Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability

by Wilkening,Dean A.

• ISBN13: 9780199290048
• ISBN10: 0199290040
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 2002-02-28
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

The US debate surrounding ballistic-missile defence is becomingincreasingly polarised: advocates claim that these defences are essential to USsecurity and should be deployed as soon as possible; critics argue that theyupset strategic stability, encourage regional arms races, and therefore, willnot work. What is lacking in the current debate is a quantitative analysis ofhow well defences would have to work to meet specific security objectives, andwhat level of defence might upset strategic stability.This paper argues that there is no immediate need to deploy US national missiledefences because accidental or unauthorised Russian or Chinese attacks areunlikely, and because deterrence should mean that the risk of attack fromemerging ballistic-missile states is acceptably low. National missile defencemight be a useful insurance, but other defence needs are more pressing. However,if the US did deploy such a system, a modified Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty that allowed the US and Russia to deploy 100 interceptors at multiplesites around their territory should not pose a realistic threat to theretaliatory capabilities of four of the five declared nuclear powers. A100-interceptor system would, however, eliminate China's current strategicretaliatory capability against the US.The proliferation of theatre-range ballistic missiles is a more pressingproblem. It is not clear that current theatre systems can achieve the necessarylevels of performance in the presence of potential countermeasures. Relativelyfew effective countermeasures exist against airborne boost-phase systems. Thesemay be a more fruitful alternative, not least because they pose very littlethreat to the strategic forces of the five major nuclear powers. They maytherefore provide the most effective theatre missile defence, without upsettingstrategic stability.

Table of Contents

Introduction	5	(9)
Ballistic-Missile Proliferation	9	(20)
Assessing the Threat	9	(3)
The Rationale for National Missile Defence	12	(3)
The Rationale for Theatre-Missile Defence	15	(1)
US Foreign Policy and Ballistic-Missile Defence	16	(7)
Performance Criteria	23	(2)
Countermeasures	25	(4)
National Missile Defence	29	(16)
The Current US National Missile Defence Plan	30	(4)
Technical Requirements for National Missile Defence	34	(3)
Does US National Missile Defence Threaten Russia or China?	37	(5)
What if Russia Deployed a National Missile Defence?	42	(1)
Balancing Costs and Benefits	43	(2)
Theatre-Missile Defence	45	(14)
Current Programmes	46	(2)
Technical Requirements for Upper-Tier Theatre-Missile Defence	48	(5)
Does Upper-Tier Theatre-Missile Defence Threaten Russia or China?	53	(6)
Boost-Phase Ballistic-Missile Defence	59	(12)
Airborne Systems	60	(7)
Does Airborne Boost-Phase Defence Threaten Russia or China?	67	(4)
Conclusion	71	(4)
Appendix 1 Selected Ballistic-Missile Inventories and Characteristics	75	(6)
Appendix 2 Future Strategic Nuclear Forces	81	(6)
Notes	87