Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective

by Baker, Lynne Rudder

• ISBN13: 9780199914746
• ISBN10: 0199914745
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2013-05-16
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Author Biography

Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and many more.

Table of Contents

Introduction: What is the Problem?
The Claim of Naturalism
A Challenge to Naturalism
What is at Stake
An Overview

Part I: The Core Argument

Chapter 1. Varieties of Naturalism
What Counts As 'Science'?
Reductive Naturalism
Nonreductive Naturalism
Disenchantment and Optimism

Chapter 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective
What is Naturalization?
The Robust First-Person Perspective
The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective

Chapter 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self
David Lewis on De Se Belief
A Comment on John Searle
Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?

Chapter 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
Daniel Dennett on Consciousness
Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory
My Recommendation

Chapter 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization
From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties
A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties
A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism

Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective

Chapter 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective
The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
Language and the Acquisition of Concepts
How to Acquire a Self-Concept
Human Persons: Wrap Up

Chapter 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent?
Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach
Objections and Replies
Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory
Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped

Chapter 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective
First-Person Properties
Dispositional Properties
Haecceitistic Implications

Chapter 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective
Personhood
Agency
Artifacts
Moral Responsibility

Chapter 10. Natural Reality
Near-Naturalism
Property-Constitution and Causation
Emergentism and Downward Causation
How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?

Index