Thought Experiments

by Sorensen, Roy A.

• ISBN13: 9780195129137
• ISBN10: 019512913X
• Edition: Reprint
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1998-10-29
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are,how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophydiffers from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, itis possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating ontheir resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientificexperimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen alsoassesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although hegrants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, heattacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. They should beused, he says, as they generally are used--as part of a diversified portfolio oftechniques. All of these devices are individually susceptible to abuse,fallacy, and error. Collectively, however, they provide a network ofcross-checks that make for impressive reliability.

Author Biography

Roy A. Sorensen is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is the author of Blindspots (Oxford, 1988) and Pseudo-Problems (1993).

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(2)
Our Most Curious Device	3	(18)
The Instrument of Choice	7	(1)
Scientific Thought Experiments	8	(3)
The Bridge to Philosophical Thought Experiments	11	(4)
Analytic Philosophy's Commitment to Thought Experiment	15	(6)
Scepticism About Thought Experiments	21	(30)
Introspection on the Sly?	21	(20)
The Internal Horizon	21	(1)
Complaints About Introspection	22	(4)
The Parallel Plight of Thought Experiments	26	(15)
A Repackaged Appeal to Ordinary Language?	41	(5)
How the Appeal to Ordinary Language Is Supposed to Work	42	(1)
Strong Scepticism About the Appeal to Ordinary Language	42	(1)
Moderate Scepticism About the Appeal to Ordinary Language	43	(2)
Semantic Descent to Thought Experiments	45	(1)
Thought Experiments and the Dilemma of Informativeness	46	(5)
Mach and Inner Cognitive Africa	51	(25)
Instinctive Knowledge	51	(7)
The Continuum of Cognitive Bargain Hunters	58	(3)
Mach's Response to the Problem Of Informativeness	61	(2)
Appraisal of Mach	63	(13)
What Mach Got Right	63	(4)
What Mach Got Wrong	67	(9)
The Wonder of Armchair Inquiry	76	(35)
The Pseudoanomaly	76	(12)
Modal Gap Illusions	77	(2)
How Thought Experiments Yield Modal Conclusions	79	(9)
Positive Theories of Armchair Inquiry	88	(16)
The Recollection Model	88	(4)
The Transformation Model	92	(3)
The Homuncular Model	95	(4)
The Rearrangement Model	99	(5)
The Cleansing Model	104	(5)
How Thought Experiment Corrects Imbalances	104	(2)
Theoretical and Practical Irrationality	106	(3)
An Eclectic View of the Mechanies of Thought Experiment	109	(2)
Kuhntradictions	111	(21)
Kuhn on the Received Opinion	111	(1)
Misfits	112	(2)
The Left Hand of Logic	114	(2)
Truth or Dare?	116	(6)
The Incoherence of Incoherent Concepts	116	(3)
Violation of Logical Conservatism	119	(3)
Reconstruction of Kuhn's Error	122	(10)
The Guts of Paradox	122	(1)
Conflationary Factors	123	(4)
The Phenomenology of Inconsistency	127	(1)
Counteranalysis of Kuhn's Cases	128	(2)
Taxonomic Prospects	130	(2)
The Logical Structure of Thought Experiment	132	(35)
Attributing Thought Experiments	132	(3)
Thought Experiments as Alethic Refuters	135	(25)
Necessity Refuters	135	(1)
The Five Responses to the Quintet	136	(16)
Summary of Necessity Refuters	152	(1)
Possibility Refuters	153	(6)
Summary of Possibility Refuters	159	(1)
The Identity Conditions of Thought Experiments	160	(4)
An Extension to Ordinary Experiments	164	(1)
The Big Picture	165	(2)
Conflict Vagueness and Precisification	167	(19)
General Features of Vegueness	167	(1)
Dueling Definitions	168	(6)
The Psychology of Conflict Vagueness	168	(2)
How Conflict Vagueness Creates the Mirage of Local Incoherence	170	(1)
Extensional Conflict Vagueness	171	(1)
Intensional Conflict Vagueness	172	(2)
Application of the Quintet Schema	174	(1)
Conceptual Reform	175	(5)
Eliminative Reactions to Conflict Vagueness	180	(1)
Tolerating the Vagueness	180	(1)
Extending the Analysis	181	(3)
Sunder, Enlighten!	184	(2)
The Evolution of Thought Experiment	186	(30)
`Experiment' Defined	186	(4)
Stereotypical Features of Experiment	186	(3)
A Cognitive Aim Is Essential to Experiment	189	(1)
Execution Is an Optional Part of Experiment	190	(2)
The Progression from Experiment to Thought Experiment	192	(5)
Classifying Thought Experiments by Grounds for Inaction	197	(5)
Unimprovables	197	(2)
Unaffordables	199	(1)
Impossibles	200	(2)
The Immigration of the Supposition Operator	202	(3)
A Definition of `Thought Experiment'	205	(5)
The Selectivity of the Definition	206	(2)
Stereotypical Features of Thought Experiments	208	(2)
Verbal Disputes over `Thought Experiment'	210	(2)
Five Theses Recapitulated	212	(4)
Are Thought Experiments Experiments?	216	(36)
Systematically Misleading Experiments	216	(2)
Comparisons with Lookalikes	218	(10)
Imaginary Experiments	218	(4)
Fictional Experiments	222	(2)
Mythical Experiments	224	(1)
Models, Simulations, Reenactments	225	(3)
The Analogy with Ordinary Experiments	228	(22)
The Taxonomic Point of the Analogy	229	(1)
Points of Resemblance	230	(11)
Points of Difference	241	(7)
Bogus Points of Difference	248	(2)
A Lopsided Tally	250	(2)
Fallacies and Antifallacies	252	(39)
The Biological Baseline	252	(2)
Myths and Abuses	254	(2)
Fallacious Thought Experiments	256	(18)
Missupposition	257	(2)
Perspectival Illusions	259	(2)
Framing Effects	261	(1)
Biases of Thought Experiment	261	(8)
Jumping the If/Ought Gap	269	(2)
Overweighting Negative Thought Experiments	271	(1)
The Additive Fallacy	272	(1)
The Blindspot Fallacy	273	(1)
Antifallacies	274	(14)
General Characterization of Antifallacies	274	(3)
The Far Out Antifallacy	277	(7)
Strangeness In, Strangeness Out?	284	(1)
The Voyeur Antifallacy	285	(1)
The Kabuki Antifallacy	286	(2)
A Parting Comparison	288	(3)
Notes	291	(16)
Select Bibliography	307	(4)
Subject Index	311	(4)
Name Index	315