Administrative Law and Process

by Pierce, Richard J.; Shapiro, Sidney A.; Verkuil, Paul R.

• ISBN13: 9781566627887
• ISBN10: 1566627885
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1999-06-01
• Publisher: Foundation Pr

Table of Contents

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION	v
CHAPTER ONE THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS	1	(23)
1.1 Private and Public Law Contrasted	1	(1)
1.2 Background to the Public Law and Private Law Distinction	2	(4)
1.3 The Relevance of the Public Law Model to Administrative Law	6	(1)
1.4 The Nature of the Administrative Process	7	(3)
1.4.1 The seat-belt controversy as a case study	7	(3)
1.4.2 Lessons for public law	10	(1)
1.5 The Public Interest Explanation for Regulation	10	(4)
1.5.1 Regulation to improve information	11	(1)
1.5.2 Regulation of competitive conditions	12	(1)
1.5.3 Regulation for externalities and free-riders	12	(1)
1.5.4 Regulation for redistribution and equity	13	(1)
1.6 Regulatory Reform	14	(2)
1.7 The Public Choice Explanation for Regulation	16	(3)
1.7.1 The demand for and supply of regulation	17	(1)
1.7.2 Theories of capture	18	(1)
1.8 The Relationship of the Public Interest and Public Choice Explanations	19	(2)
1.9 Organizational Norms	21	(1)
1.10 Legal Norms	22	(2)
CHAPTER TWO THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS	24	(18)
2.1 Administrative Law and Democratic Legitimation	24	(6)
2.1.1 The "classical" or "liberal" definition of democracy	24	(1)
2.1.2 The role and meaning of separation of powers in democratic theory	25	(2)
2.1.3 "Liberal" and "pluralistic" democracy contrasted	27	(1)
2.1.4 The "republican" definition of democracy	28	(2)
2.2 Beginnings of the Administrative Law Process	30	(2)
2.3 The Administrative Process and the New Deal	32	(1)
2.4 The Administrative Process and the Modern State	33	(2)
2.5 The Administrative Process and Democratic Theory	35	(3)
2.5.1 The delegation problem	36	(1)
2.5.2 The rulemaking problem	37	(1)
2.6 The Future of Administrative Law and Process	38	(4)
CHAPTER THREE LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION	42	(37)
3.1 Methods of Legislative Control	42	(4)
3.2 The FTC as an Illustration	46	(3)
3.3 Overview of Legal Limitations	49	(1)
3.4 The Nondelegation Doctrine	50	(11)
3.4.1 Cases prior to the New Deal	50	(1)
3.4.2 The New Deal Cases	51	(2)
3.4.3 Post New Deal cases	53	(3)
3.4.4 Reinvigoration of the Nondelegation Doctrine	56	(4)
3.4.5 Nondelegation in the states	60	(1)
3.5 The Legislative Veto	61	(7)
3.6 Due Process as a Limitation	68	(6)
3.6.1 Congress and formal adjudication	69	(3)
3.6.2 Congress and informal agency action	72	(2)
3.7 Article III and the Seventh Amendment as a Limitation	74	(5)
CHAPTER FOUR EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION	79	(39)
4.1 The Need for Executive Control	79	(1)
4.2 The Constitutional Basis for Executive Control	80	(1)
4.3 Methods of Executive Control	81	(10)
4.3.1 The appointment process	82	(1)
4.3.2 The recognization process	83	(2)
4.3.3 The budgetary process	85	(5)
4.3.4 The policy-making process	90	(1)
4.4 The Independent Agency Complication	91	(15)
4.4.1 Executive and independent agencies compared	92	(1)
4.4.1a Why are they "independent"?	93	(1)
4.4.1b The functional characteristics of independent agencies	94	(2)
4.4.2 Myers and Humphrey's Executor	96	(3)
4.4.3 Morrison v. Olson	99	(2)
4.4.4 The future of agency independence: The core function idea	101	(2)
4.4.5 The politics of agency independence: Recent legislative initiatives	103	(3)
4.5 "Principal" versus "Inferior" Officers	106	(2)
4.6 Other Limitations on Executive Control	108	(5)
4.6.1 The congressional decision to locate responsibility in subordinates	108	(2)
4.6.2 Tort liability of the President and his staff	110	(1)
4.6.3 Civil service considerations	111	(2)
4.7 Executive Control at the State Level	113	(5)
4.7.1 Separation of powers and the elected official problem	114	(1)
4.7.2 Techniques for achieving policy control at the state level	115	(3)
CHAPTER FIVE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AGENCY DISCRETION-THRESHOLD ISSUES	118	(103)
5.1 The Role of Judicial Review	118	(6)
5.1.1 Conclusions of law	118	(2)
5.1.2 Findings of fact	120	(1)
5.1.3 Choice of procedures	120	(1)
5.1.4 Scope of review	121	(2)
5.1.5 Consistency and rationality as limits on discretion	123	(1)
5.2 The Constitutional Basis for Judicial Review	124	(8)
5.2.1 Legislative limits on judicial review of constitutional questions	128	(3)
5.2.2 Review of issues of constitutional fact	131	(1)
5.3 The Statutory Basis for judicial Review	132	(6)
5.4 Standing to Obtain Judicial Review of Administrative Action	138	(28)
5.4.1 The history of the constitutional test for standing	139	(3)
5.4.2 The nature of the required injury	142	(8)
5.4.3 The relationship between the injury and the interest asserted	150	(2)
5.4.4 Causality and redressability	152	(5)
5.4.5 The statutory test for standing	157	(9)
5.4.6 Associational standing	166	(1)
5.5 Standing to Participate in Agency Action	166	(10)
5.5.1 Eligibility to intervene as an "interested" or "affected" person	169	(4)
5.5.2 Agency discretion to control intervention	173	(1)
5.5.3 Reform of intervention	173	(2)
5.5.4 Public financing of intervention	175	(1)
5.6 Jurisdiction and Venue	176	(6)
5.6.1 The problem of forum shopping	180	(1)
5.6.2 Reform of venue provisions	181	(1)
5.7 Timing of Judicial Review	182	(24)
5.7.1 Final agency action	183	(6)
5.7.2 Exhaustion of administrative remedies	189	(6)
5.7.3 Ripeness of administrative action for judicial review	195	(8)
5.7.4 A postscript on the tactical implications of the ripeness doctrine	203	(2)
5.7.5 The relationship between finality, exhaustion, and ripeness	205	(1)
5.8 Primary Jurisdiction	206	(11)
5.8.1 The origin of the doctrine	208	(1)
5.8.2 The current approach to primary jurisdiction	209	(1)
5.8.3 Primary jurisdiction and antitrust law	210	(5)
5.8.4 Judicial reservation about primary jurisdiction	215	(2)
5.9 The Problem of Agency Delay	217	(4)
CHAPTER SIX JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION-PROCEDURAL ISSUES	221	(135)
6.1 Sources of Agency Procedural Requirements	221	(1)
6.2 The Role of Procedures in Limiting Agency Discretion	222	(3)
6.3 The Due Process Clause as a Source of Procedural Requirements	225	(50)
6.3.1 Interests protected by Due Process	227	(2)
6.3.1a Property interests	229	(3)
6.3.1b The search for limits on property interests	232	(4)
6.3.1c Property as a statutory right?	236	(5)
6.3.1d "New" property versus "old" property	241	(2)
6.3.1e Liberty interests	243	(4)
6.3.1f Summary of interests protected by due process	247	(2)
6.3.2 The Due Process Clause applies to individualized determinations	249	(6)
6.3.3 Procedures required by Due Process	255	(8)
6.3.4 Application of the Mathews criteria	263	(1)
6.3.4a Private interest affected	263	(1)
6.3.4b The value of additional procedures	264	(4)
6.3.4c The cost of additional procedures	268	(1)
6.3.4d Criticisms of the Mathews test	269	(2)
6.3.5 Summary and postscript	271	(4)
6.4 Statutes as a Source of Procedural Requirements	275	(81)
6.4.1 Agency choice of rulemaking or adjudication	279	(4)
6.4.1a Agency power to make rules	283	(5)
6.4.1b Judicial oversight of agency choice of procedures	288	(8)
6.4.1c Judicial incentives to use rulemaking	296	(2)
6.4.2 The requirement of formal adjudication	298	(4)
6.4.3 The elements of formal adjudication	302	(1)
6.4.3a The central role of the Administrative Law Judge	302	(2)
6.4.3b Notice	304	(1)
6.4.3c Presentation of evidence	304	(1)
6.4.3d Findings and conclusions based exclusively on the record	305	(2)
6.4.4 Rulemaking	307	(1)
6.4.4a Interpretive rules	308	(3)
6.4.4b General statements of policy	311	(1)
6.4.4c Procedural rules	312	(1)
6.4.4d The good cause exception	313	(2)
6.4.5 The choice between formal and informal rulemaking	315	(5)
6.4.6 Informal rulemaking procedure	320	(1)
6.4.6a Notice and comments	321	(5)
6.4.6b Statement of basis and purpose	326	(5)
6.4.6c Executive control of rulemaking	331	(2)
6.4.6d Disincentives to use rulemaking	333	(1)
6.4.6e Interim rules on remand	334	(1)
6.4.6f Negotiated rulemaking	335	(1)
6.4.6g Obsolete rules and petitions for rulemaking	336	(1)
6.4.7 The effects of legislative rules in adjudicative proceedings	336	(1)
6.4.8 Must agencies provide exceptions to rules?	337	(1)
6.4.9 Hybrid procedures	338	(1)
6.4.9a The impact of Vermont Yankee	339	(2)
6.4.9b Legislative imposition of hybrid procedures	341	(1)
6.4.10 Informal adjudication	342	(4)
6.4.11 Prosecutorial discretion	346	(5)
6.4.12 Private rights of action	351	(5)
CHAPTER SEVEN JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION-SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES	356	(42)
7.1 The Role of Substantive Review	356	(3)
7.2 The Requirement of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law	359	(2)
7.3 Review of Findings of Fact	361	(13)
7.3.1 The substantial evidence test	362	(3)
7.3.2 The arbitrary and capricious test	365	(2)
7.3.3 The arguable convergence of substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious test	367	(2)
7.3.4 Judicial review of unknowable facts	369	(5)
7.4 Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations	374	(6)
7.5 Review of Agency Reasoning Process	380	(6)
7.6 A Digression on the Appropriate Role of Judicial Review	386	(7)
7.7 The Controversy Over Non-acquiescence in Judicial Decisions	393	(5)
CHAPTER EIGHT ACCESS TO PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INFORMATION	398	(56)
8.1 The Role of Government Information Policies	398	(2)
8.2 Government Access to Private Information	400	(20)
8.2.1 Statutory authority to compel disclosure	401	(2)
8.2.2 Paperwork Reduction Act	403	(1)
8.2.3 Fourth Amendment protections	404	(2)
8.2.4 Subpoenas and required reports	406	(5)
8.2.5 Anatomy of a subpoena	411	(2)
8.2.6 Inspections	413	(3)
8.2.7 Exceptions to the warrant requirement	416	(1)
8.2.8 Privilege as a limitation on administrative searches	417	(2)
8.2.9 Summary and assessment	419	(1)
8.3 Private Access to Public Information	420	(34)
8.3.1 Disclosure under the FOLA	421	(2)
8.3.2 Scope of disclosure	423	(1)
8.3.2a Definition of agency	424	(1)
8.3.2b Definition of record	425	(1)
8.3.3 Exemptions from disclosure	426	(1)
8.3.3a Exemption (b)(1): National defense and foreign affairs	427	(1)
8.3.3b Exemption (b)(2): Personnel rules and practices	428	(1)
8.3.3c Exemption (b)(3): Other statutory exemptions	429	(3)
8.3.3d Exemption (b)(4): Trade secrets and commercial or financial information	432	(6)
8.3.3e Exemption (b)(5): Inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda	438	(6)
8.3.3f Exemption (b)(6): Personnel and medical files	444	(2)
8.3.3g Exemption (b)(7): Investigatory records	446	(3)
8.3.4 The Privacy Act and the FOLA	449	(2)
8.3.5 Discovery and the FOIA	451	(3)
CHAPTER NINE FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY	454	(47)
9.1 The Relationship Between Fairness and Political Accountability	454	(1)
9.2 The Requirement of a Neutral Decision-Maker	455	(8)
9.2.1 Neutrality as a Due Process imperative	455	(2)
9.2.2 Neutrality under the APA	457	(2)
9.2.3 The problem of decision quotas and reversal rates	459	(2)
9.2.4 Neutrality in the rulemaking setting	461	(2)
9.3 The Problems of Ex Parte Contacts	463	(13)
9.3.1 The APA restrictions	463	(2)
9.3.2 Ex parte contacts and informal rulemaking	465	(4)
9.3.3 Ex parte contacts by the White House	469	(2)
9.3.4 Ex parte contacts by Congress	471	(1)
9.3.5 Ex parte contacts by agency staff: The role of separation of functions	472	(2)
9.3.6 Ex parte contacts between commissioners and ALJs and the ALJ corps idea	474	(2)
9.4 Open-Government Legislation	476	(9)
9.4.1 The Sunshine Act: The statutory framework	476	(1)
9.4.2 The Sunshine Act definition of "Meeting"	477	(1)
9.4.3 The effect of openness on collegial decision-making	478	(2)
9.4.4 The Federal Advisory Committee Act	480	(3)
9.4.5 The Ethics in Government Act	483	(2)
9.5 Regulatory Analysis and Political Accountability	485	(13)
9.5.1 Techniques of regulatory analysis	486	(1)
9.5.2 The executive order requirements	487	(2)
9.5.3 The statutory requirements	489	(2)
9.5.4 Congressional review of rules	491	(2)
9.5.5 Regulatory Review Legislation	493	(4)
9.5.5 The future of regulatory analysis	497	(1)
9.6 Concluding Note	498	(3)
APPENDIX	501	(52)
TABLE OF CASES	553	(14)
TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS	567	(8)
BIBLIOGRAPHY	575	(24)
INDEX	599