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What is included with this book?
List of Figures | p. xi |
List of Tables | p. xiii |
Foreword | p. xiv |
Acknowledgements | p. xvi |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Why the stock bubble? | p. 1 |
From one bubble to another? | p. 1 |
A unique set of circumstances? | p. 2 |
How absurd were valuations? | p. 2 |
Why did investors ignore warning signals? | p. 3 |
Why did the stock bubble burst? | p. 4 |
Why did Greenspan ignore 'irrational exuberance'? | p. 4 |
Greenspan and the markets | p. 5 |
How costly was corporate governance failure? | p. 6 |
The Fed's enemy: inflation or deflation? | p. 7 |
What are the lessons from the 1929 bubble? | p. 8 |
Japan's mess and deflation: what can the United States learn? | p. 8 |
The massive policy push: powerful enough to create sustainable growth? | p. 9 |
How fragile is the US recovery? | p. 11 |
Where from here? | p. 11 |
A bull or bear market rally? | p. 12 |
The bubble era in US stocks | p. 13 |
Introduction | p. 13 |
Origins of the bubble | p. 14 |
Why the stock bubble? | p. 16 |
Stocks versus bonds | p. 16 |
Absurd valuations | p. 19 |
The bubble: geopolitical forces at work? | p. 20 |
The bubble: underwritten by a stable bond market? | p. 22 |
Debt, savings and switching | p. 23 |
Warning signals: why not switch? | p. 24 |
What of corporate earnings? | p. 25 |
Similarities with 1929 | p. 28 |
Where from here? | p. 29 |
Conclusion | p. 29 |
The great bull run of the 1990s | p. 31 |
Introduction | p. 31 |
Macroeconomic background | p. 32 |
The policy paradigm | p. 37 |
Dip and recovery: 1990-1 | p. 38 |
The roaring Dow: 1992-3 | p. 39 |
The policy-induced correction: 1994-5 | p. 41 |
Up, up and away: 1996-7 | p. 43 |
Correction and a major recovery: 1998-2000 | p. 47 |
Conclusion | p. 51 |
Valuation methods and investment strategies | p. 52 |
Introduction | p. 52 |
Portfolio choice | p. 53 |
Diversification and risk | p. 55 |
News: economic or financial? | p. 57 |
Market efficiency | p. 57 |
Investing over the life cycle | p. 58 |
The fundamentals approach | p. 59 |
The contrarian strategy | p. 60 |
Serial correlation and mean reversion | p. 63 |
Investment strategies | p. 64 |
Financial fragility | p. 66 |
Expectations, trading and timing | p. 67 |
Conclusion | p. 68 |
The bubble era: how rational? | p. 70 |
Introduction | p. 70 |
Biases in the one-way street | p. 70 |
Where were the arbitragers? | p. 76 |
Old benchmarks and turning points | p. 77 |
Was it a speculative bubble? | p. 78 |
The 'New' new economy | p. 79 |
The 1990s: a deviation from fundamentals | p. 80 |
Wealth storage and far-sightedness | p. 82 |
Greenspan's defense of the NASDAQ bubble | p. 83 |
Domestic origins of the boom | p. 85 |
Conclusion | p. 86 |
The new economy: has it arrived? | p. 88 |
Introduction | p. 88 |
Productivity growth and the stock market | p. 89 |
A rational bubble? | p. 90 |
Old questions and old answers | p. 91 |
The productivity slow down debate | p. 91 |
Sources of productivity growth | p. 93 |
The IT and communications revolution | p. 94 |
IT and communications: drivers of productivity growth? | p. 97 |
US government and productivity growth | p. 98 |
Productivity growth: how permanent? | p. 99 |
Productivity and the stock bubble | p. 100 |
Conclusion | p. 101 |
Governance issues: old and new | p. 102 |
Introduction | p. 102 |
Market versus government failure | p. 102 |
Incentives and trade-offs | p. 105 |
What are the challenging issues? | p. 106 |
Wall Street in the 1960s: fresh challenges | p. 108 |
Past pressure for regulation | p. 109 |
The case of Enron | p. 110 |
A dangerous incentive structure? | p. 111 |
Regulatory reform and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act | p. 112 |
Conclusion | p. 114 |
The Federal Reserve: in unchartered waters? | p. 115 |
Introduction | p. 115 |
Ultimate objectives and trade-offs | p. 116 |
The yield curve | p. 116 |
The government environment | p. 117 |
America's economic cruise speed: what guideposts? | p. 118 |
Diagnosis of imbalances | p. 120 |
Hitting targets: what policy mix? | p. 123 |
What economic indicators? | p. 124 |
Critics of the 'Wrong Paradigm' | p. 126 |
Canterbery's Vatican paradigm | p. 127 |
Reputation and credibility of the Federal Reserve | p. 128 |
The caterpillar market and fear of the Fed | p. 129 |
Confessions of a central banker | p. 130 |
Is the Fed secretive? | p. 130 |
Conclusion | p. 131 |
Shifting ground beneath the Federal Reserve | p. 132 |
Introduction | p. 132 |
Deregulation of the financial sector | p. 132 |
Financial product innovation | p. 133 |
Technology and innovation | p. 136 |
The effectiveness of monetary policy | p. 138 |
Target interest rates or monetary aggregates? | p. 140 |
Does money affect output? | p. 141 |
Channels of the monetary transmission mechanism | p. 142 |
Does money affect stock prices? | p. 144 |
Interest rates: how effective on output? | p. 145 |
Interest rates: what affect on stocks? | p. 146 |
Conclusion | p. 148 |
Evaluating the Greenspan years: 1987-2004? | p. 149 |
Introduction | p. 149 |
Greenspan's background | p. 150 |
Greenspan's economic philosophy | p. 150 |
Greenspan and the markets | p. 152 |
Sifting wheat from the chaff | p. 156 |
Power to move the economy? | p. 157 |
Mistakes in the Greenspan era? | p. 157 |
Greenspan's two flagships | p. 160 |
Flexibility: Greenspan's hallmark | p. 161 |
Conclusion | p. 163 |
The great asset price bubble of 1929 | p. 165 |
Introduction | p. 165 |
Seeds of the bust in the 1920s | p. 165 |
Damage to the real economy | p. 167 |
Causes of the 1929 crash and depression | p. 168 |
What were the triggers? | p. 175 |
What lessons have we learnt? | p. 175 |
Could history repeat itself? | p. 176 |
Conclusion | p. 177 |
Lessons from Japan's financial crisis | p. 178 |
Introduction | p. 178 |
Japan's old growth strategy | p. 178 |
Weaknesses and seeds of destruction | p. 180 |
Macroeconomic challenges | p. 180 |
Policy levers | p. 181 |
Why the asset price bubble? | p. 182 |
Financial not economic constraints | p. 183 |
Japan's asset price bubble: liquidity roots? | p. 184 |
What of the export growth strategy? | p. 185 |
Monetary policy failure | p. 186 |
Monetary transmission mechanism: clogged pipes? | p. 187 |
Fiscal policy failure | p. 188 |
Krugman's insight | p. 190 |
Japan's policy response: why so ineffective? | p. 191 |
Lessons from Japan's financial crisis | p. 192 |
A multi-pronged approach to recovery | p. 192 |
Flow on effects from Krugman's solution | p. 193 |
Lessons from Japan's stagnation | p. 194 |
Conclusion | p. 194 |
The Asian bubble and crisis | p. 196 |
Introduction | p. 196 |
Some commonalities | p. 196 |
Financial origins of the bubble | p. 197 |
Excess liquidity revisited | p. 203 |
Why did the bubble burst? | p. 203 |
The Asian crisis: why so sudden? | p. 206 |
Stock market performances: post bubble | p. 207 |
Conclusion | p. 210 |
US stock markets: where from here? | p. 212 |
Introduction | p. 212 |
From one bubble to another? | p. 213 |
What of currency instability? | p. 213 |
The liberation of Iraq | p. 214 |
Geopolitical forces | p. 215 |
Synchronization and integrated markets | p. 217 |
Why the US stock rally? | p. 218 |
The powerful policy stimulus | p. 219 |
The US economic recovery: where from here? | p. 222 |
Lessons from the movie: Wall Street | p. 223 |
Conclusion | p. 223 |
Bibliography | p. 226 |
Index | p. 232 |
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