The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War

by Ro'i, Yaacov

• ISBN13: 9780804758802
• ISBN10: 0804758808
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2008-04-07
• Publisher: Stanford Univ Pr

Summary

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources,The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day Waranswers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently publishedFoxbats over Dimonaby Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.

Author Biography

Yaacov Roi is professor emeritus of history at Tel Aviv University. Boris Morozov is Research Fellow at the Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Table of Contents

Preface
Introduction
Soviet Policy toward the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow's Relations with Egypt and Syria	p. 1
The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation	p. 43
A Paper Bear: Similarities and Contrasts in Soviet Involvement in the 1956 and 1967 Wars	p. 65
American Perceptions of the Soviet Threat before and during the Six Day War	p. 102
The Israeli Evaluation of the Soviet Position on the Eve of the Six Day War	p. 122
The Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean at the Time of the Six Day War	p. 144
Eastern Europe and the Six Day War: The Case of Bulgaria	p. 172
The "Seventh Day" of the Six Day War: The Soviet Intervention in the War of Attrition (1969-1970)	p. 198
The Soviet Jewish Reaction to the Six Day War	p. 251
Conclusions	p. 268
Selected Documents	p. 281
Contributors	p. 355
Index	p. 357
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