Order Without Law

by Ellickson, Robert C.

• ISBN13: 9780674641693
• ISBN10: 0674641698
• Edition: Reprint
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1994-03-15
• Publisher: Harvard Univ Pr

Summary

In Order without Law Robert C. Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules-social norms-that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson's theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In "The Problem of Social Cost" --the most frequently cited article on law--economist Ronald H. Cease depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson's field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase's vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord-tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(14)
Part I. Shasta County
Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry	15	(14)
The Politics of Cattle Trespass	29	(11)
The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes	40	(25)
Who Pays for Boundary Fences?	65	(17)
Disputes Arising out of Higway Collisions Involving Livestock	82	(22)
The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances	104	(19)
Part II. A Theory of Norms
The System of Social Control	123	(14)
Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control	137	(19)
The Puzzle of Cooperation	156	(11)
A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms	167	(17)
Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales	184	(23)
Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks	207	(23)
Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship	230	(10)
Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies	240	(27)
Part III The Future of Norms
Testing the Content of Norms	267	(13)
Conclusions and Implications	280	(9)
Appendix. Research Methods	289	(4)
Index	293