Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation

by Misak,Cheryl

• ISBN13: 9780415140355
• ISBN10: 0415140358
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1999-12-29
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Can we criticize those who hold beliefs which are likely to be wrong? Or must we abandon notions of truth and objectivity and claim that certain beliefs are best for us while incompatible beliefs are best for others? Truth, Politics, Moralityaddresses this crucial issue and its implications for democracy by arguing that the notion of truth ought to be returned to the center of moral and political philosophy. Cheryl Misak persuasively makes a case for a certain kind of pragmatism in which a true belief is one that could not be improved by inquiry, nor defeated by experience or argument. Her compelling discussion makes sense of the idea that, despite conflict, pluralism, and the expression of difference, our moral and political beliefs aim at truth and can be subject to justified criticism.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	ix
Introduction	1	(8)
The problem of justification	9	(39)
Carl Schmitt and the aim of substantive homogeneity	9	(3)
Rorty and the abandonment of justification	12	(6)
Rawls: political, not metaphysical	18	(11)
Harmony and the virtues of deliberation	29	(6)
Habermas, Apel, and the transcendental argument	35	(13)
Truth, inquiry, and experience: a pragmatist epistemology	48	(54)
Peirce, truth, and the end of inquiry	48	(3)
Philosophy, practice, and correspondence	51	(6)
Pragmatism and disquotationalism	57	(7)
Pragmatism, superassertibility, and pluralism about truth	64	(3)
Bivalence	67	(6)
The role of truth in inquiry	73	(5)
Experience: taking it seriously	78	(6)
Holism and radical holism	84	(6)
Moral inquiry	90	(5)
Convergence and the end of inquiry	95	(7)
Moral deliberation	102	(53)
Truth-seekers and reason-givers	102	(6)
Neutrality: three senses	108	(3)
The principle of neutrality	111	(6)
Public/private	117	(5)
Modesty and the philosopher	122	(5)
Conflict, difference, and community	127	(9)
Pluralism, underdetermination, and defeated reasons	136	(11)
Schmitt, coercion, and when we have talked enough	147	(8)
Conclusion	155	(2)
Notes	157	(11)
Bibliography	168	(12)
Index	180