Preference, Belief, and Similarity Selected Writings

by Tversky, Amos; Shafir, Eldar

• ISBN13: 9780262700931
• ISBN10: 026270093X
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2003-11-21
• Publisher: Bradford Books

Summary

Amos Tversky (19371996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics. This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.

Author Biography

Amos Tversky (1937–1996) was a mathematical psychologist whose research in the cognitive and decision sciences has been enormously influential. From 1978 to 1996, Tversky taught at Stanford University, where he was the inaugural David-Brack Professor of Behavioral Sciences and Principal Investigator at the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation.

Eldar Shafir, a student, close friend, and collaborator of Tversky's, is Class of 1987 Professor of Behavioral Science and Public Policy at Princeton University.

Table of Contents

Introduction and Biography	p. ix
Sources	p. xv
Similarity	p. 1
Editor's Introductory Remarks	p. 3
Features of Similarity	p. 7
Additive Similarity Trees	p. 47
Studies of Similarity	p. 75
Weighting Common and Distinctive Features in Perceptual and Conceptual Judgments	p. 97
Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological Spaces	p. 129
On the Relation between Common and Distinctive Feature Models	p. 171
Judgment	p. 187
Editor's Introductory Remarks	p. 189
Belief in the Law of Small Numbers	p. 193
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases	p. 203
Extensional vs. Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment	p. 221
The Cold Facts about the "Hot Hand" in Basketball	p. 257
Editor's Introductory Remarks to Chapter 11	p. 267
The "Hot Hand": Statistical Reality or Cognitive Illusion?	p. 269
The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence	p. 275
On the Evaluation of Probability Judgments: Calibration, Resolution, and Monotonicity	p. 301
Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability	p. 329
On the Belief That Arthritis Pain Is Related to the Weather	p. 377
Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory	p. 383
Preference	p. 403
Editor's Introductory Remarks	p. 405
Probabilistic Models of Choice	p. 411
On the Optimal Number of Alternatives at a Choice Point	p. 413
Substitutability and Similarity in Binary Choices	p. 419
The Intransitivity of Preferences	p. 433
Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice	p. 463
Preference Trees	p. 493
Choice under Risk and Uncertainty	p. 547
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk	p. 549
On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies	p. 583
Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions	p. 593
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice	p. 621
Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty	p. 645
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty	p. 673
Thinking through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice	p. 703
Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective	p. 729
Weighing Risk and Uncertainty	p. 747
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance	p. 777
A Belief-Based Account of Decision under Uncertainty	p. 795
Contingent Preferences	p. 823
Self-Deception and the Voter's Illusion	p. 825
Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice	p. 845
Anomalies: Preference Reversals	p. 875
Discrepancy between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for Groups	p. 887
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model	p. 895
Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being	p. 917
Reason-Based Choice	p. 937
Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making	p. 963
Amos Tversky's Complete Bibliography	p. 995
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