Moore and Wittgenstein Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense

by Coliva, Annalisa

• ISBN13: 9780230580633
• ISBN10: 0230580637
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-10-15
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

Summary

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Author Biography

Annalisa Coliva is lecturer in philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy, and Associate Director of the Research Centre in Philosophy COGITO, Italy. Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, her publications include several monographs and papers in Italian and English. Her forthcoming books are Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright and The Self and Self-Knowledge.

Table of Contents

Preface to the English Edition	p. vii
Series Editor's Foreword	p. viii
Acknowledgements	p. xi
Abbreviations of cited works	p. xiii
Introduction	p. 1
G. E. Moore: Scepticism, Certainty and Common sense	p. 13
'A defence of common sense'	p. 14
'Proof of an external world'	p. 25
Malcolm: 'common sense' and 'ordinary language'	p. 28
Clarke and Stroud: At the origins of contextualism	p. 37
Moore and Humean scepticism: Wright's interpretation of the proof	p. 42
Moore's comeback: Pryor's dogmatist interpretation	p. 44
Having knowledge and being able to prove that one does	p. 47
Wittgenstein: Belief, Knowledge and Certainty	p. 55
The philosophical use of 'to know'. On the misleading assimilation of 'to know' and 'to believe'	p. 57
The language game with 'to know' and 'I know'. A perspicuous description	p. 60
The grammatical use of 'I know'	p. 74
Wittgenstein and the 'assertion fallacy'	p. 90
Coda. Wittgenstem and semantic contextualism	p. 100
Wittgenstein: Doubts and the Nonsense of Scepticism	p. 103
The language game with 'to doubt': A perspicuous description	p. 104
Some philosophical consequences: Why idealism and scepticism in general are nonsensical	p. 111
Two classical sceptical arguments and Wittgenstein's replies	p. 118
Wittgenstein: Hinges, Certainty, World-Picture and Mythology	p. 149
Only apparently empirical propositions: Examples and preliminary considerations	p. 152
Propositions that characterize a method. The hinges around which all other propositions rotate	p. 161
On the groundlessness of the foundations	p. 166
World-picture	p. 179
Different world-pictures and epistemic relativism?	p. 188
Propositions that might be part of a kind of mythology	p. 203
Conclusion: Moore and Wittgenstein on Epistemology and Language. A Synopsis	p. 208
Truisms, hinges, common sense, world-picture and knowledge	p. 208
Meaning, use and philosophical contexts	p. 209
Scepticism	p. 209
Certainty	p. 210
Epistemic foundationalism and epistemic relativism	p. 210
Notes	p. 211
Bibliography	p. 234
Index	p. 241
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