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The first part of the book sets out how the theory enables rich, layered perception. The theory's probabilistic and statistical foundations are explained using examples from empirical research and analogies to different forms of inference. The second part uses the simple mechanism in an explanation of problematic cases of how we manage to represent, and sometimes misrepresent, the world in health as well as in mental illness. The third part looks into the mind, and shows how the theory accounts for attention, conscious unity, introspection, self and the privacy of our mental world.
Jakob Hohwy is a philosopher engaged in both conceptual and experimental research. He works on problems in philosophy of mind about perception, neuroscience, and mental illness. At the same time, he collaborates with neuroscientists and psychiatrists, conducting experiments that put philosophical ideas to the test and that bring philosophical concerns into the lab. Hohwy completed his PhD at the Australian National University, his Masters degree at St Andrews University in Scotland, and his basic philosophy training in Denmark. He has set up the Philosophy and Cognition lab in the Philosophy Department at Monash University in Melbourne.
Table of Contents
Part I: The Mechanism
1. Perception as causal inference
2. Prediction error minimisation
3. Prediction error, context, and precision
4. Action and expected experience
Part II: The World
5. Binding is inference
6. Is predicting seeing?
7. Precarious prediction
8. Surprise and misrepresentation
Part III: The Mind
9. Precision, attention, and consciousness
10. Perceptual unity in action
11. The fragile mirror of nature
12. Into the predictive mind
Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction