Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to Mitigate Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas

by Edited by Richard C. Feiock , John T. Scholz

• ISBN13: 9780521764933
• ISBN10: 0521764939
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-10-26
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This book investigates the self-organizing responses of governments and interests to the institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas of particular concern to students of federalism, urban governance, and regional management of natural resources. ICA dilemmas arise in fragmented systems whenever decisions by one independent formal authority do not consider costs or benefits imposed on others. The ICA framework analyzes networks, joint projects, partnerships, and other mechanisms developed by affected parties to mitigate ICA decision externalities. These mechanisms play a widespread role in federalist systems by reshaping incentives to encourage coordination/cooperation. The empirical studies of urban service delivery and regional integration of regional resource management address three questions: How does a given mechanism mitigate costs of uncoordinated decisions? What incentives do potential members have to create the mechanism? How do incentives induced by the mitigating mechanism affect its sustainability in a changing environment and its adaptability to other ICA dilemmas?

Table of Contents

List of Figures	p. vii
List of Tables	p. ix
Contributors	p. xi
Preface	p. xv
Self-Organizing Versus Centralized Solutions to Institutional Collective Action Problems: Theoretical Considerations
Self-Organizing Governance of Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas: An Overview	p. 3
Can Consolidation Preserve Local Autonomy? Mitigating Vertical and Horizontal Dilemmas	p. 33
The Institutional Collective Action Perspective on Self-Organizing Mechanisms: Market Failures and Transaction Cost Problems	p. 51
Conflict, Power, and Irreconcilable Preferences: Some Limits to Self-Organizing Mechanisms	p. 73
Integrating Metropolitan Service Provision: Networks, Contracts, Agreements, and Special Districts
Adaptive versus Restrictive Contracts: Can They Resolve Different Risk Problems?	p. 91
Do Risk Profiles of Services Alter Contractual Patterns? A Comparison across Multiple Metropolitan Services	p. 114
Special Districts versus Contracts: Complements or Substitutes?	p. 142
The Political Market for Intergovernmental Cooperation	p. 161
Integrating Regional Policies Through Networks, Joint Ventures, and Partnerships
Collaborative Institutions, Functional Areas, and Beliefs: What Are Their Roles in Policy Networks?	p. 179
Sustaining Joint Ventures: The Role of Resource Exchange and the Strength of Interorganizational Relationships	p. 204
Institutional Collective Action in an Ecology of Games	p. 229
Enhancing Vertical and Horizontal Self-Organizing: Harnessing Informal Networks to Integrate Policies within and between Governments in the European Union	p. 261
Self-Organizing Governance and Institutional Collective Action
Self-Organizing Mechanisms for Mitigating Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas: An Assessment and Research Agenda	p. 285
References	p. 319
Index	p. 341
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