The Chechen Struggle Independence Won and Lost

by Akhmadov, Ilyas; Lanskoy, Miriam; Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.

• ISBN13: 9780230105348
• ISBN10: 0230105343
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-11-15
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

Summary

KEY TITLEThe Russian-Chechen war has been the longest, cruelest, and bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II, surpassing even the level of destruction of Bosnia and Kosovo. Told from the perspective of its former Foreign Minister, this uniquely candid account of Chechnya's struggle for independence and its two wars against Russia will revise our understanding of the conflict and explain how it continues. Ilyas Akhmadov delivers a comprehensive history including new details about the start of the first war against Russia, the crises within Chechen society, the splintering and radicalization of the Chechen leadership, the incursions into Dagestan, and his own efforts to bring about peace. Akhmadov provides intimate portraits of key personalities including General Dzhokhar Dudayev Chechnya's first charismatic president; Shamil Basayev who was transformed from a talented rebel fighter into radical who was responsible for many terrorist attacks including the hostage takings in the theater Nord Ost and the school in Beslan; and the tragic personality of Aslan Maskhadov, the principled president who tried to maintain unity and coherence despite enormous difficulties. The book shows the impossible dilemma of the moderate nationalists in post-Soviet societies, who are challenged by radical Islamic ideology, social deprivations, Russian aggression, and international neglect. By giving voice to the moderates, the book seeks to shift the balance in their favor.

Author Biography

Ilyas Akhmadov was the Foreign Minister of Chechnya from 1999 to 2005, during the government of Aslan Maskhadov.  His articles appeared in The Washington Post and The Boston Globe.

Miriam Lanskoy, Ph.D. is Director of Russia and Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy. She has testified before Congress and has been interviewed on NPR and appeared on PBS’s The News Hour.  

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. vii
Foreword	p. xi
Map of Chechnya	p. xv
The War Begins	p. 1
Joining Maskhadov's General Staff	p. 25
Raid on Budennovsk: Basayev Forces Peace	p. 41
Maskhadov Is Elected President	p. 63
Maskhadov's Impossible Quandary	p. 77
The Hostage Trade	p. 101
Crisis within Chechen Society	p. 121
Incursions into Dagestan: War Resumes	p. 151
The Chechen Resistance Splinters	p. 173
My Tenure as Foreign Minister	p. 193
The Killing of Maskhadov	p. 221
The North Caucasus Emirate and Beyond	p. 235
Notes	p. 249
Index	p. 263
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Excerpts

FOREWORD

 

CHAPTER 1

THE WAR BEGINS

Prior to the summer of 1994, I considered myself an ordinary person. I was not involved in politics, and I had the equivalent of a master of arts in political science from Rostov State University in Rostov on the Don. I had served in the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces for almost five years when I was demobilized in 1985. I held a minor clerical job in the Chechen Foreign Ministry for about six months in 1992 under Foreign Minister Shamil Beno.

When I realized that war with Russia was imminent, I joined up with Shamil Basayev, a famous Chechen commander with whom I had formed a friendship and had later served under Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen Army Chief of Staff. During the first war (1994–96), I had frequent and close contact with these two men, who were brilliant military commanders and dominant figures in Chechen politics. Their relationship, sometimes cooperative and other times competitive, determined the course of the nation’s history in the ensuing decade. Joining up with Shamil in August 1994 gave me a unique vantage point from which to view and analyze Chechen politics.

Politically, I was a nationalist who favored independence and supported General Dzhokhar Dudayev. As the head of the National Congress of the Chechen People Dudayev proclaimed Chechnya’s independence in November 1991, just as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Dudayev’s pro-independence government had domestic l egitimacy and w as e nthusiastically accepted by most of the population. After 1991, Chechnya did not participate in the referendum on the Russian constitution, had no representation in the Russian parliament and Dudayev did not take policy directions from the Russian government. Chechnya maintained its own economic and foreign policies and did not participate in Russian national elections.

In the Soviet period Checheno-Ingushetia was an autonomous republic within the Russian union republic. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the Ingush and the Chechens separated; the Ingush preferred to remain in the Russian Federation while the Chechens wanted independence. However, though the international community recognized union republics as independent states, it did not extend the same recognition to autonomous republics like Chechnya. Nonetheless, even without de jure recognition, Chechnya began functioning as an independent state in 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet Union presented a historic opportunity for Chechnya to finally achieve the independence it had sought for centuries. Many Chechens believed that if Chechnya could function as an independent state, it would eventually receive official recognition from other states and the United Nations.

My support for Dudayev and Chechen independence did not mean that I approved of everything that was happening. There were different political factions that challenged Dudayev’s leadership, and these internal disputes were not resolved transparently. People with little experience in politics were exercising their freedoms of speech and assembly for the first time, and the absence of established political institutions led to a variety of conflicts. The political environment suffered from an unstable mix of Soviet-era structures, such as a strong executive system, new efforts to import Western institutions—a new parliament and electoral system—and attempts to introduce national institutions such as theMekh Khell(a traditional council of elders) which should have been purely consultative. Dudayev used theMekh Khellto legitimate his decisions when the parliament would not. He eventually disbanded parliament in 1993 and appointed a new one. I felt a strong distaste for such power struggles and for the constant rallies that took place in the center of Grozny where, in the presence of armed men, orators gave inf lammatory speeches. The summer of 1994 brought new and unwelcome changes to city life, including the appearance of armored personnel carriers in the streets and occasional gunfire at night.

Those who were not involved in politics managed to ignore these scenes and go on with their daily lives. Politics involved only a small sliver of the population of one million; most people did not understand why a particular shoot-out had occurred or why the supporters of one politician or another were rallying in front of the presidential palace—like others, we too thought it was palace intrigue that did not concern us. But everything changed a few months later when the first war dragged all Chechens into a battle for survival.