Bomb Scare

by Cirincione, Joseph

• ISBN13: 9780231135108
• ISBN10: 0231135106
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2007-03-02
• Publisher: Columbia Univ Pr

Summary

Since their inception, nuclear weapons have multiplied at an alarming rate, leaving everyone from policymakers to concerned citizens wondering what it will take to slow, stop, or even reverse their spread. With clarity and expertise, Joseph Cirincione presents an even-handed look at the history of nuclear proliferation and an optimistic vision of its future, providing a comprehensive survey of the wide range of critical perspectives.Cirincione begins with the first atomic discoveries of the 1930s and covers the history of their growth all the way to current crisis with Iran. He unravels the science, strategy, and politics that have fueled the development of nuclear stockpiles and increased the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack. He also explains why many nations choose not to pursue nuclear weapons and pulls from this the outlines of a solution to the world's proliferation problem: a balance of force and diplomacy, enforcement and engagement that yields a steady decrease in these deadly arsenals.Though nuclear weapons have not been used in war since August 1945, there is no guarantee this good fortune will continue. A unique blend of history, theory, and security analysis, Bomb Scareis an engaging text that not only supplies the general reader and student with a clear understanding of this issue but also provides a set of tools policymakers and scholars can use to prevent the cataclysmic consequences of another nuclear attack.

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables	p. vii
Acknowledgments	p. ix
Introduction	p. xi
Building the Bomb	p. 1
Controlling the Bomb	p. 14
Racing with the Bomb	p. 21
Why States Want Nuclear Weapons-and Why They Don't	p. 47
Today's Nuclear World	p. 84
The New U.S. Policy	p. 110
The Good News About Proliferation	p. 125
Nuclear Solutions	p. 139
Glossary	p. 159
Notes	p. 169
Index	p. 193
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Excerpts

From the Chapter "Nuclear Solutions" SOLVING PROBLEM 3: PREVENTING NEW STATES Most of the news, debate and discussion of nonproliferation problems have focused in recent years on the two or three states suspected of developing new weapon programs. In part, this is because the overthrow of these governments, particularly in the Middle East, has overlapped with other political and security agendas. The war in Iraq was only partially about eliminating Saddam Hussein& rs"s weapons capability, though that was the major justi& Fication for the war. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz famously admitted, & "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.& " The crises with Iran and North Korea are serious, but proliferation problems cannot be solved one country at a time. As the Carnegie study notes: Attempting to stem nuclear proliferation crisis by crisis& - from Iraq, to North Korea, to Iran, et cetera& -ultimately invites defeat. As each deal is cut, it sets a new expectation for the next proliferator. Regime change by force in country after country is neither right nor realistic. The United States would bankrupt and isolate itself, all the while convincing additional countries that nuclear weapons would be their only protection. A more systematic approach that prevents states within the NPT from acquiring the nuclear infrastructure needed to produce nuclear weapons is the only real sustainable option. size> While the speci& Fics and politics vary from country to country, a comprehensive, multidimensional approach is needed for all the threats we face from new nations acquiring weapons. Iran, by far the most di& cult of the cases, can serve as a model of how such an approach could work. Think for a moment about what it will take to convince the current or future Iranian government to abandon plans to build between six and twenty nuclear power reactors and all the facilities needed to make and reprocess the fuel for these reactors. Plans to do so predate the Islamic Republic. The United States, in fact, provided Iran with its & First research reactor in the late 1960s (it is still operating at the University of Tehran) and encouraged Iran in its nuclear pursuits. In the 1970s this encouragement included agreement by senior of& Ficials such as Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Cheney that Iran could develop indigenous facilities for enriching uranium and for reprocessing the spent fuel from nuclear reactors. Then-ruler Shah Reza Pahlavi developed plans to build 22 nuclear power reactors with an electrical output of 23,000 megawatts. Iran& rs"s current leaders say they are merely continuing these plans. Whatever its true intentions, it will not be easy to convince Iran that while it could proceed with construction of power reactors, the country must abandon construction of fuel-manufacturing facilities. It will likely require both the threat of sanctions and the promise of the economic bene& Fits of cooperation. This is the package of carrots and sticks that made up the negotiations between the European Union and Iran. Calibrating the right balance in this mix is di& cult enough, but the package itself is probably not su& cient t