A Unified Theory Of Party Competition

by James F. Adams , Samuel Merrill III , Bernard Grofman

• ISBN13: 9780521544931
• ISBN10: 0521544939
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-03-21
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures	x
Acknowledgments	xvii
1 Modeling Party Competition	1	(14)
1.1 Introduction to the Unified Theory of Party Competition	1	(4)
1.2 Data and Methodology	5	(1)
1.3 Justifying Our Theoretical Focus: Why Assume a Unified Model of Party Competition with Vote-Maximizing Parties?	6	(4)
1.4 Plan of the Book	10	(5)
2 How Voters Decide: The Components of the Unified Theory of Voting	15	(13)
2.1 Introduction	15	(1)
2.2 The Policy-Only Model	16	(3)
2.3 Nonpolicy Factors: The Unified Model	19	(4)
2.4 The Unified Discounting Model	23	(3)
2.5 Discussion	26	(2)
3 Linking Voter Choice to Party Strategies: Illustrating the Role of Nonpolicy Factors	28	(24)
3.1 Introduction	28	(3)
3.2 The Logic of Policy Competition in the Unified Spatial Model: Illustrative Examples of How Nonpolicy Considerations Matter	31	(9)
3.3 Party Competition and the Concept of Equilibrium in Policy Strategies	40	(6)
3.4 Empirical Application to the 1988 French Presidential Election	46	(6)
4 Factors Influencing the Link between Party Strategy and the Variables Affecting Voter Choice: Theoretical Results	52	(20)
4.1 Introduction	52	(1)
4.2 The Model	53	(4)
4.3 Centrifugal Incentives for Candidate Strategies	57	(6)
4.4 An Empirical Illustration	63	(4)
4.5 Robustness of Equilibrium Positions to the Salience of Partisanship	67	(3)
4.6 Discussion	70	(2)
5 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1988 French Presidential Election	72	(22)
5.1 Introduction	72	(1)
5.2 The Context of the 1988 French Presidential Election	73	(4)
5.3 Candidate Competition under the Policy-Only Model	77	(2)
5.4 Candidate Competition under a Unified Model with Nonpolicy Factors	79	(6)
5.5 Candidate Competition under a Unified Discounting Model	85	(8)
5.6 Conclusion	93	(1)
6 Policy Competition under the Unified Theory: Empirical Applications to the 1989 Norwegian Parliamentary Election	94	(23)
6.1 Introduction	94	(2)
6.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1989 Parliamentary Election	96	(3)
6.3 Party Competition in the Policy-Only Model	99	(3)
6.4 Party Competition in the Unified Model	102	(3)
6.5 Party Competition in a Unified Discounting Model	105	(6)
6.6 Coalition-Seeking Motivations	111	(5)
6.7 Conclusion	116	(1)
7 The Threat of Abstention: Candidate Strategies and Policy Representation in U.S. Presidential Elections	117	(15)
7.1 Introduction	117	(3)
7.2 Incorporating the Turnout Decision into the Unified Voting Model	120	(3)
7.3 Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model: Illustrative Arguments	123	(7)
7.4 Conclusion	130	(2)
8 Candidate Strategies with Voter Abstention in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000	132	(20)
8.1 Introduction	132	(1)
8.2 Hypotheses on Voting Behavior and Candidate Strategies under the Unified Turnout Model	133	(1)
8.3 Candidate Competition in the 1988 American Presidential Election	134	(8)
8.4 Unified Turnout Models for the 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections	142	(2)
8.5 Candidate Equilibrium under the Unified Turnout Model	144	(3)
8.6 The Unified Turnout Model with Policy Discounting	147	(3)
8.7 Discussion	150	(2)
9 Policy Competition in Britain: The 1997 General Election	152	(18)
9.1 Introduction	152	(2)
9.2 Ideology and Policy Issues in the 1997 General Election	154	(2)
9.3 Party Competition under the Policy-Only Model	156	(4)
9.4 Party Competition under the Unified Model	160	(4)
9.5 Party Competition under a Unified Turnout Model: The Strategic Effects of Abstention due to Alienation	164	(4)
9.6 Conclusion	168	(2)
10 The Consequences of Voter Projection: Assimilation and Contrast Effects	170	(14)
10.1 Introduction	170	(1)
10.2 Data Analysis	171	(11)
10.3 Discussion	182	(2)
11 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Theory	184	(17)
11.1 Introduction	184	(3)
11.2 Spatial Models with Full Information: How Valence Advantages Motivate Divergence between Policy-Seeking Candidates	187	(1)
11.3 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 1: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Impact of Valence Issues	188	(7)
11.4 A Policy-Seeking Model with Incomplete Information, Part 2: The Effects of Uncertainty about the Voter Distribution	195	(4)
11.5 Conclusion	199	(2)
12 Policy-Seeking Motivations of Parties in Two-Party Elections: Empirical Analysis	201	(26)
12.1 Introduction	201	(3)
12.2 Equilibrium Strategies under Electoral Certainty	204	(4)
12.3 Modeling Election Uncertainty over Valence Issues in Empirical Applications	208	(4)
12.4 Candidate Equilibria under Valence-Related Election Uncertainty	212	(10)
12.5 Equilibria under Policy-Related Uncertainty: Application to France	222	(3)
12.6 Discussion	225	(2)
13 Concluding Remarks	227	(14)
13.1 Introduction	227	(5)
13.2 Evaluating the Unified Model: Does It Satisfactorily Explain Party Behavior?	232	(2)
13.3 Directions for Future Research	234	(5)
13.4 Final Remarks	239	(2)
Appendix 1.1 Literature Review: Work Linking Behavioral Research to Spatial Modeling	241	(4)
Appendix 2.1 Alternative Statistical Models of Voter Choice	245	(2)
Appendix 2.2 Controversies in Voting Research: The Electoral Impact of Party Identification	247	(4)
Appendix 2.3 Relationship between the Unified Discounting Model and the Directional Model of Rabinowitz and Macdonald	251	(3)
Appendix 3.1 Spatial Models That Incorporate Valence Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation	254	(4)
Appendix 4.1 Uniqueness Theorem and Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibria	258	(5)
Appendix 4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1	263	(2)
Appendix 4.3 Simulation Analysis and an Approximation Formula for Nash Equilibria	265	(3)
Appendix 4.4 Derivations of Formulas Relating Electoral Factors to the Shrinkage Factor, ck	268	(2)
Appendix 6.1 Equilibria for Outcome-Oriented Motivations: The Kedar Model	270	(5)
Appendix 7.1 Proof of Lemma 7.1	275	(2)
Appendix 7.2 Derivations for the Unified Turnout Model	277	(2)
Appendix 8.1 Coding and Model Specifications	279	(3)
Appendix 8.2 Alternative Turnout Models	282	(5)
Appendix 11.1 Proof of Theorem 11.1	287	(2)
Appendix 11.2 Empirical Estimation of the Mean and Standard Deviation of Valence Effects	289	(4)
References	293	(14)
Index	307