Rules and Choice in Economics: Essays in Constitutional Political Economy

by Vanberg; Viktor J.

• ISBN13: 9780415094795
• ISBN10: 0415094798
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 1994-12-20
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Rules and Choice in Economicsis concerned with how the rules and institutions which are the basis of cooperation in society can be systematically explained. Economics, with its emphasis on individual choice, seems unable to account for individuals following rules when it is not in their interest to do so. Sociology, which can explain such rule-following behavior, struggles to account for purposeful individual action. In the place of these models, Viktor J. Vanberg offers an account which cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries. Analyzing the work of thinkers including Hayek, Rawls, Nozick and Coleman, Vanberg addresses issues such as rational choice, rule following behavior, self-interest and morality. The book pays particular attention to a comparison of Hayek's evolutionary liberalism and Buchanan's contractarian liberalism. Taken together the various parts of the volume represent a coherent theoretical argument about why institutions cohere and why theychange.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	p. vii
Introduction	p. 1
The Reason of Rules	p. 9
Rules and Choice in Economics and Sociology	p. 11
Rational Choice vs Adaptive Rule-Following	p. 25
Rationality and Morality	p. 39
Morality and Economics	p. 41
Rational Choice and Moral Order	p. 60
The Evolution of Rules	p. 75
Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules	p. 77
Hayekian Evolutionism- A Reconstruction	p. 95
Rules in Markets and Organizations	p. 107
Hayek's Constitutional Political Economy	p. 109
Organizations as Constitutional Systems	p. 125
Carl Menger's Evolutionary and John R. Commons's Collective Action Approach to Institutions	p. 144
Constitutional Choice	p. 165
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice	p. 167
Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance and the Limits of Reason	p. 178
Legitimacy in Constitutional Order	p. 193
Liberal Evolutionism and Contractarian Constitutionalism	p. 195
Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints	p. 208
Notes	p. 235
Bibliography	p. 293
Index	p. 305
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.