The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law

by Robert E. Scott , Paul B. Stephan

• ISBN13: 9780521858465
• ISBN10: 0521858461
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-08-14
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan identifies the areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation, and where it does not. In particular it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

Table of Contents

Foreword

1. Introduction

2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law

4. A model of optimal enforcement

5. Patterns of international law enforcement

6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement

7. The future of international law enforcement

Glossary

Table of authorities

Index.