Moral Aggregation

by Hirose, Iwao

• ISBN13: 9780199933686
• ISBN10: 0199933685
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2014-11-04
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Author Biography

Iwao Hirose is Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department and the School of Environment, McGill University. He is the author of Egalitarianism (2014), co-author of The Ethics of Health Care Rationing (with Greg Bognar, 2014), and co-editor of Weighing and Reasoning (with Andrew Reisner; forthcoming from OUP) and The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (with Jonas Olson; forthcoming from OUP).

Table of Contents

I. A Theory of Aggregation

1 Why Aggregation?
1.1 Aggregation in ethics
1.2 Example I: QALY aggregation
1.3 Example II: Taurek's Rescue Case Rescue Case
1.4 The structure of this book

2 The Structure of Aggregation
2.1 Aggregation defined
2.2 What is aggregative and what is not?
2.3 The structure of interpersonal aggregation
2.3.1 Interpersonal comparability
2.3.2 Impartiality
2.3.3 Pareto
2.3.4 Continuity

3 Formal and Substantive Aggregation
3.1 Counterexample to interpersonal aggregation: the World Cup Case
3.2 Hidden assumptions
3.3 Substantive and formal aggregation aggregation
3.4 Formal aggregation in perspective

4 Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons
4.1 The separateness of persons: Rawls's strict account
4.2 The wider account
4.3 Defusing the wider account
4.4 The separateness objection and contractarianism
4.5 Scanlon's contractualism

5 Intra-Personal Aggregation
5.1 Who supports intra-personal aggregation?
5.2 The structure of intra-personal aggregation
5.3 The objection to intra-personal continuity
5.4 The objection to temporal symmetry

II The Number Problem

6 Taurek's argument for the coin-toss
6.1 Taurek and the Rescue Case
6.2 Taurek (1): the permissibility claim
6.3 Taurek (2): the no-worse claim
6.4 Taurek (3): the equal respect claim
6.5 Two remarks on Taurek's argument Taurek's argument
6.6 Critics of aggregation (1): Nozick
6.7 Critics of aggregation (2): Rawls
6.8 Critics of aggregation (3): Nagel
6.9 Three solutions and many intuitions

7 Four Responses:
Kavka, Kamm, Scanlon, and Schelling
7.1 How to deal with Taurek's claim?
7.2 Kavka on Taurek
7.3 The Kamm-Scanlon argument Kamm-Scanlon argument
7.4 Kamm's Argument for Best Outcomes
7.5 Schelling's probabilistic argument

8 Irrelevant Utilities and Formal Aggregation
8.1 The principle of irrelevant utilities
8.2 The objection to the principle of irrelevant utilities
8.3 Taking unfairness seriously
8.4 The Large Scale Rescue Case revisited
8.5 The force of aggregation

9 Weighted Lotteries
9.1 The third proposal: weighted lotteries
9.2 The appeal of weighted lotteries
9.3 The procedure of proportional chances: two criticisms criticisms
9.4 The general weighted lotteries: two-step criticism
9.5 An additional problem

Conclusion