Ontological Categories

by Westerhoff, Jan

• ISBN13: 9780199285044
• ISBN10: 0199285047
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2006-01-05
• Publisher: Clarendon Press

Summary

The concept of an ontological category is central to metaphysics. Metaphysicians argue about which category of existence an object should be assigned to, whether one category can be reduced to another one, or whether there might be different equally adequate systems of categorization. Answers to these questions presuppose a clear understanding of what precisely an ontological category is, and Jan Westerhoff now provides the first in-depth analysis. After examining a variety of attempted definitions, he proceeds to argue for a new understanding of ontological categories, according to which they are systematizations of our knowledge of the world rather than essential characteristics of the world itself. Metaphysicians will find his work highly stimulating.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(11)
I Sample cases: systems of ontological categories	12	(10)
§1 Some examples	12	(6)
§2 Common features	18	(4)
II Attempted definitions of 'ontological category'	22	(43)
1. Unsatisfying accounts	22	(3)
§3 Defeatism	22	(1)
§4 Laundry-lists	23	(1)
§5 Possible bases for an account	24	(1)
2. Accounts in terms of generality	25	(15)
§6 Norton's account	25	(1)
§7 A better account of generality	26	(2)
§8 The persistence of the problem	28	(1)
§9 Categories as semantically redundant: Katz's account	29	(2)
§10 A graph-theoretic view of redundancy rules	31	(2)
§11 Advantages and problems of Katz's account	33	(1)
§12 The further persistence of the problem	34	(4)
§13 A list-based account	38	(2)
3. Accounts based on intersubstitutability	40	(19)
§14 Notions of intersubstitutability	41	(1)
§15 Grammatical categories: The standard account	42	(1)
§16 Unsatisfying solutions	43	(2)
§17 Grammatical categories: Husserl's account	45	(1)
§18 Ontological categories: Getting ontology from grammar?	46	(2)
§19 Ontological categories: The Ryle—Sommers account.	48	(2)
§20 Smart's criticism	50	(1)
§21 Carnap's concept of ontological statements	51	(3)
§22 Metaontological implications of this	54	(1)
§23 Containment of categories	55	(2)
§24 Sommers' law	57	(2)
4. Accounts in terms of identity	59	(6)
§25 The Frege-Dummett account	59	(3)
§26 Ultimate sortals	62	(2)
§27 Essential properties	64	(1)
III A world of states of affairs	65	(25)
1. The centrality of states of affairs	66	(11)
§28 Cognitional arguments	67	(5)
§29 Semantic arguments	72	(5)
2. The priority of states of affairs over their constituents	77	(13)
§30 The complex principle	78	(1)
§31 Analysis, decomposition, and dependence	79	(2)
§32 Kinds of dependence	81	(2)
§33 Epistemic and existential dependence	83	(2)
§34 Uniqueness of constituents	85	(1)
§35 The complex principle and states of affairs	86	(4)
IV Categories in an ontology of states of affairs	90	(54)
1. Form-sets and base-sets	90	(14)
§36 States of affairs and their constituents	90	(2)
§37 The 'fitting' of constituents	92	(4)
§38 Form-sets and base-sets	96	(3)
§39 Motivation for introducing base-sets	99	(1)
§40 Weak and strong form-sets	99	(2)
§41 Dealing with too specific categories	101	(2)
§42 A simple model	103	(1)
2. Form-sets	104	(14)
§43 Mereology and states of affairs	105	(2)
§44 The overlap relations	107	(4)
§45 Problems with quasi-analysis	111	(1)
§46 Some formalism for the notion of a complex	112	(4)
§47 Typing data	116	(1)
§48 Containment of types	117	(1)
3. Base-sets	118	(18)
§49 Constructing categories	118	(5)
§50 Local relativism	123	(4)
§51 Constructs and originals	127	(1)
§52 Adequacy of constructs	128	(2)
§53 Construction and paraphrase	130	(2)
§54 Global relativism	132	(2)
§55 Base-sets and axioms	134	(2)
4. Base-sets as ontological categories	136	(8)
§56 Cut-off point problem and too special categories	136	(1)
§57 Sommers' law and hierarchical structure	137	(2)
§58 Flexibility of the base-set account	139	(1)
§59 Ontological categories without states of affairs	140	(4)
V Individuals and properties in an ontology of states of affairs	144	(55)
1. Typings and their transformations	146	(24)
§60 The problem	146	(1)
§61 Data and conventions	147	(2)
§62 A graph-theoretic perspective	149	(4)
§63 Ontological import of transformations	153	(3)
§64 The flexibility result	156	(1)
§65 Expansions: adding more of the same	157	(3)
§66 Expansions: the polyadic case	160	(2)
§67 Tightening the type-form conventions	162	(2)
§68 Rigidity	164	(2)
§69 Cardinality	166	(3)
§70 Proto-typings	169	(1)
2. Frege's distinction between individuals and properties	170	(5)
§71 Saturation and complexes	170	(2)
§72 Defining the Frege hierarchy	172	(1)
§73 Extending the Frege hierarchy	173	(2)
3. Criticism of the Fregean account of saturation	175	(7)
§74 Analyses of unsaturatedness	175	(2)
§75 Ramsey's criticism	177	(2)
§76 Morals to draw	179	(3)
4. Adding Logic	182	(17)
§77 Quantificational reasoning	183	(2)
§78 Distinguishing objects through their logics	185	(3)
§79 Blind logic	188	(2)
§80 Ordered application	190	(1)
§81 Ordered states of affairs and natural language	191	(1)
§82 Distinctions which can be drawn	192	(1)
§83 Structural ontological distinctions	193	(6)
VI Philosophical implications	199	(39)
1. Main assumptions and their interaction	199	(8)
§84 Main assumptions	199	(4)
§85 Putting the assumptions to work	203	(4)
2. Main implications of our account	207	(12)
§86 Relativism	207	(1)
§87 Holism	208	(5)
§88 Individuals and properties	213	(4)
§89 The significance of ontological categories	217	(2)
3. Comparisons: parallels and differences	219	(19)
§90 Objects and logical form	219	(3)
§91 Structuralist logic	222	(4)
§92 Quantification	226	(2)
§93 Logical constants and ontological form	228	(4)
§94 Factualism and trope theory	232	(2)
§95 Situation semantics	234	(4)
Appendix	238	(7)
§96 Complex descriptions and type descriptions: an example	238	(1)
§97 Generating a containment hierarchy: an example	239	(3)
§98 Proof of the flexibility result	242	(1)
§99 Proof of the uniqueness of proto-typings	243	(2)
Bibliography	245	(12)
Index	257