Radical, Religious, and Violent The New Economics of Terrorism

by Berman, Eli

• ISBN13: 9780262516679
• ISBN10: 0262516675
• Edition: Reprint
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2011-09-30
• Publisher: The MIT Press

Summary

How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In [title], Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best understood as rational altruists seeking to help their own communities. Yet despite the vast pool of potential recruits--young altruists who feel their communities are repressed or endangered--there are less than a dozen highly lethal terrorist organizations in the world capable of sustained and coordinated violence that threatens governments and makes hundreds of millions of civilians hesitate before boarding an airplane. What's special about these organizations, and why are most of their followers religious radicals?Drawing on parallel research on radical religious Jews, Christians, and Muslims, Berman shows that the most lethal terrorist groups have a common characteristic: their leaders have found a way to control defection. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban, for example, built loyalty and cohesion by means of mutual aid, weeding out "free riders" and producing a cadre of members they could rely on. The secret of their deadly effectiveness lies in their resilience and cohesion when incentives to defect are strong.These insights suggest that provision of basic social services by competent governments adds a critical, nonviolent component to counterterrorism strategies. It undermines the violent potential of radical religious organizations without disturbing free religious practice, being drawn into theological debates with Jihadists, or endangering civilians.

Author Biography

Eli Berman is Professor of Economics at the University of California, San Diego, and Research Director of international Security Studies at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. ix
Note to Readers	p. xiii
Why Are Religious Terrorists So Lethal?	p. 1
Hezbollah	p. 2
The Taliban	p. 4
Hamas	p. 6
The Lethality of Religious Radicals	p. 7
What Motivates Terrorists? The Afterlife and Other Myths	p. 9
Terrorist OrganizationsùWhy So Few?	p. 13
Internal Economies and Organizational Efficiency	p. 15
What's Coming?	p. 20
The Defection Constraint	p. 29
Origins of the Taliban	p. 30
Trade Routes and Defection	p. 34
Coordinated Assault	p. 38
Terrorism and DefectionùHamas	p. 40
The Jewish UndergroundùTerrorists Who Overreached	p. 46
Hezbollah and Suicide Attacks	p. 50
The Mahdi Army in Iraq	p. 56
Sects, Prohibitions, and Mutual Aid: The Organizational Secrets of Religious Radicals	p. 61
Prohibitions and Sacrificesùthe Benign Puzzles	p. 64
Where Are the Dads?	p. 68
Mutual Aid	p. 15
Prohibitions and Clubs	p. 78
Evidence	p. 81
Fertility	p. 85
Pronatalist Prohibitions	p. 89
Radical Islam and Fertility	p. 91
Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice	p. 95
Subsidized Sacrifice	p. 101
Madrassas	p. 108
Subsidized Prohibitions and Fertility	p. 111
How Many Radical Islamists?	p. 116
Recap	p. 118
The Hamas Model: Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists	p. 121
The "Hamas Model"	p. 121
Origins of the Model	p. 123
Hamas	p. 129
Social Service Provision by the Taliban, Hezbollah, and al-Sadr	p. 132
"Why Religious Radicals Are Such Lethal Terrorists	p. 134
Terrorist Clubs	p. 138
Evidence	p. 140
When Terrorists Fail	p. 145
Clubs and Violence without Religion	p. 147
Gratuitous Cruelty	p. 149
Objections	p. 152
Why Suicide Attacks?	p. 157
Rebels, Insurgents, and Terrorists	p. 158
Suicide Attacks	p. 164
Evidence	p. 168
Coreligionists Are Soft Targets	p. 171
Clubs	p. 173
Alternative Explanations	p. 178
The Future of Suicide Attacks?	p. 179
Constructive Counterterrorism	p. 183
How Terrorist Clubs Succeed	p. 185
Constructive Counterterrorism	p. 187
What's Wrong with the Old-Fashioned Methods?	p. 196
Where to Start?	p. 198
The Malayan Precedent	p. 200
Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World	p. 211
Radical Christians, Benign and Violent	p. 214
The Supernatural and Credibility	p. 217
Markets and Denominations	p. 221
Jewish and Muslim Denominations	p. 223
What's Wrong with Religion in Government? Competition and Pluralism	p. 229
Not about Us	p. 235
What's Our Role?	p. 238
Analytical Appendix	p. 241
The Defection Constraint	p. 241
Clubs, Loyalty, and Outside Options	p. 243
Suicide Attacks vs. Hard Targets	p. 244
Protecting Hard Targets by Improving Outside Options	p. 248
Notes	p. 251
References	p. 273
Index	p. 285
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