After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq

by Bensahel, Nora; Oliker, Olga; Crane, Keith; Brennan, Richard R.; Gregg, HEather S.

• ISBN13: 9780833044587
• ISBN10: 0833044583
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2008-07-18
• Publisher: RAND Corporation

Summary

"This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policyrnakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations."--BOOK JACKET.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. iii
Figures	p. xiii
Tables	p. xv
Summary	p. xvii
Acknowledgments	p. xxxi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	p. xxxiii
Introduction	p. 1
Military Planning Efforts	p. 5
CENTCOM Operational Planning	p. 6
Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Phase IV Planning	p. 10
Planning at V Corps and Subordinate Commands	p. 14
Observations	p. 14
Civilian Planning Efforts	p. 21
Interagency Planning: The ESG and the IPMC	p. 21
The Office of the Secretary of Defense	p. 24
The Office of Special Plans	p. 24
Policy Guidance	p. 26
OSD's Role in Policymaking	p. 28
State Department Planning	p. 29
The State Department and Interagency Planning	p. 30
The Future of Iraq Project	p. 31
USAID Planning	p. 33
Reconstruction Planning and Contracting	p. 33
Coordination with Other Agencies	p. 34
The National Security Council	p. 35
De-Ba'athification	p. 36
Restructuring Iraqi Military and Security Institutions	p. 36
Other Analyses of Postwar Requirements	p. 37
Task Force IV	p. 41
Establishing Task Force IV	p. 41
Task Force IV Planning	p. 42
Operational Challenges	p. 46
Staffing Issues	p. 46
Relations with CENTCOM and CFLCC	p. 47
Relations with ORHA	p. 50
The Dissolution of Task Force IV	p. 51
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance	p. 53
Organization and Staffing	p. 53
ORHA Planning	p. 58
The February Rock Drill	p. 59
ORHA's Role in Reconstruction	p. 64
Deploying to Kuwait	p. 65
Arriving in Baghdad	p. 68
The Transition to CPA	p. 70
Humanitarian Planning	p. 73
Interagency Humanitarian Planning	p. 73
IO and NGO Frustrations	p. 77
Actual Humanitarian Requirements	p. 78
Assessing Humanitarian Planning	p. 79
Combat Operations During Phase IV	p. 81
Phase IVa: Stability Operations	p. 81
Anticipated Security Challenges	p. 81
Security Challenges During the Transition to Phase IVa	p. 82
Initial Response to Civil Unrest	p. 84
Stabilization Efforts, March to June 2003	p. 86
Phase IVb: Recovery Operations	p. 93
Organization for Phase IVb	p. 93
The Growing Insurgency	p. 94
The Coalition Provisional Authority	p. 101
The Origins and Authorities of CPA	p. 101
Goals	p. 104
Other Governing Institutions	p. 106
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)	p. 106
Ministries	p. 107
Organization of CPA	p. 109
Location and Staffing	p. 115
Relations with CJTF-7	p. 118
Concluding Observations	p. 120
Building New Iraqi Security Forces	p. 121
Defining and Building Iraqi Security Forces	p. 121
Building the MoI	p. 123
Creating the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)	p. 124
The Facilities Protection Services	p. 132
The Border Police	p. 135
High-End MoI Forces	p. 137
Ministry of Defense	p. 138
The Iraqi Armed Forces	p. 139
Dissolution of the Iraqi Armed Forces: Aftermath	p. 139
Designing a New Force	p. 141
Building the New Force	p. 143
Changing Goals and Parameters	p. 145
Success or Failure?	p. 146
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)	p. 147
Intelligence	p. 150
National Security Decisionmaking Structures	p. 151
Iraqi Armed Forces and the Handover of Power	p. 153
Integrating the Armed Forces and Militias Not Under Government Control	p. 154
Concluding Observations	p. 156
Governance and Political Reconstruction	p. 159
Prewar Planning for Postwar Governance	p. 159
Postwar Governance: The Iraqi Governing Council	p. 160
The November 15 Agreement and the Transfer of Authority	p. 171
The Transitional Administrative Law	p. 179
Provincial and City Governance	p. 182
Lessons Learned	p. 187
Security and Political Development	p. 187
The Role of Exiles in the New Government	p. 188
Bringing All Groups into the Political Process	p. 189
Flexibility in Creating a New Government and Establishing Reasonable Timelines	p. 190
Publicizing Political Developments and Informing the Population	p. 191
The Importance of Civil Society and Political Culture	p. 192
Economic Policy	p. 195
Economic Conditions in Iraq at the End of Major Combat	p. 195
Economic Policies Pursued by CPA	p. 197
Restarting the Economy	p. 197
Resuming the Provision of Government Services	p. 198
Controlling Inflation	p. 199
Tariffs and Taxes	p. 201
The Budget	p. 202
Law on Foreign Direct Investment	p. 202
Economic Policy Changes That Were Not Fully Implemented	p. 203
Price Liberalization	p. 203
Reforming the Food Rationing System	p. 204
Rationalizing State-Owned Enterprises	p. 206
Lessons Learned	p. 208
Essential Services and Infrastructure	p. 211
Status at the End of Major Combat	p. 211
Prewar Assumptions	p. 212
Contracting for the Resumption of Essential Services	p. 215
Initial Contracts	p. 216
Post-Conflict Contracts in FY2003	p. 217
The Project Management Office	p. 218
The Players: Who Was Involved in Reconstruction	p. 219
Iraqi Ministries and State-Owned Enterprises	p. 219
CPA	p. 219
Regional Military Commanders	p. 220
U.S. Government Contracting Institutions	p. 220
International Institutions	p. 220
Contractors	p. 220
Financing	p. 221
Coordinating and Implementing Reconstruction Projects	p. 224
Project Selection	p. 224
Reconstruction and Project Management	p. 225
Allocation of Funds	p. 228
Results as of June 28, 2004	p. 229
Resuming the Provision of Essential Services	p. 229
Expenditures	p. 230
Costs	p. 230
Quality Control	p. 231
Assessing Postwar Efforts	p. 233
Shaping the Plan	p. 233
Unchallenged Assumptions and Expectations	p. 234
Ineffective Interagency Coordination	p. 237
Security as the Key Postwar Task	p. 239
Lessons for the Army	p. 241
Strategic Studies Institute's Mission Matrix for Iraq	p. 245
Bibliography	p. 255
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.