Noncognitivism in Ethics

by Schroeder; Mark

• ISBN13: 9780415773430
• ISBN10: 0415773431
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-04-14
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. Noncognitivism in Ethicsis an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with a general introduction to metaethics, Mark Schroeder introduces and assesses three principal kinds of noncognitivist theory: the speech-act theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, the expressivist theories of Blackburn and Gibbard, and hybrid theories. He pays particular attention both to the philosophical problems about what moral facts could be about or how they could matter which noncognitivism seeks to solve, and to the deep problems that it faces, including the task of explaining both the nature of moral thought and the complexity of moral attitudes, and the '¬ÜFrege-Geach'¬" problem. Schroeder makes even the most difficult material accessible by offering crucial background along the way. Also included are exercises at the end of each chapter, chapter summaries, and a glossary of technical terms - making Noncognitivism in Ethicsessential reading for all students of ethics and metaethics.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	p. ix
Preface	p. xi
The problems of metaethics	p. 1
What is metaethics?	p. 1
The core questions (i): metaphysics and epistemology	p. 4
The core questions (ii): mind and language	p. 6
The motivation problem	p. 9
Noncognitivism in ethics	p. 12
Chapter summary	p. 15
Further reading	p. 15
Exercises	p. 16
Morals	p. 17
References	p. 18
The noncognitivist turn	p. 20
Where we are	p. 20
What the heck was emotivism?	p. 21
Stevenson	p. 23
Truth-conditional semantics	p. 26
Hare's prescriptivism	p. 30
Noncognitivism recharacterized	p. 33
Chapter summary	p. 35
Further reading	p. 35
Exercises	p. 36
Partial answers	p. 39
Morals	p. 40
References	p. 40
The Frege-Geach problem, 1939-70	p. 41
The basic problem	p. 41
Geach	p. 44
Hare and compositional semantics	p. 47
The contrast with truth functions	p. 50
The Hare-Smart argument from license for optimism	p. 54
Chapter summary	p. 57
Further reading	p. 58
Exercises	p. 58
Partial answers	p. 62
Morals	p. 62
References	p. 64
Expressivism	p. 65
Speaker subjectivism	p. 65
Two problems with speaker subjectivism	p. 67
The basic expressivist maneuver	p. 70
Expressivism contrasted with earlier views	p. 74
Chapter summary	p. 76
Further reading	p. 76
Exercises	p. 77
Partial answers	p. 80
Morals	p. 80
References	p. 81
Moral thought	p. 83
The variety of attitudes	p. 83
A putative problem	p. 85
Disagreement	p. 88
The challenge from CAIR	p. 92
Other challenges	p. 95
Chapter summary	p. 98
Further reading	p. 98
Exercises	p. 98
Partial answers	p. 103
Morals	p. 103
References	p. 104
The Frege-Geach problem, 1973-88	p. 105
The Frege-Geach challenge	p. 105
What do we need from an account of the meaning of conditional sentences?	p. 107
Recipes and explanations	p. 110
The involvement account	p. 112
Higher-Order Attitudes	p. 115
Problems with Higher-Order Attitude accounts	p. 118
The challenge remaining	p. 122
Chapter summary	p. 123
Further reading	p. 123
Exercises	p. 123
Partial answers	p. 126
Morals	p. 126
References	p. 127
The Frege-Geach problem, 1988-2006	p. 128
Where we are	p. 128
Gibbardish semantics	p. 129
Non-constructive and unexplanatory	p. 131
The negation problem	p. 134
The hierarchy of attitudes	p. 137
Inferential-commitment theories	p. 139
Chapter summary	p. 142
Further reading	p. 142
Exercises	p. 142
Partial answers	p. 148
Morals	p. 148
References	p. 149
Truth and objectivity	p. 151
The problem of truth	p. 151
Correspondence vs. deflationism	p. 153
Deflationism and truth-aptness	p. 155
Expressivist deflationism	p. 159
More transcendental arguments	p. 161
Objectivity	p. 162
Chapter summary	p. 165
Further reading	p. 165
Exercises	p. 165
Partial answers	p. 171
References	p. 171
Epistemology: wishful thinking	p. 172
Wishful thinking	p. 172
The shape of the problem	p. 174
Enoch on accepting P2	p. 177
Lenman on evidence for P1 and P2	p. 179
The second fork?	p. 182
Other problems in epistemology	p. 183
Chapter summary	p. 184
Further reading	p. 184
Exercises	p. 185
Partial answers	p. 187
Morals	p. 188
References	p. 188
The hybrid gambit	p. 189
Pejoratives and license for optimism	p. 189
Cheap advantages of hybrid theories	p. 192
What is the 'something extra'?	p. 195
The advantages of noncognitivism	p. 199
The Big Hypothesis and judgment internalism	p. 201
Chapter summary	p. 205
Further reading	p. 205
Exercises	p. 206
Partial answers	p. 209
References	p. 210
Prospects and applications	p. 211
What we've learned so far	p. 211
New directions	p. 214
Applications - epistemic modals	p. 216
Applications - truth and conditionals	p. 219
Directions for progress	p. 220
Chapter summary	p. 222
Further reading	p. 222
Exercises	p. 222
Morals	p. 224
References	p. 224
Glossary	p. 225
Notes	p. 231
Bibliography	p. 235
Index	p. 247
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