Range of Explanations	14	(9)
Stereotypes Fail	23	(1)
Summary: Three Propositions	24	(3)
Recurrent Patterns and Dilemmas from Roosevelt to Eisenhower	27	(42)
``Hot Potato'' Briefings	27	(3)
The ``Asian Berlin''	30	(2)
The Roosevelt Administration	32	(4)
The Truman Administration	36	(14)
The Eisenhower Administration	50	(19)
Picking up the Torch: The Kennedy Administration	69	(27)
Fastening the Commitment: 1961	72	(7)
Buildup and Breakdown	79	(7)
Taking the Reins: 1963	86	(10)
Intervention in Force: The Johnson Administration, I	96	(48)
Preparing for Pressure: 1964	97	(19)
Crossing the Rubicon: Early 1965	116	(14)
Setting the Pattern of Perseverance: Late 1965	130	(14)
Coming Home to Roost: The Johnson Administration, II	144	(37)
On the Tiger's Back: 1966-67	145	(11)
Debate, Diplomacy, and Disillusionment	156	(14)
Off the Tiger's Back: The Reckoning of 1968	170	(11)
PART TWO Goals: The Imperative Not to Lose
National Security Goals and Stakes	181	(20)
The Cautious Route to Commitment	182	(8)
Exploring the Security Issue	190	(7)
The Domino Theory	197	(4)
Domestic Political Stakes	201	(26)
The Two Phases of American Policy on Vietnam	203	(17)
Practical Political Considerations	220	(7)
The Bureaucracy and the Inner Circle	227	(22)
Career Services and U.S. Stakes in Vietnam	227	(9)
Pressure from the Top and from the Bottom	236	(4)
Concluding Observations about the Imperative Not to Lose	240	(9)
PART THREE Means: The Minimum Necessary and the Maximum Feasible
Constraints	249	(23)
Four Strategies for Winning	252	(6)
The Fate of the ``Winning'' Strategies	258	(9)
Building and Breaching ``Firebreaks''	267	(5)
Pressures and the President	272	(27)
Pressures to Do Both More and Less	273	(5)
Presidential Responses	278	(8)
Presidential Management of the Political System	286	(5)
How the System Helped the President	291	(3)
Strategy and Politics: The Presidents' Dilemmas	294	(5)
PART FOUR Perceptions: Realism, Hope, and Compromise
Optimism, Pessimism, and Credibility	299	(24)
Contradictions and Hedging	300	(2)
The Roots of Internal Estimates	302	(8)
The Cycle of Highs and Lows	310	(8)
Estimates and Escalation	318	(5)
The Strategy of Perseverance	323	(24)
The Stalemated War	324	(7)
Elements of the Strategy	331	(16)
PART FIVE Conclusions
The Lessons of Vietnam	347	(24)
Nixon's and Ford's Policies	348	(4)
How the System Worked	352	(2)
Two Schools of Thought on the Lessons of Vietnam	354	(9)
Recommendations	363	(8)
Documentary Appendix	371	(4)
Bibliographical Note	375	(2)
Index	377