Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era

by Robert Buzzanco

• ISBN13: 9780521599405
• ISBN10: 0521599407
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1997-02-28
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Throughout the last decade, defenders of the US role in Vietnam have argued that America’s defeat was not the result of an illegitimate intervention or military shortcomings but rather a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to ‘fight with one hand tied behind their backs.’ In this volume, Robert Buzzanco disproves this theory by demonstrating that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policymakers always understood the problems and peril of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped lead the United States into the war. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the US role in Vietnam.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
List of Abbreviations	xii
Introduction: Losing Battles and Winning Wars	1	(24)
Prologue to Tragedy: U.S. Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam, 1950--1954	25	(30)
Preparing for and Avoiding War: Military Affairs and Politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955--1960	55	(26)
Pinning Down the President: JFK, the Military, and Political Maneuvering over Vietnam, January--October 1961	81	(34)
The Best and Worst of Times: The U.S. War against Vietnam, October 1961--November 1963	115	(38)
``Seeing Things Through in Vietnam'': LBJ, the Military, and the Growing U.S. Commitment to Vietnam, November 1963--December 1964	153	(34)
Hope for the Best, Expect the Worst: U.S. Ground Troops Enter the Vietnam War, January--July 1965	187	(42)
War on Three Fronts: U.S. Forces versus the Viet Cong, Westmoreland versus the Marines, and Military Leaders versus the White House, July 1965--December 1966	229	(46)
``The Platform of False Prophets Is Crowded'': Public Hope and Private Despair in Vietnam, 1967	275	(36)
The Myth of Tet: Military Failure and the Politics of War	311	(30)
Conclusion: Bringing It All Back Home	341	(22)
Epilogue: ``This Is a Real War'': Military Dissent and Politics after Vietnam	353	(10)
Bibliography	363	(16)
Index	379