The Calculus of Consent

by Buchanan, James M.

• ISBN13: 9780865975323
• ISBN10: 0865975329
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2004-11-01
• Publisher: Liberty Fund

Summary

This is the second volume of Liberty Fund's "The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock", it is a reprint edition of the ground-breaking economic classic written by two of the world's preeminent economists -- Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan. This book is a unique blend of economics and political science that helped create significant new subfields in each discipline respectively, namely, the public choice school and constitutional political economy. Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University, points out in his introduction, "The Calculus of Consent" is, by a wide margin, the most widely cited publication of each coauthor and, by general agreement, their most important scientific contribution." The book is divided into four parts, each consisting of several chapters. The introduction by Professor Rowley provides a short overview of the book and identifies key insights that permeated the bounds of economics and political science and created an enduring nexus between the two sciences. Part I establishes the conceptual framework of the book's subject; part II defines the realm of social choice; part III applies the logic developed in part II to describe a range of decision-making rules, most notably, the rule of simple majority; while part IV explores the economics and ethics of democracy.

Table of Contents

Introduction
James McGill Buchanan
The conceptual framework
Introduction	p. 3
The individualistic postulate	p. 11
Politics and the economic nexus	p. 16
Individual rationality in social choice	p. 30
The realm of social choice
The organization of human activity	p. 41
A generalized economic theory of constitutions	p. 60
The rule of unanimity	p. 81
The costs of decision-making	p. 93
Analyses of decision-making rules
The structure of the models	p. 115
Simple majority voting	p. 127
Simple majority voting and the theory of games	p. 143
Majority rule, game theory, and Pareto optimality	p. 165
Pareto optimality, external costs, and income redistribution	p. 182
The range and extent of collective action	p. 192
Qualified majority voting rules, representation, and the interdependence of constitutional variables	p. 202
The bicameral legislature	p. 222
The orthodox model of majority rule	p. 237
The economics and the ethics of democracy
Democratic ethics and economic efficiency	p. 253
Pressure groups, special interests, and the constitution	p. 269
The politics of the good society	p. 281
Marginal notes on reading political philosophy	p. 291
Theoretical forerunners	p. 310
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