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LUCA DELGROSSI, PhD, is Director of Driver Assistance and Chassis Systems U.S. at Mercedes-Benz Research & Development North America, Inc., Chairman of the Board of Directors at the VII Consortium, and coeditor of the IEEE Communications Magazine Automotive Networking Series.
TAO ZHANG, PhD, is Chief Scientist for Smart Connected Vehicles at Cisco Systems. He is a Fellow of the IEEE and the coauthor of IP-Based Next-Generation Wireless Networks.
Foreword xv
Ralf G. Herrtwich
Foreword xvii
Flavio Bonomi
Foreword xix
Adam Drobot
Preface xxi
Acknowledgments xxv
1 Traffic Safety 1
1.1 Traffic Safety Facts / 1
1.1.1 Fatalities / 2
1.1.2 Leading Causes of Crashes / 3
1.1.3 Current Trends / 5
1.2 European Union / 5
1.3 Japan / 7
1.4 Developing Countries / 7
References / 8
2 Automotive Safety Evolution 10
2.1 Passive Safety / 10
2.1.1 Safety Cage and the Birth of Passive Safety / 10
2.1.2 Seat Belts / 11
2.1.3 Air Bags / 11
2.2 Active Safety / 12
2.2.1 Antilock Braking System / 12
2.2.2 Electronic Stability Control / 13
2.2.3 Brake Assist / 13
2.3 Advanced Driver Assistance Systems / 14
2.3.1 Adaptive Cruise Control / 15
2.3.2 Blind Spot Assist / 16
2.3.3 Attention Assist / 16
2.3.4 Precrash Systems / 16
2.4 Cooperative Safety / 17
References / 18
3 Vehicle Architectures 20
3.1 Electronic Control Units / 20
3.2 Vehicle Sensors / 21
3.2.1 Radars / 21
3.2.2 Cameras / 21
3.3 Onboard Communication Networks / 22
3.3.1 Controller Area Network / 23
3.3.2 Local Interconnect Network / 23
3.3.3 FlexRay / 24
3.3.4 Media Oriented Systems Transport / 24
3.3.5 Onboard Diagnostics / 24
3.4 Vehicle Data / 25
3.5 Vehicle Data Security / 26
3.6 Vehicle Positioning / 27
3.6.1 Global Positioning System / 27
3.6.2 Galileo / 29
3.6.3 Global Navigation Satellite System / 29
3.6.4 Positioning Accuracy / 30
References / 30
4 Connected Vehicles 32
4.1 Connected Vehicle Applications / 32
4.1.1 Hard Safety Applications / 32
4.1.2 Soft Safety Applications / 33
4.1.3 Mobility and Convenience Applications / 33
4.2 Uniqueness in Consumer Vehicle Networks / 34
4.3 Vehicle Communication Modes / 36
4.3.1 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast / 36
4.3.2 V2V Multihop Message Dissemination / 37
4.3.3 Infrastructure-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast / 38
4.3.4 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Bidirectional Communications / 39
4.4 Wireless Communications Technology for Vehicles / 39
References / 42
5 Dedicated Short-Range Communications 44
5.1 The 5.9 GHz Spectrum / 44
5.1.1 DSRC Frequency Band Usage / 45
5.1.2 DSRC Channels / 45
5.1.3 DSRC Operations / 46
5.2 DSRC in the European Union / 46
5.3 DSRC in Japan / 47
5.4 DSRC Standards / 48
5.4.1 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments / 48
5.4.2 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments Protocol Stack / 48
5.4.3 International Harmonization / 50
References / 50
6 WAVE Physical Layer 52
6.1 Physical Layer Operations / 52
6.1.1 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing / 52
6.1.2 Modulation and Coding Rates / 53
6.1.3 Frame Reception / 54
6.2 PHY Amendments / 55
6.2.1 Channel Width / 56
6.2.2 Spectrum Masks / 56
6.2.3 Improved Receiver Performance / 57
6.3 PHY Layer Modeling / 57
6.3.1 Network Simulator Architecture / 58
6.3.2 RF Model / 59
6.3.3 Wireless PHY / 61
References / 62
7 WAVE Media Access Control Layer 64
7.1 Media Access Control Layer Operations / 64
7.1.1 Carrier Sensing Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance / 64
7.1.2 Hidden Terminal Effects / 65
7.1.3 Basic Service Set / 66
7.2 MAC Layer Amendments / 66
7.3 MAC Layer Modeling / 67
7.3.1 Transmission / 68
7.3.2 Reception / 68
7.3.3 Channel State Manager / 68
7.3.4 Back-Off Manager / 69
7.3.5 Transmission Coordination / 70
7.3.6 Reception Coordination / 71
7.4 Overhauled ns-2 Implementation / 72
References / 74
8 DSRC Data Rates 75
8.1 Introduction / 75
8.2 Communication Density / 76
8.2.1 Simulation Study / 77
8.2.2 Broadcast Reception Rates / 78
8.2.3 Channel Access Delay / 81
8.2.4 Frames Reception Failures / 83
8.3 Optimal Data Rate / 85
8.3.1 Modulation and Coding Rates / 85
8.3.2 Simulation Study / 86
8.3.3 Simulation Matrix / 87
8.3.4 Simulation Results / 88
References / 91
9 WAVE Upper Layers 93
9.1 Introduction / 93
9.2 DSRC Multichannel Operations / 94
9.2.1 Time Synchronization / 94
9.2.2 Synchronization Intervals / 95
9.2.3 Guard Intervals / 96
9.2.4 Channel Switching / 96
9.2.5 Channel Switching State Machine / 96
9.3 Protocol Evaluation / 97
9.3.1 Simulation Study / 98
9.3.2 Simulation Scenarios / 99
9.3.3 Simulation Results / 99
9.3.4 Protocol Enhancements / 102
9.4 WAVE Short Message Protocol / 103
References / 104
10 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Safety Applications 106
10.1 Intersection Crashes / 106
10.2 Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance System for Violations / 107
10.2.1 CICAS-V Design / 107
10.2.2 CICAS-V Development / 110
10.2.3 CICAS-V Testing / 116
10.3 Integrated Safety Demonstration / 118
10.3.1 Demonstration Concept / 118
10.3.2 Hardware Components / 120
10.3.3 Demo Design / 121
References / 124
11 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Safety Applications 126
11.1 Cooperation among Vehicles / 126
11.2 V2V Safety Applications / 127
11.3 V2V Safety Applications Design / 128
11.3.1 Basic Safety Messages / 129
11.3.2 Minimum Performance Requirements / 129
11.3.3 Target Classifi cation / 131
11.3.4 Vehicle Representation / 132
11.3.5 Sample Applications / 133
11.4 System Implementation / 135
11.4.1 Onboard Unit Hardware Components / 135
11.4.2 OBU Software Architecture / 135
11.4.3 Driver–Vehicle Interface / 137
11.5 System Testing / 138
11.5.1 Communications Coverage and Antenna Considerations / 138
11.5.2 Positioning / 139
References / 140
12 DSRC Scalability 141
12.1 Introduction / 141
12.2 DSRC Data Traffi c / 142
12.2.1 DSRC Safety Messages / 142
12.2.2 Transmission Parameters / 143
12.2.3 Channel Load Assessment / 144
12.3 Congestion Control Algorithms / 145
12.3.1 Desired Properties / 145
12.3.2 Transmission Power Adjustment / 146
12.3.3 Message Rate Adjustment / 147
12.3.4 Simulation Study / 148
12.4 Conclusions / 148
References / 149
13 Security and Privacy Threats and Requirements 151
13.1 Introduction / 151
13.2 Adversaries / 151
13.3 Security Threats / 152
13.3.1 Send False Safety Messages Using Valid Security Credentials / 152
13.3.2 Falsely Accuse Innocent Vehicles / 153
13.3.3 Impersonate Vehicles or Other Network Entities / 153
13.3.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks Specific to Consumer Vehicle Networks / 154
13.3.5 Compromise OBU Software or Firmware / 155
13.4 Privacy Threats / 155
13.4.1 Privacy in a Vehicle Network / 155
13.4.2 Privacy Threats in Consumer Vehicle Networks / 156
13.4.3 How Driver Privacy can be Breached Today / 158
13.5 Basic Security Capabilities / 159
13.5.1 Authentication / 159
13.5.2 Misbehavior Detection and Revocation / 160
13.5.3 Data Integrity / 160
13.5.4 Data Confidentiality / 160
13.6 Privacy Protections Capabilities / 161
13.7 Design and Performance Considerations / 161
13.7.1 Scalability / 162
13.7.2 Balancing Competing Requirements / 162
13.7.3 Minimal Side Effects / 163
13.7.4 Quantifi able Levels of Security and Privacy / 163
13.7.5 Adaptability / 163
13.7.6 Security and Privacy Protection for V2V Broadcast / 163
13.7.7 Security and Privacy Protection for Communications with Security Servers / 164
References / 165
14 Cryptographic Mechanisms 167
14.1 Introduction / 167
14.2 Categories of Cryptographic Mechanisms / 167
14.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions / 168
14.2.2 Symmetric Key Algorithms / 169
14.2.3 Public Key (Asymmetric Key) Algorithms / 170
14.3 Digital Signature Algorithms / 172
14.3.1 The RSA Algorithm / 172
14.3.2 The DSA Algorithm / 178
14.3.3 The ECDSA Algorithm / 184
14.3.4 ECDSA for Vehicle Safety Communications / 194
14.4 Message Authentication and Message Integrity Verifi cation / 196
14.4.1 Authentication and Integrity Verifi cation Using Hash Functions / 197
14.4.2 Authentication and Integrity Verifi cation Using Digital Signatures / 198
14.5 Diffi e–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 200
14.5.1 The Original Diffie–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 200
14.5.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Key Establishment Protocol / 201
14.6 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) / 202
14.6.1 The Basic Idea / 202
14.6.2 Scheme Setup / 202
14.6.3 Encrypt a Message / 202
14.6.4 Decrypt a Message / 204
14.6.5 Performance / 204
References / 206
15 Public Key Infrastructure for Vehicle Networks 209
15.1 Introduction / 209
15.2 Public Key Certificates / 210
15.3 Message Authentication with Certificates / 211
15.4 Certifi cate Revocation List / 212
15.5 A Baseline Reference Vehicular PKI Model / 213
15.6 Confi gure Initial Security Parameters and Assign Initial Certificates / 215
15.6.1 Vehicles Create Their Private and Public Keys / 216
15.6.2 Certificate Authority Creates Private and Public Keys for Vehicles / 217
15.7 Acquire New Keys and Certifi cates / 217
15.8 Distribute Certifi cates to Vehicles for Signature Verifications / 220
15.9 Detect Misused Certifi cates and Misbehaving Vehicles / 222
15.9.1 Local Misbehavior Detection / 223
15.9.2 Global Misbehavior Detection / 224
15.9.3 Misbehavior Reporting / 224
15.10 Ways for Vehicles to Acquire CRLs / 226
15.11 How Often CRLs should be Distributed to Vehicles? / 228
15.12 PKI Hierarchy / 230
15.12.1 Certifi cate Chaining to Enable Hierarchical CAs / 231
15.12.2 Hierarchical CA Architecture Example / 231
15.13 Privacy-Preserving Vehicular PKI / 233
15.13.1 Quantitative Measurements of Vehicle Anonymity / 234
15.13.2 Quantitative Measurement of Message Unlinkability / 234
References / 235
16 Privacy Protection with Shared Certificates 237
16.1 Shared Certificates / 237
16.2 The Combinatorial Certificate Scheme / 237
16.3 Certificate Revocation Collateral Damage / 239
16.4 Certified Intervals / 242
16.4.1 The Concept of Certified Interval / 242
16.4.2 Certified Interval Produced by the Original Combinatorial Certificate Scheme / 242
16.5 Reduce Collateral Damage and Improve Certified Interval / 244
16.5.1 Reduce Collateral Damage Caused by a Single Misused Certificate / 245
16.5.2 Vehicles Become Statistically Distinguishable When Misusing Multiple Certificates / 248
16.5.3 The Dynamic Reward Algorithm / 250
16.6 Privacy in Low Vehicle Density Areas / 253
16.6.1 The Problem / 253
16.6.2 The Blend-In Algorithm to Improve Privacy / 256
References / 259
17 Privacy Protection with Short-Lived Unique Certificates 260
17.1 Short-Lived Unique Certificates / 260
17.2 The Basic Short-Lived Certificate Scheme / 261
17.3 The Problem of Large CRL / 263
17.4 Anonymously Linked Certificates to Reduce CRL Size / 264
17.4.1 Certificate Tags / 264
17.4.2 CRL Processing by Vehicles / 265
17.4.3 Backward Unlinkability / 267
17.5 Reduce CRL Search Time / 268
17.6 Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates / 269
17.7 Reduce the Volume of Certificate Request and Response Messages / 270
17.8 Determine the Number of Certificates for Each Vehicle / 270
References / 273
18 Privacy Protection with Group Signatures 274
18.1 Group Signatures / 274
18.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge / 275
18.3 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme and its Extensions / 277
18.3.1 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme / 277
18.3.2 The Challenge of Group Membership Revocation / 282
18.3.3 ACJT Extensions to Support Membership Revocation / 283
18.4 The CG Group Signature Scheme with Revocation / 286
18.5 The Short Group Signatures Scheme / 288
18.5.1 The Short Group Signatures Scheme / 288
18.5.2 Membership Revocation / 291
18.6 Group Signature Schemes with Verifier-Local Revocation / 292
References / 293
19 Privacy Protection against Certificate Authorities 295
19.1 Introduction / 295
19.2 Basic Idea / 295
19.3 Baseline Split CA Architecture, Protocol, and Message Processing / 297
19.4 Split CA Architecture for Shared Certifi cates / 301
19.5 Split CA Architecture for Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates / 302
19.5.1 Acquire One Unlinked Certifi cate at a Time / 302
19.5.2 Assign Batches of Unlinked Short-Lived Certifi cates / 304
19.5.3 Revoke Batches of Unlinked Certifi cates / 306
19.5.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches / 307
19.6 Split CA Architecture for Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 308
19.6.1 Assign One Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificate at a Time / 308
19.6.2 Assign Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 311
19.6.3 Revoke Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates / 312
19.6.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches / 313
References / 314
20 Comparison of Privacy-Preserving Certificate Management Schemes 315
20.1 Introduction / 315
20.2 Comparison of Main Characteristics / 316
20.3 Misbehavior Detection / 320
20.4 Abilities to Prevent Privacy Abuse by CA and MDS Operators / 321
20.5 Summary / 322
21 IEEE 1609.2 Security Services 323
21.1 Introduction / 323
21.2 The IEEE 1609.2 Standard / 323
21.3 Certificates and Certificate Authority Hierarchy / 325
21.4 Formats for Public Key, Signature, Certificate, and CRL / 327
21.4.1 Public Key Formats / 327
21.4.2 Signature Formats / 328
21.4.3 Certificate Format / 329
21.4.4 CRL Format / 332
21.5 Message Formats and Processing for Generating Encrypted Messages / 333
21.6 Sending Messages / 335
21.7 Request Certifi cates from the CA / 336
21.8 Request and Processing CRL / 343
21.9 What the Current IEEE 1609.2 Standard Does Not Cover / 344
21.9.1 No Support for Anonymous Message Authentication / 344
21.9.2 Separate Vehicle-CA Communication Protocols Are Required / 344
21.9.3 Interactions and Interfaces between CA Entities Not Addressed / 346
References / 346
22 4G for Vehicle Safety Communications 347
22.1 Introduction / 347
22.2 Long-Term Revolution (LTE) / 347
22.3 LTE for Vehicle Safety Communications / 353
22.3.1 Issues to Be Addressed / 353
22.3.2 LTE for V2I Safety Communications / 353
22.3.3 LTE for V2V Safety Communications / 356
22.3.4 LTE Broadcast and Multicast Services / 357
References / 358
Glossary 360
Index 367
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