Top
| Foreword | p. ix |
| Preface | p. xi |
| Introduction | p. xiii |
| Summary and Analysis | p. 1 |
| General Comments | p. 1 |
| The Arab-Israeli Wars and the Rise of the Ba'ath Party | p. 2 |
| Between the 1973 War and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) | p. 3 |
| The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) | p. 5 |
| Thoughts on the Iran-Iraq "Cold-War" in the 1990s | p. 16 |
| Comments on Saddam Hussein as Political and Military Leader | p. 16 |
| The Interviews | p. 19 |
| p. 19 | |
| Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 | |
| Military Transition under Ba'athist Rule | |
| p. 26 | |
| Iraqi Military and Political Transition through the 1970s | |
| Prologue to Iran-Iraq War | |
| Transition of Iranian Leadership and Military | |
| Decision to Invade | |
| Saddam's Aspirations | |
| Earliest Phase of the War | |
| Political and Professional Soldiers | |
| Disorganized Command and Control of Iranian Operations | |
| p. 34 | |
| Early Use of Air Power | |
| Sigint [Signals Intelligence] | |
| Winter 1980-1981 Iraqi Command Changes | |
| Saddam's Response to Failure and Executions | |
| 1980-1982 Losses and Army Expansions | |
| Developments of Iranian and Iraqi Forces | |
| p. 40 | |
| Saddam's Psychology and Personality Development | |
| January 1981 Armor Battle | |
| Iranian Human Wave Tactics and Iraqi Minefields | |
| Khomeini's Spiritual Influence | |
| Battles of Abadan and Khorramshahr | |
| Loss of Special Forces | |
| End of Initial Iraqi Offensives in May 1981 | |
| p. 49 | |
| 1981-1982 Turbulence in Tehran | |
| Iranian Infiltration Tactics | |
| 1982 Attacks around Basra | |
| 1984-1988 Marsh Infiltrations and Iraqi Engineering Efforts | |
| International Support to Iran | |
| Chemical Weapons Usage | |
| Iranian Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction | |
| Postwar Preparations with WMD | |
| 1982-1983 Reorganization and Recruiting for Republican Guard | |
| Psychological Support of Saddam to Troops | |
| Postwar Republican Guard Reorganization | |
| p. 62 | |
| Summer 1983 Iranian Offensive into Haj Umran | |
| Northern Mountain Operations and Kurdish Support | |
| A 1,000-kilometer Front | |
| Threats to the Dams and Baghdad | |
| Unpredictable Iranian Strategy and Tactics | |
| February 1984 Iraqi 6th Armored Division Losses | |
| Iranian Marsh Operations | |
| Intelligence Development and Satellite Support in March 1985 | |
| p. 70 | |
| 1986 Al-Fao Campaign and Baghdad's Misinterpretation of Iranian Strategy | |
| Traitors in the Iraqi Leadership | |
| Prisoners of War | |
| Operation Dawn | |
| Iraqi Casualty Competition and the "Bedouin Mentality" | |
| p. 77 | |
| Republican Guard Expansion and the Response to Al-Fao | |
| Hussein Kamel | |
| General Hamdani's Command Obstacles | |
| 1987 Iranian Attack on Basra and Casualty Inflation | |
| Shalamjah: The Somme of the Iran-Iraq War | |
| Hamdani's Venture through the Front and the Battlefield Conditions | |
| p. 83 | |
| July 1987 Republican Guard Command Changes | |
| Battlefield Missiles | |
| Halabjah | |
| Factors of Post-1987 Shift in "Correlation of Forces" toward Iraq-Planning Effort for Al-Fao Offensive | |
| Use of Helicopters | |
| Front of 1988 | |
| July 1988 Iraqi Incursion through to Ahvaz and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq | |
| p. 90 | |
| Foundations of the Iraqi Military and Saddam's Detrimental Influence | |
| Hamdani's Effort to Improve Iraqi Military Culture | |
| Questioning Military Orders and Planning | |
| Lessons Learned from the Iran-Iraq War | |
| Fight to follow the War and Saddam's Perception of Victory and Warfare | |
| p. 95 | |
| Stories of War Heroes, 1973 to Operation Iraqi Freedom | |
| Saddam's Misunderstanding of Warfare | |
| Hamdani's Recognition of U.S. Strategy in 2003 | |
| Understanding One's Enemy | |
| p. 100 | |
| 1990s Military Planning against Iran | |
| Historical Explanation of Iran-Iraq Conflict | |
| Religious and Ethnic Elements | |
| Economic and Regional Aspects (Persian Gulf) | |
| Shatt al-Arab | |
| Ideology, Ba'athism, and Khomeini | |
| Present Conflict and Iranian and al Qaeda Influence | |
| p. 108 | |
| Planning for an Iranian Adversary | |
| Iranian Structure | |
| 2003 and Iranian Strategy | |
| Ayatollah as Executive | |
| Iranian Military Development and Capabilities | |
| Missiles | |
| Iranian Threat to Iraq and Infiltration | |
| Internal Agents | |
| Iraqi Counterinfiltration | |
| Iranian Militias | |
| Iraqi Military Developments since 1991 | |
| Cooptation of Tribes | |
| p. 119 | |
| Role of Religion in Iran-Iraq Conflict | |
| Hypothetical Iraqi Offensive Against Iran and Phases of Preparations | |
| Iranian Influence in Iraq | |
| Arabistan | |
| Baluchs and Kurds | |
| Air and Missile Strikes and Military-Industrial Complex | |
| Younger Iranian Generation | |
| Smart Weapons and Satellites | |
| Terrain | |
| Operational Objectives | |
| Iranian Lessons Learned | |
| Iranian Missile Deterrent | |
| p. 127 | |
| Armor Operations | |
| Bravery and the Warrior Mentality | |
| Saddam's Misunderstanding of Military Technology | |
| Integration of Helicopter and Tank Capabilities | |
| Lessons Learned on Artillery, Iraq, and Iran | |
| Changes in Iranian Command and Control | |
| Iranian Tactical and Operational Developments | |
| p. 133 | |
| Recommendations for U.S. Actions in Iraq from May 2007 | |
| Endnotes | p. 137 |
| Bibliography | p. 143 |
| Index to Themes in the Discussions | p. 144 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
