Known and Unknown

by Rumsfeld, Donald

• ISBN13: 9781595230676
• ISBN10: 159523067X
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2011-02-08
• Publisher: Sentinel

Summary

With the same directness that defined his career in public service, Rumsfeld's memoir is filled with previously undisclosed details and insights about the Bush administration, 9/11, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also features Rumsfeld's unique and often surprising observations on eight decades of history: his experiences growing up during the Depression and World War II, his time as a Naval aviator; his service in Congress starting at age 30; his cabinet level positions in the Nixon and Ford White Houses; his assignments in the Reagan administration; and his years as a successful business executive in the private sector. Rumsfeld addresses the challenges and controversies of his illustrious career, from the unseating of the entrenched House Republican leader in 1965, to helping the Ford administration steer the country away from Watergate and Vietnam, to bruising battles over transforming the military for the 21st century, to the war in Iraq, to confronting abuse at Abu Ghraib and allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay. Along the way, he offers his plainspoken, first-hand views and often humorous and surprising anecdotes about some of the world's best known figures, from Margaret Thatcher to Saddam Hussein, from Henry Kissinger to Colin Powell, from Elvis Presley to Dick Cheney, and each American president from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Rumsfeld relies not only on his memory but also on previously unreleased and recently declassified documents. Thousands of pages of documents not yet seen by the public will be made available on an accompanying website. Known and Unknown delivers both a fascinating narrative for today's readers and an unprecedented resource for tomorrow's historians. Proceeds from the sales of Known and Unknown will go to the veterans charities supported by the Rumsfeld Foundation.

Table of Contents

Author's Note	p. xiii
Lessons in Terror	p. 1
Smiling Death	p. 9
Into the Swamp	p. 17
An American, Chicago Born	p. 35
The Last of Spring	p. 40
The Longest of Long Shots	p. 53
The U.S. Congress: From Camelot to Quagmire	p. 67
ôHere, Sir, the People Governö	p. 74
Young Turks	p. 91
In Nixon's Arena	p. 105
1968: Year of Turmoil	p. 110
The Job That Couldn't Be Done	p. 119
Counsellor	p. 130
NATO and Nixon's Fall	p. 147
Javelin Catcher: Inside the Ford White House	p. 161
Restoring Trust	p. 165
A Rocky Start	p. 176
An Agonizing Reappraisal	p. 192
Fighting the Cold War	p. 203
Unfinished Business	p. 207
Turning On the Lights	p. 213
Hold the SALT: Tension over Détente	p. 222
The 1976 Defeat	p. 233
Back to Reality	p. 241
Searle's Sweet Success	p. 245
From Malaise to Morning in America	p. 258
Our Rural Period, Interrupted	p. 267
Leaning Forward	p. 277
Here We Go Again	p. 284
Dogs Don't Bark at Parked Cars	p. 290
Bears in the Woods	p. 305
The National Security Council	p. 316
The Agony of Surprise	p. 331
War President	p. 349
Into the Graveyard of Empires	p. 363
Special Operations	p. 367
Little Birds in a Nest	p. 379
Kabul Falls, Karzai Rises	p. 395
Saddam's Miscalculation	p. 411
Out of the Box	p. 416
The Case for Regime Change	p. 425
A Failure of Diplomacy	p. 443
Exit the Butcher of Baghdad	p. 459
The Occupation of Iraq	p. 471
Catastrophic Success	p. 479
Mission Accomplished?	p. 493
Too Many Hands on the Steering Wheel	p. 508
Liberation from the Occupation	p. 524
Wartime Detention	p. 543
The Least Worst Place	p. 554
The Twentieth Hijacker	p. 574
Law in a Time of War	p. 587
The Road Not Traveled	p. 601
Pulling On Our Boots: Challenges and Controversies Beyond the War Zones	p. 611
Katrina and the Challenge of New Institutions	p. 616
Gardening	p. 627
The Army We Had	p. 645
The Long, Hard Slog	p. 657
Hands Off the Bicycle Seat	p. 661
The Dead Enders	p. 671
Eyes on Afghanistan	p. 681
Iraq's Summer of Violence	p. 692
Farewells	p. 704
After Tides and Hurricanes
Acknowledgments	p. 727
List of Acronyms	p. 731
List of Illustrations	p. 733
Notes	p. 739
Index	p. 793
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Excerpts

Chapter 14
Unfinished Business

I was still serving as White House chief of staff on April 29, 1975, when America’s long and vexing involvement in Vietnam came to a close. A few weeks earlier President Ford had implored the Democratic- controlled Congress to authorize aid to our ally, the beleaguered South Vietnamese. He and Kissinger hoped the funds could bolster the South enough so it could arrange some sort of a truce with the North Vietnamese. But the U.S. Congress had had enough of Vietnam.

When Ford heard that Congress had rejected his request, he was furious. “Those bastards,” he snapped. An evacuation of all of our forces was now inevitable.

Vietnam was the first war in our history that the American people were able to watch unfold on television. That fact made a big difference. As such, we were all witnesses to the heartbreaking scene of U.S. forces executing a humiliating exit while our Vietnamese allies of more than a decade of war faced an uncertain future at the hands of the triumphant Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.

Throughout that long, sad day, I was with President Ford at the White House as he monitored the withdrawal. The American ambassador to Vietnam, Graham Martin, updated us on the number of Americans still waiting to evacuate, as well as the number of Vietnamese clamoring to leave. The second number kept growing.

Many of the Vietnamese who had worked with our forces were understandably desperate to flee from the advancing Northern forces, making use of rafts, small boats, whatever they could find to escape. When our Marines temporarily opened the gates to the embassy in Saigon, thousands of local citizens tried to force their way in, only to be physically pushed back. Martin and his team understandably found it difficult to turn our Vietnamese allies away.

As Martin’s wife departed by helicopter, she reportedly abandoned her suitcase so that space could be made for one more South Vietnamese woman to squeeze onboard.

Eventually it was decided that only American citizens could be airlifted in the short time remaining. The indelible image from that day is the heartbreaking photograph of desperate Vietnamese at a building across from the American embassy, trying to crowd aboard a helicopter departing from its roof. Those who had helped America during the war knew what was coming for them. It was an ignominious retreat for the world’s leading superpower.

David Kennerly, the White House photographer who had earned a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam War photography and understood the power of images as well as anyone, put it succinctly to those of us gathered in the Oval Office with the President that day. “The good news is the war is over,” he said. “The bad news is we lost.”

Secretary of State Kissinger believed that Ambassador Martin would be the last American to leave the country. After word was received that Martin had been airlifted out of the South Vietnamese capital, Kissinger announced to reporters,“Our ambassador has left, and the evacuation can be said to be completed.”

As it turned out, that wasn’t quite true.

After hearing Kissinger’s statement, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger advised us of the problem. The contingent of U.S. Marines assigned to prevent the panicking Vietnamese from flooding our embassy was still on the ground. Somehow there had been a misunderstanding. Kissinger and Schlesinger each considered the other’s department responsible for the miscommunication. The President felt Schlesinger bore responsibility and said he was “damn mad” about it. The last thing Ford needed was another public disagreement between his two top national security cabinet officials.

I discussed the issue in the Oval Office with Ford, Kissinger, and Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary. A few in the room felt we should not issue a correction because the Marines were expected to be airlifted out soon, at which point Kissinger’s statement would be accurate. I disagreed. What if the Marines were overrun and unable to get out? In any event, what we had told the American people simply was not true. That mattered.

“This war has been marked by so many lies and evasions,” I said, “that it is not right to have the war end with one last lie.”

The President agreed. He sent Nessen down to the press room to issue a statement saying that the evacuation had not been completed after all.

Kissinger was not pleased about the correction and again vented his anger at Schlesinger. He wanted the Defense Department to be blamed publicly for the miscommunication.* So the war in Vietnam ended in much the way it had been carried out—with recriminations and regret.

Since my years in Congress, I had had concerns about our country’s involvement in Vietnam—to the point that both President Nixon and Kissinger viewed me as something of a dove on the subject. I hoped they would find a way to bring the war to an orderly close. It seemed to me that we had lost opportunities to actually win the war. During the Nixon administration, I supported the President’s and Defense Secretary Mel Laird’s policy of Vietnamization, which put the emphasis on enabling the Vietnamese to take charge of their own affairs. Even in the final days of the war, there was at least a possibility that we might have been able to salvage something worthwhile from the effort had Congress approved the resources to support the South Vietnamese government—and particularly to fund its army—for a longer period. But Congress was not ready to go against the strong antiwar sentiment in the country.

With the war’s unfortunate end, a great many in our military and among the American people swore they would never again get involved in the tough, bloody business of counterinsurgency. Many wanted to turn inward, ignoring conflicts waged by the Soviet Union and its proxies. Instead of bringing us peace, I feared the chaotic conclusion of Vietnam could result in an even more deadly escalation of the broader Cold War struggle. The withdrawal from Vietnam became a symbol of American weakness—a weakness our adversaries would highlight for years—and an invitation to further aggression.

Even after the pullout from Vietnam, President Ford pleaded with Congress to at least provide military aid to the anticommunists in the region so they could defend themselves. Those pleas, too, were rebuffed. As such, the victory of the Viet Cong was accompanied by the rise of Communist forces in neighboring Laos and Cambodia.

* By the next day Kissinger had cooled down. After a meeting with the President, he said, “Don, I want you to know that I believe you handled the matter last night just right. . . . We would have ended up in a pissing match within the government, and we don’t need that.” He concluded saying, “I owed you that and wanted you to know it.” Kissinger could be a fierce bureaucratic battler, but he also was a man of integrity who would admit when he had erred.