The Struggle against Dogmatism

by Kuusela, Oskari

• ISBN13: 9780674027718
• ISBN10: 067402771X
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2008-04-30
• Publisher: Harvard Univ Pr

Summary

Searching for rigor and a clear grasp of the essential features of their objects of investigation, philosophers are often driven to exaggerations and harmful simplifications. According to Ludwig Wittgensteinrs"s provocative suggestion, this has to do with confusions relating to the status of philosophical statements. The Struggle against Dogmatism elucidates his view that there are no theses, doctrines, or theories in philosophy. Even when this claim is taken seriously, explanations of what it means are problematic-typically involving a relapse to theses. This book makes Wittgensteinrs"s philosophical approach comprehensible by presenting it as a response to specific problems relating to the practice of philosophy, in particular the problem of dogmatism. Although the focus of this book is on Wittgensteinrs"s later work, Oskari Kuusela also discusses Wittgensteinrs"s early philosophy as expressed in the Tractatus, as well as the relation between his early and later work. In the light of this account of Wittgensteinrs"s critique of his early thought, Kuusela is able to render concrete what Wittgenstein means by philosophizing without theses or theories. In his later philosophy, Kuusela argues, Wittgenstein establishes a non-metaphysical (though not anti-metaphysical) approach to philosophy without philosophical hierarchies. This method leads to an increase in the flexibility of philosophical thought without a loss in rigor.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. xi
Abbreviations	p. xv
Introduction	p. 1
Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems: From One Fundamental Problem to Particular Problems	p. 17
The Tractatus on philosophical problems	p. 18
Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems	p. 27
Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings	p. 30
Tendencies and inclinations of thinking: philosophy as therapy	p. 43
Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy: the contrast with the Tractatus	p. 46
Two Conceptions of Clarification	p. 54
The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis	p. 55
Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's notion of logical analysis	p. 65
Clarification in Wittgenstein's later philosophy	p. 74
From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn	p. 96
Philosophical theses, metaphysical philosophy, and the Tractatus	p. 97
Metaphysics and conceptual investigation: the problem with metaphysics	p. 102
Conceptual investigation and the problem of dogmatism	p. 111
Wittgenstein's turn	p. 120
The turn and the role of rules	p. 132
Rules as objects of comparison	p. 140
Rules, metaphysical projection, and the logic of language	p. 145
Grammar, Meaning, and Language	p. 149
Grammar, use, and meaning: the problem of the status of Wittgenstein's remarks	p. 150
Wittgenstein's formulation of his conception of meaning	p. 158
The concept of language: comparisons with instruments and games	p. 163
Wittgenstein's development and the advantages of his mature view	p. 168
Examples as centers of variation and the conception of language as a family	p. 171
Avoiding dogmatism about meaning	p. 176
Wittgenstein's methodological shift and analyses in terms of necessary conditions	p. 180
The Concepts of Essence and Necessity	p. 184
Constructivist readings and the arbitrariness/nonarbitrariness of grammar	p. 185
Problems with constructivism	p. 188
The methodological dimension of Wittgenstein's conception of essence	p. 192
The nontemporality of grammatical statements	p. 195
Explanations of necessity in terms of factual regularities	p. 198
Wittgenstein's account of essence and necessity	p. 204
Beyond theses about the source of necessity	p. 208
Philosophical Hierarchies and the Status of Clarificatory Statements	p. 215
Philosophical hierarchies and Wittgenstein's "leading principle"	p. 216
The concept of perspicuous presentation	p. 228
The (alleged) necessity of accepting philosophical statements	p. 238
The concept of agreement and the problem of injustice	p. 247
The criteria of the correctness of grammatical remarks	p. 252
Multidimensional descriptions and the new use of old dogmatic claims	p. 258
Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Everyday Language, and Ethics	p. 265
Metaphysics disguised as methodology	p. 266
The historicity of philosophy	p. 271
Philosophy and the everyday	p. 275
Notes	p. 287
Index	p. 347
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