Uncertainty, Rationality, And Agency

by Hoek, Wiebe Van Der

• ISBN13: 9781402046308
• ISBN10: 1402046308
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-06-15
• Publisher: Springer Verlag

Summary

This book is about Rational Agents, which can be humans, players in a game, software programs or institutions. Typically, such agents are uncertain about the state of affairs or the state of other agents, and under this partial information they have to decide on which action to take next. This book collects chapters that give formal accounts not only of Uncertainty, Rationality and Agency, but also of their interaction: what are rational criteria to accept certain beliefs, or to modify them; how can degrees of beliefs guide an agent in making decisions; why distinguish between practical and epistemic rationality when agents try to coordinate; what must be common beliefs between agents about each other's rationality in order to act rationally themselves; can an agent assign probabilities to planned actions; how to formalise assumptions about a rational speaker in a conversation obeying Gricean maxims; how should a rational agent best represent the states, consequences, and acts that constitute the agent's rational decision problem?This volume should appeal to researchers addressing issues in artificial systems that have to gather information in order to obtain Knowledge, reason about it and then make a Rational decision about which Action to take next.

Table of Contents

FORWORD	vii
Wiebe van der Hoek
THE NO PROBABILITIES FOR ACTS-PRINCIPLE	1	(10)
Marion Ledwig
A LOGIC FOR INDUCTIVE PROBABILISTIC REASONING	11	(68)
Manfred Jaeger
RATIONALITY AS CONFORMITY	79	(38)
Hykel Hosni and Jeff Paris
ON THE STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL ACCEPTANCE: COMMENTS ON HAWTHORNE AND BOVENS	117	(18)
Gregory R. Wheeler
LOGIC AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY OF GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION	135	(4)
Giacomo Bonanno
A SIMPLE MODAL LOGIC FOR BELIEF REVISION	139	(36)
Giacomo Bonanno
PROLEGOMENA TO DYNAMIC LOGIC FOR BELIEF REVISION	175	(48)
Hans P. van Ditmarsch
FROM KNOWLEDGE-BASED PROGRAMS TO GRADED BELIEF-BASED PROGRAMS, PART I: ON-LINE REASONING	223	(46)
Noël Laverny and Jérôme Lang
ORDER-INDEPENDENT TRANSFORMATIVE DECISION RULES	269	(20)
Martin Peterson and Sven Ove Hansson
A PRAGMATIC SOLUTION FOR THE PARADOX OF FREE CHOICE PERMISSION	289	(36)
Katrin Schulz
A LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENTION	325	(22)
Giacomo Sillari
INDEX	347