What is included with this book?
List of Figures | p. x |
List of Tables | p. xi |
Notes on the Contributors | p. xiii |
Foreword | p. xv |
Preface | p. xvii |
Acknowledgements | p. xix |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Survey of Models and Indicators of Independence | p. 6 |
Introduction | p. 6 |
Base indicators of independence | p. 7 |
First indicators of de jure independence: Bade and Parkin (1977) | p. 8 |
Alesina's political response (1988, 1989) | p. 10 |
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) | p. 12 |
Two of the most widely used indicators: Cukierman (1992) | p. 16 |
Aggregation of two legal measures: Alesina and Summers (1993) | p. 18 |
A new legal indicator: Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) | p. 20 |
Political vulnerability of central banks: Cukierman and Webb (1995) | p. 20 |
Subsequent literature and empirical studies on base indicators | p. 25 |
Theoretical and empirical clarifications on central bank independence | p. 25 |
Endogenizing the inflation bias | p. 29 |
Robustness of independence measures | p. 32 |
Causality of hypotheses on central bank independence | p. 35 |
Robustness and sensitivity of results, and search for new measures | p. 41 |
Independence, credibility, and costs of deflation | p. 51 |
Conclusions | p. 59 |
Appendices: | p. 63 |
Variables in Cukierman's LVAU-LVAW indices | p. 63 |
Variables in Cukierman's QVAU-QVAW | p. 67 |
Summary of base indicators of de jure independence | p. 69 |
Summary of base indicators of de facto independence | p. 77 |
Summary of empirical studies of de jure independence | p. 81 |
Summary of empirical studies on de fact independence | p. 88 |
Survey of Models and Indicators on Accountability | p. 90 |
Responsibility and accountability | p. 90 |
Responsibility | p. 91 |
Accountability | p. 91 |
The concept of accountability in the literature | p. 93 |
Briault, Haldane, and King (1996): de jure and de facto accountability | p. 93 |
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000): ex ante and ex post accountability | p. 94 |
de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998): three main features | p. 95 |
Castellani (2002) | p. 97 |
Siklos (2002) | p. 97 |
Time inconsistency and accountability | p. 98 |
Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank | p. 98 |
Override | p. 98 |
Contractual solution | p. 99 |
Indicators and measures of accountability | p. 99 |
Briault, Haldane, and King (1996) | p. 99 |
de Haan, Amtenbrink, and Eijffinger (1998) | p. 100 |
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2000 and 2001) | p. 102 |
Stasavage (2003) | p. 104 |
Siklos (2002) | p. 104 |
Accountability indices: comparison of empirical results | p. 105 |
Survey of Models and Indicators of Transparency | p. 107 |
Introduction | p. 107 |
Rationales for transparency | p. 108 |
Boost central bank credibility | p. 108 |
Influence expectations | p. 108 |
Protect central bank independence | p. 109 |
Strengthen the understanding of monetary policy | p. 109 |
Reduce information asymmetries and uncertainity in financial markets | p. 110 |
Enhance market efficiency | p. 111 |
Eliminate government uncertainty on the performance of monetary policy | p. 111 |
Enhance fiscal and monetary policy coordination | p. 111 |
The concept of transparency in the literature | p. 111 |
Transparency and accountability | p. 111 |
Characteristics of transparency | p. 112 |
Aspects of transparency in the policy-making process | p. 114 |
Indicators and measures in the literature | p. 116 |
General observations | p. 116 |
Siklos (2002) | p. 117 |
Eijffinger and Geraats (2004) | p. 117 |
Stasavage (2003) | p. 118 |
de Haan and Amtenbrink (2003) | p. 120 |
Comparison between measures | p. 121 |
Conclusions | p. 122 |
Indicators of Independence, Accountability, and Transparency | p. 124 |
Methodology for assessing central bank independence | p. 124 |
General considerations | p. 124 |
The GMT (1991) index | p. 124 |
The Cukierman (1992) index | p. 126 |
Assessment procedure and sampling | p. 127 |
Methodology for assessing central bank accountability and transparency | p. 127 |
General considerations | p. 132 |
Detailed index of accountability | p. 136 |
Detailed index of transparency | p. 145 |
Global Trends in Central Bank Governance | p. 151 |
Global trends in central bank independence | p. 151 |
Central bank independence in the late 1980s | p. 152 |
Central bank independence as of end-2003 | p. 152 |
Developments in central bank independence over time | p. 159 |
Global trends in central bank accountability and transparency | p. 163 |
Accountability scores | p. 163 |
Transparency scores | p. 167 |
Relationships between independence, accountability, and transparency | p. 170 |
Accountability and transparency | p. 170 |
Accountability and independence | p. 173 |
Transparency and independence | p. 175 |
Additional considerations | p. 178 |
Conclusions | p. 178 |
Global trends in central bank governance | p. 179 |
Trends by stages of economic development and regions | p. 179 |
Relative deficit of accountability | p. 179 |
Relative deficit of transparency | p. 182 |
Appendices: | p. 187 |
Independence: country sample | p. 187 |
Independence: political scores for advanced economies (2003) | p. 190 |
Independence: political scores for emerging markets (2003) | p. 192 |
Independence: political scores for developing countries (2003) | p. 194 |
Independence: economic scores for advanced economies (2003) | p. 198 |
Independence: economic scores for emerging markets (2003) | p. 200 |
Independence: economic scores for developing countries (2003) | p. 202 |
Independence: evolution for GMT sample (late 1980s-2003) | p. 206 |
Independence: evolution for Cukierman sample (late 1980s-2003) | p. 208 |
Independence: Summary indices (late 1980s-2003) | p. 213 |
Accountability database (2006) | p. 220 |
Transparency database (2006) | p. 224 |
Detailed governance scores | p. 228 |
Independence and Inflation Performance: New Empirical Evidence | p. 232 |
Policy Lessons from Global Trends | p. 237 |
Overview | p. 237 |
Relationships between the pillars of central bank governance | p. 238 |
Consensus views | p. 241 |
Set price stability as one of the primary objectives of monetary policy | p. 242 |
Curtail direct lending to governments | p. 242 |
ensure full independence for setting the policy rate | p. 243 |
ensure no government involvement involvement in policy formulation | p. 243 |
ensure that accountability corresponds to the level of independence | p. 244 |
ensure that transparency corresponds to the level of accountability and financial market deepening | p. 244 |
Role of central banks in financial supervision | p. 245 |
Theoretical considerations | p. 245 |
Survey of practices | p. 247 |
The way forward | p. 249 |
Sequencing of reforms | p. 251 |
clarify objectives and establish basic instrument independence | p. 252 |
establish the building block of accountability | p. 254 |
strengthen further political independence, accountability, and transparency | p. 255 |
References | p. 256 |
Index | p. 264 |
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.
The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.