Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in British Government 1945–2007

by Samuel Berlinski , Torun Dewan , Keith Dowding

• ISBN13: 9780521519724
• ISBN10: 0521519721
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2012-04-09
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. The authors use a unique dataset of ministers from 1945 to 2007 to examine the structural and individual characteristics that lead to the selection and durability of ministers. Sensitive to historical context, it describes the unique features of different Prime Ministers and the sorts of issues and scandals that lead to the forced exit of ministers. The authors identify the structural factors that determine ministerial performance and tenure, seeing resignation calls as performance indicators. Probing the nature of individual and collective responsibility within Westminster forms of government, its rigorous analysis provides powerful new insights into the nature of Cabinet government.

Table of Contents

List of figures	p. vii
List of tables	p. viii
Preface and acknowledgements	p. ix
Introduction	p. 1
Managing the cabinet: principal-agent relations in government	p. 6
Principals and their agents	p. 7
Agency models of elections	p. 8
Parliamentary democracy	p. 13
The prime minister and cabinet	p. 14
Applying the agency model in parliamentary democracies	p. 15
Our data and questions	p. 19
The structure of British government	p. 21
Constitutional situation	p. 21
The cabinet	p. 26
Ministers	p. 30
The jobs of ministers	p. 33
Choosing ministers	p. 37
Ministerial responsibility	p. 42
Government changes	p. 46
Who serves in government and how long do they last?	p. 54
Who serves	p. 55
How long do ministers last?	p. 65
Political effects	p. 76
Separating the effect of individual characteristics	p. 76
The determinants of ministerial hazard rates	p. 78
Conclusion	p. 83
The prime minister and cabinet	p. 87
Prime ministerial styles	p. 89
Survivor functions for different prime ministers	p. 109
Conclusion	p. 115
Performance measures and forced exits	p. 117
Introduction	p. 117
Resignations and non-resignations	p. 119
Differences between prime ministers and parties in power	p. 127
Proximate causes of forced exits	p. 132
Conclusions	p. 148
Ministerial performance and tenure	p. 150
Our assumptions	p. 152
Performance and tenure	p. 154
Descriptive analysis	p. 157
Empirical strategy	p. 160
Hazard rate estimates	p. 165
Conclusions	p. 170
Conclusion	p. 173
References	p. 179
Index	p. 190
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