More New and Used
from Private Sellers
Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.
Questions About This Book?
What version or edition is this?
This is the 3rd edition with a publication date of 3/23/2009.
What is included with this book?
- The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any CDs, lab manuals, study guides, etc.
A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Many paradoxes raise serious philosophical problems, and they are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. The expanded and revised third edition of this intriguing book considers a range of knotty paradoxes including Zeno's paradoxical claim that the runner can never overtake the tortoise, a new chapter on paradoxes about morals, paradoxes about belief, and hardest of all, paradoxes about truth. The discussion uses a minimum of technicality but also grapples with complicated and difficult considerations, and is accompanied by helpful questions designed to engage the reader with the arguments. The result is not only an explanation of paradoxes but also an excellent introduction to philosophical thinking.
R.M. Sainsbury is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. He was editor of the journal Mind for a decade from 1990 and his many publications include Reference Without Referents (2005, 2007) and Logical Forms, 2nd edition (2000).
Table of Contents
|Foreword to third edition||p. vii|
|Suggested reading||p. 3|
|Zeno's paradoxes: space, time, and motion||p. 4|
|The Racetrack||p. 11|
|The Racetrack again||p. 15|
|Achilles and the Tortoise||p. 19|
|The Arrow||p. 19|
|Suggested reading||p. 21|
|Moral paradoxes||p. 22|
|Crime Reduction||p. 22|
|Mixed Blessings||p. 27|
|Not Being Sorry||p. 31|
|Moral dilemmas||p. 34|
|Suggested reading||p. 39|
|Vagueness: the paradox of the heap||p. 40|
|Sorites paradoxes: preliminaries||p. 40|
|Sorites paradoxes: some options||p. 46|
|Accepting the conclusion: Unger's view||p. 48|
|Rejecting the premises: the epistemic theory||p. 49|
|Rejecting the premises: supervaluations||p. 51|
|Rejecting the reasoning: degrees of truth||p. 56|
|Vague objects?||p. 63|
|Suggested reading||p. 66|
|Acting rationally||p. 69|
|Newcomb's paradox||p. 69|
|The Prisoner's Dilemma||p. 82|
|Suggested reading||p. 88|
|Believing rationally||p. 90|
|Paradoxes of confirmation||p. 90|
|The paradox of the Ravens||p. 95|
|The Unexpected Examination||p. 107|
|Revising the Unexpected Examination||p. 110|
|The Knower||p. 115|
|Suggested reading||p. 120|
|Classes and truth||p. 123|
|Russell's paradox||p. 123|
|The Liar: semantic defects||p. 127|
|Grounding and truth||p. 129|
|The Strengthened Liar||p. 132|
|Indexical circularity||p. 139|
|Comparison: how similar are Russell's paradox and the Liar?||p. 142|
|Suggested reading||p. 145|
|Are any contradictions acceptable?||p. 150 è|
|Contradictions entail everything||p. 151|
|A sentence which is both true and false could have no intelligible content||p. 152|
|Three dualities||p. 153|
|Falsehood and untruth||p. 157|
|Suggested reading||p. 158|
|Some more paradoxes||p. 160|
|Remarks on some text questions and appended paradoxes||p. 168|
|Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.|