Public Choice and Public Law

by Stearns, Maxwell L.

• ISBN13: 9780870848063
• ISBN10: 0870848062
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1997-04-01
• Publisher: Anderson Pub Co

Table of Contents

Foreword	xi	(6)
Preface	xvii	(14)
Table of Contents	xxxi
Chapter 1 An Introduction to Public Choice	1	(254)
1:1 The Public Choice Assumptions: Rationality and Self Interest	3	(70)
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987)	5	(31)
Daniel A. Farber
Philip P. Frickey
Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1988)	36	(7)
Abner J. Mikva
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1988)	43	(15)
Michael E. DeBow
Dwight R. Lee
Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1013 (1988)	58	(5)
Daniel A. Farber
Philip P. Frickey
Both Sides in 4-Vote Squeaker Seek 2d Connecticut Recount Special to the New York Times, (November 19, 1994, Saturday, Late Edition-Final)	63	(1)
Notes and Questions	64	(9)
1:2 Economic Reasoning: An Introduction to Modeling	73	(182)
Introduction	75	(2)
Case Study: The Item Veto	77	(57)
The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49:2 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 385 (1992)	77	(24)
Maxwell L. Stearns
Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 Va. L. Rev. 408 (1988)	101	(9)
Glen O. Robinson
Notes and Questions	110	(24)
Case Study: The Nondelegation Doctrine	134	(70)
A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1982)	134	(46)
Peter H. Aranson
Ernest Gellhorn
Glen O. Robinson
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. Law, Econ. And Org. 81 (1985)	180	(17)
Jerry Mashaw
Notes and Questions	197	(7)
Case Study: The Scope of Judicial Review	204	(51)
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991)	204	(42)
Einer R. Elhauge
Notes and Questions	246	(9)
Chapter 2 An Introduction to Social Choice	255	(218)
2:1 The Cycle, The Condorcet Paradox, and the Empty Core	257	(116)
Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 Va. L. Rev. 971 (1989)	258	(37)
Saul Levmore
The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219 (1994)	295	(60)
Maxwell L. Stearns
Notes and Questions	355	(18)
2:2 Institutional Implications of Social Choice	373	(100)
Introduction	373	(2)
Case Study: Applications to Congress	375	(43)
Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 145 (1992)	375	(18)
Saul Levmore
Congress is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 Int. Rev. Law and Econ. 239 (1992)	393	(16)
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Notes and Questions	409	(9)
Case Study: Applications to Federal Courts	418	(55)
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982)	418	(22)
Frank H. Easterbrook
Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986)	440	(25)
Lewis A. Kornhauser
Lawrence G. Sager
Notes and Questions	465	(8)
Chapter 3 Applications of Covered Concepts	473	(496)
Introduction	475	(2)
3:1 Stare Decisis and the Structure of Appellate Courts	477	(76)
Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 736 (1993)	479	(26)
Erin O'Hara
An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 63 (1989)	505	(20)
Lewis Kornhauser
The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 93 (1989)	525	(15)
Jonathan R. Macey
Notes and Questions	540	(13)
3:2 Legislative Intent and Public Choice	553	(171)
Introduction	555	(2)
Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983)	557	(15)
Frank Easterbrook
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179 (1986)	572	(27)
Richard A. Posner
Promoting Public Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986)	599	(30)
Jonathan R. Macey
Notes and Questions	629	(12)
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423 (1988)	641	(30)
Daniel A. Farber
Philip P. Frickey
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988)	671	(41)
William N. Eskridge
Notes and Questions	712	(12)
3:3 The Economics of Litigation	724	(61)
Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal Studies 51 (1977)	727	(11)
Paul Rubin
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Studies 65 (1977)	738	(15)
George L. Priest
What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993)	753	(26)
Richard A. Posner
Notes and Questions	779	(6)
3:4 Topics in Constitutional Law	785	(138)
Standing (and Stare Decisis Reconsidered)	787	(90)
Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309 (1995)	787	(83)
Maxwell L. Stearns
Notes and Questions	870	(7)
Federalism	877	(24)
Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265 (1990)	877	(18)
Jonathan Macey
Notes and Questions	895	(6)
Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Rights	901	(22)
Article Summary: Lynn Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 Geo. L. J. 1787 (1992)	901	(8)
Article Summary: Richard McAdams, Intra-Group Cooperation and Inter-Group Conflict: The Economics of Status Production and Race Discrimination, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1003 (1995)	909	(11)
Notes and Questions	920	(3)
3:5 Proposals for Constitutional Reform	923	(46)
Term Limits and the Balanced Budget Amendment	925	(44)
Term Limits, 80 Geo. L.J. 477 (1992)	925	(36)
Linda Cohen
Matthew Spitzer
Notes and Questions	961	(8)
Indices	969	(2)
Table of Cases	971	(6)
Table of Authorities	977	(26)
Table of Miscellaneous Authorities	1003	(4)
Subject Matter Index	1007