Excerpt fromChapter 6: Regional Security Cooperation

China and India have unleashed a diplomatic charm offensive in Asia to satisfy their growing economic needs. Delegations fly back and forth between Asian capitals to broker new trade agreements and business deals. In their wake, Chinese and Indian engineers are laying out the infrastructure necessary to carry the expanding trade flows. The economization of China and India's regional diplomacy has created new security challenges. In many parts of the region their economic ventures have come under threat from organized criminality, terrorism, and domestic instability in partner countries, not least in their immediate neighborhood. In the corridor of states stretching from Pakistan to Myanmar, Chinese and Indian economic interests have been confronted by various security risks. This area, where mainly nontraditional violence draws strong concern from both sides, has for a long time been an arena for Sino-Indian rivalry.

This chapter studies to what extent growing commercial interests in the region will lead to enhanced security cooperation between China and India. My aim is to test empirically whether trade and the increasing interest in a stable neighborhood will mitigate the "protracted contest," as it is described by scholars like John Garver. Will India and China join forces to promote security and to deal with the unrest in neighboring states? Four assumptions are central. First, it is assumed that economic security has become a more important element in China and India's neighborhood policy. Second, as a consequence of their increasing economic interests the two countries have become more confronted by nontraditional security challenges. Third, it is presupposed that this similarly growing exposure has led to more regional security interdependence. Finally, this interdependence can be expected to lead to more security cooperation.

The idea of security interdependence taps into the Copenhagen school of international studies, in particular the two key concepts of regional security complexes and securitization. Defining a regional security complex as a geographically restricted set of states whose security interests are so interlinked that solutions cannot be achieved apart from one another, Barry Buzan approaches Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar as insulators and buffer states that separate the two larger East and South Asian regional security complexes, mainly because of a lack of connectedness. Pakistan is perceived as only a part of the South Asian complex. Given the growing logistical links, cross-border commercial activity, trade, investments, and flows of people, threats as well can be expected to travel more easily over short distances. In this regard, consideration is given to what extent a subregional security complex is emerging as a consequence of the similar challenges that Beijing and New Delhi are facing due to increasing connectedness and the growing nontraditional security threats.

This in turn brings us to the pattern of security interdependence. Three types of security complexes can be distinguished. At the negative end lie conflict formations, which are driven by threat perceptions. Security interests are perceived as a zero-sum-game in which self-help and the quest for creating a favorable balance of power are decisive. Cooperation is absent because of the fear of losing influence. This is the setting that bears the most resemblance to the idea of a protracted contest that Garver and most other students of Sino-Indian relations have postulated. Security complexes may also take the shape of security regimes, where the security dilemma is somewhat mitigated and cooperation is possible. At the other end of the spectrum rests the security community in which threat perceptions have completely disappeared.

According to the Copenhagen school, the evolution from conflict formation to other stages depends mainly on the type of securitization. Although security interdependence may have become an urgent reality, it still has to be recognized as such before it can lead to cooperation. On the one hand, similar security interests between states do not necessarily have to be approached as common interests; on the other, common security interests may be accepted but still not lead to security cooperation because in the hierarchy of security objectives they are still ranked below the wish to maintain diplomatic, military, or economic dominance vis-à-vis another state. In order to assess the prospects for cooperation between China and India in their common neighborhood, the extent to which recent securitization of regional economic interests leads to a desecuritization of their mutual interaction in this area must be measured.

While Ole Wæver rightly stresses that political discourse should be a key focus in such an assessment, this chapter aims at striking a balance between discourse and deeds. In their most primitive form joint security interests could take the shape of a joint willingness to repress low-level risks such as criminality. New Delhi and Beijing could also jointly decide to support local regimes for suppressing armed resistance and rebellion. Yet, the evolution from a conflict setting to enhanced security cooperation needs to go further; the quality of collective regional security efforts should also be assessed by looking at the extent to which India and China are prepared to put pressure on local elites to foster more comprehensive security, that is, an inclusive political transition in which all rival parties are involved, as well as the tackling of economic and political mechanisms at the basis of grievances and violence. In a competitive context where neighboring regimes are considered precious allies, sovereignty tends to be perceived as sacrosanct and above all a comfortable premise for strengthening goodwill and influence among political leaders. In such a situation it is attractive to neglect that those political fiends are often more a part of security problems than of their solution. The quality of cooperation, rather than cooperation as such, will reveal whether China and India succeed in desecuritizing their bilateral relations in regional affairs for the sake of securing their short- and long-term economic interests.

In the following sections, I elucidate how China and India have expanded their influence in their shared neighborhood, how this transformation has rendered them more vulnerable to various nontraditional threats, and to what extent they have grasped these challenges to join forces with regard to regional security issues.

Interests

The grouping of Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Myanmar is one of the least-developed quarters in Asia, and their trade relations with China and India have remained limited. In 2006, China's trade volume with the subregion amounted to only U.S.$7 billion. India's stood at U.S.$4 billion. That year, China's investment stock was not more than U.S.$400 million; for India this remained well below U.S.$200 million. Nevertheless, there are still several beckoning opportunities. This market is a perfect fit with the unsophisticated industries in India and China's landlocked provinces. Between 2001 and 2006, Chinese exports to the subregion grew from U.S.$1.3 billion to U.S.$5.5 billion, with Xinjiang, Yunnan, and Tibet representing 18 percent of this volume. India saw its business expand from U.S.$600 million to U.S.$2 billion. The poorly developed states are also a lucrative target for engineering companies. Fazal-ur-Rahman estimated that, in 2006, the total contracted volume of engineering work gained by China in Pakistan alone amounted to U.S.$8.64 billion. By the end of 2007, the accumulated amount of contracts China had signed with Myanmar for labor services reached U.S.$4.7 billion, with a total realized turnover of U.S.$3.1 billion. In Nepal the accumulated value of such contracts surpassed U.S.$1 billion.

Natural resources are another asset in which China and India both take an interest. Chinese and Indian companies are eying oil reserves in Pakistan and Myanmar. In 2007, Zhenhua Oil, a subsidiary of CNPC, signed an agreement with Islamabad to explore reserves in the provinces of Punjab, Northwest Frontier, and Baluchistan. In 2006, CNPC successfully bid for the rights to explore a block in Sindh, eastern Pakistan. All three Chinese oil giants have gained a footing in Myanmar. In October 2004, a consortium led by CNOOC's Myanmar unit, China Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering, started drilling at onshore blocks C-1, C-2, and M, as well as at offshore blocks A-4, M-2, and M-10. In July 2004, Sinopec's Dian-Qian-Gui unit signed a production-sharing contract with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise to look for mineral fuels at Block D in the onshore area of Mahudaung, in Rakhine state. In 2007, CNPC signed production-sharing contracts to explore for oil and gas in three offshore blocks, AD-1, AD-6, and AD-8, off the western Rakhine coast. Regarding India ONGC, GAIL, and Essar have made forays and become involved in blocks A-1 and A-3, also off the Rakhine coast. In September 2007, ONGC signed separate production-sharing contracts for natural gas in three deep-sea blocks, AD-2, AD-3, and AD-9. In 2008, Essar started exploratory drilling for natural gas at an inland block near Sittwe, in Rakhine state.

Myanmar's largely untapped mineral reserves have also attracted the attention of its neighbors. In 2004, China and Myanmar signed a memorandum on cooperation in the exploitation of mineral resources, including copper, nickel, and iron. At the same time, a large-scale mineral exploration project was approved between the China Hainan Jiayi Machine Import and Export Company and Myanmar's Department of Geological Survey and Mineral Exploration, providing for the exploration right for copper and other minerals in Kachin state. China Nonferrous Metal Mining Company got approval to invest U.S.$500 million in nickel-mining operations in Mandalay province. In 2005, an agreement followed with Kingbao Mining for nickel exploration in northwestern Myanmar's Mwetaung region. On a smaller scale, several Indian companies are digging for gold and precious stones, especially near the border with India. Approximately 76 percent of the country's timber production is shipped to China and India. Another commodity of strategic importance is pigeon peas. India relies on Myanmar for half its import of these legumes. Any disruption in the supply could cause severe social difficulties because many Indians spend a significant part of their earnings on the product for their daily patties. In Pakistan, Chinese companies have invested in excavation projects in Baluchistan. In 2003, the Metallurgical Construction Corporation hammered out a concession for copper, gold, and silver mining in Saindak.

Finally, there is the objective to turn the subregion into a transit corridor. For China, securing its commercial links means access to the Indian Ocean from Yunnan via Myanmar and, second, from Xinjiang via Pakistan. India needs to keep an eye on its links between the northeast and Myanmar, as well as those that could be further developed to central Asia via Pakistan. Equally important to the facilitation of cross-border trade is preventing interaction with neighboring countries that could undermine stability and economic development of their fragile peripheral areas. While the people that live in such places might not always feel attached to the political center, the center is more and more interested in the soil they live on. Tibet and Xinjiang, for instance, are of vital importance for supplying natural resources to the factories on the Chinese coast. Xinjiang has promising deposits of oil and natural gas. Since 1999, Chinese geologists have discovered more than six hundred new sites of copper, iron, lead, and zinc deposits on the Tibetan Plateau. India's remote northeast is believed to contain large reserves of fossil fuels, uranium, and various mineral ores. Upstream control in these regions is a prerequisite for national growth and domestic stability.

In recent years, Chinese and Indian economic interests in their neighborhood have expanded significantly. The region has become a direct target for natural resources, and indirectly it is expected to play an important role in the development of domestic peripheral areas. The economization of both countries' relations with their neighbors has resulted in increasing vulnerability. The growing dependence on safe transit and the supply of natural resources means that it will be more difficult to absorb disruptions to which they might become exposed. Although the links with countries like Myanmar and Pakistan remain modest compared to China and India's overall engagement with the global economy, this region has become more important for their economic security.

Belt of Insecurity

Given this increasing vulnerability, what are the risks for China and India's economic security? For one thing, they are confronted by the proliferation of criminal activities in the border areas. The porous boundaries with Nepal and Myanmar in particular are a transit zone for smuggling. Most of India and China's drug imports come from Myanmar. The Wa ethnic group, with communities in both Myanmar and China, has developed a certain division of labor where Wa farmers in Myanmar produce poppies and Chinese Wa act as smugglers and furnishers of chemicals to make heroine. Across the border with Yunnan, Manipur, and Mizoram, gangs are involved in the smuggling of rare species of animals, gems, and timber. Brothels and gambling bars have shot out of the ground like mushrooms. India is struggling with criminal activities mainly at its border with Nepal. Armed gangs are active in the trafficking of Nepali women, arms, oil, and drugs. Apart from the dramatic prevalence of AIDS in border areas such as Yunnan or the Indian states of Mizoram, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, this has also led to a steady criminalization of border towns, with Indian and Chinese citizens more often falling prey to violence. Since 2006, overseas drug traders have opened new trafficking routes for smuggling narcotics to China through India and Nepal. In some areas, even the security forces face aggression. In February 2008, for example, three Chinese marine police officers were injured in a gunfight with Myanmar drug traffickers on the Mekong River. In 2003, Indian border guards reportedly were so often victim to armed aggression they ceased patrolling in several sections of the border with Myanmar.

The situation is aggravated when criminal activities mingle with armed rebellion. Several areas where China and India look to improve transport infrastructure are affected by rebel movements. In Myanmar China's oil pipeline and road and railway projects run partially through Shan state, a region fragmented into drug empires and ravaged by rival warlords. Two main armed movements, the Shan State Army and the Shan State National Army, are among the most resilient competitors of the military junta. A study by Toshihiro Kudo reveals that most of the current trade links with China have become prone to violence and, further, that the trade flows via the main road from Ruili to Mandalay are monopolized by a branch of the Myanmar military intelligence service. Power struggles between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and rebel groups, as well as internal rivalry between different units of the military, loom large over China's ambition to link the city of Kunming to the Andaman Sea. India's routes are imperiled too. The Kaladan Project, for connecting the state of Mizoram to the Myanmar port of Sittwe, covers the unstable states of Chin and Arakan, where various armed movements from Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India seek refuge.

The challenges in Pakistan are even more serious. In Baluchistan, where several Chinese projects are located, rebel movements have frequently targeted Chinese workers. In May 2004, three Chinese were killed in Gwadar. In February 2006, three Chinese engineers were shot dead. In July that year, a car bomb targeted a vehicle carrying Chinese mine workers. In South Waziristan, an area near the border with Afghanistan, one Chinese hostage held by Islamic militants was killed while another was freed in a rescue mission by Pakistani forces. In June 23, Islamist hard-liners abducted seven Chinese nationals. A month later, three Chinese nationals were killed in a town near Peshawar, in northwestern Pakistan. The killings were widely seen as revenge for the government's crackdown on religious militants holed up in Islamabad. Islamic radicals have targeted Chinese citizens because they are perceived as an ally of the regime of President Musharraf. States like Baluchistan and Waziristan feel that Chinese investments are benefiting the political elite in Islamabad rather than the local populations. They are also angered by what they see as repression of the Muslim Uighur minority community in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This violence has caused CNPC to reconsider its exploration activities. Escalating rebellion in Baluchistan risks hampering other companies' exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, Indian and Chinese plans to develop a logistical corridor through this region, to the Indian Ocean and central Asia, respectively, will be thwarted if the new roads and pipelines become a target for insurgents.

In Nepal domestic political violence has affected mainly India's interests. Several opposition groups have targeted India as a new imperialist oppressor. In 2000, a wave of anti-Indian sentiment resulted in attacks on Indian entrepreneurs and led to four deaths. In 2004, after Indian armed forces arrested one of their leaders, Nepalese Maoist factions threatened Indian businessmen in the border areas and forced them to leave within twenty-four hours. They torched Indian oil tankers and opened fire on Indian truckers. In 2005 and 2006, outbursts of anger followed alleged attempts by India to interfere in Nepalese domestic affairs. Again Indian entrepreneurs where threatened with expulsion. In 2006, an Indian national was killed in fights between security forces and Maoists in a Nepalese border town.

While instability threatens interests abroad, domestic security is at risk, too, as violence spills over the border into sensitive regions. The forested mountains near the Indian lowlands or the rocky valleys of the Himalayas are perfect terrain for rebels to shelter themselves or from which to make forays. Most of the Indian and Chinese people living in these areas are among the poorest of their countries. Often, these groups are banished to the economic and political margins, resulting in frustration, an informal economy prone to criminality, and increasing awareness of local ethnic and religious identities. Several of these isolated regions have stronger cultural and economic links with neighboring states than with the rest of the country.

At the end of 2007, India's northeast counted eleven rebel movements, each with an average of 850 combatants. New Delhi considers them one of the main stumbling blocks to domestic development. Blackmail, looting, popular support among impoverished farmers, and the porous boundary with Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Bangladesh allow the armed groups to persist in their activities. All are assumed to have training camps and weapons stockpiles in neighboring countries. The Naxalites, an amalgamation of leftist resistance groups, find refuge in Nepal and Bhutan. Indian home minister Shivraj Patil said that, in 2007, ten states and 180 districts in the country were affected by the "Naxalite problem," good for a total of seven hundred violent incidents. The Madheshi resistance in the Terai region in southern Nepal exposes Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to cross-border violence. Combatants of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha faction often run over the border with India seeking shelter from raids by Nepalese security forces. Indian citizens from Uttar Pradesh are believed to have participated in Terai riots. Because the Madheshi armed rebellion is closely related to property feuds, smuggling, and other criminal activities, the political economy of this Nepalese conflict risks undermining the stability in the fragile Indian border states. Moreover, as the conflict in southern Nepal becomes more and more complicated, with the Madheshis involved in a struggle against Nepalese Maoists and both entities fragmenting internally, violence can further escalate and become uncontrollable. Nepal is also a potential stepping-stone for Islamic terrorists. Several attacks by Pakistani terrorists since the late 1990s have had a connection with Nepal. Nepal has been used as an infiltration route into and from Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi now also fears that the Islamic communities in southern Nepal may become a means for Pakistani Islamic extremists to target India. Finally, there is Pakistan. Apart from the conflict in Kashmir, where the Pakistani military continues supporting anti-India guerrillas, the Talibanization of the rest of Pakistan is the single-most important source of terrorist attacks in India.

China's security fear of a spillover of violence relates first and foremost to Tibetan refugees. Approximately thirty-five thousand Tibetans live in Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal. Beijing's attitude toward these communities is ambivalent. On the one hand there is the opinion that the expulsion of ethnic Tibetans favors the dominance of Han Chinese in the region and rids the People's Republic of a problem. On the other, the concentration of Tibetans in neighboring countries represents a potential bastion of resistance. In the 1960s and 1970s for instance, Tibetans, supported by the United States, launched a guerrilla war from Nepal's Mustang district. China is also concerned that Tibetan emancipation in Nepal may stir unrest within its own borders. Protests in its neighboring countries are seen as a blow to the Chinese government's legitimacy. Beijing wants to make sure that it controls the emerging logistical links with Nepal to avoid emigrated Tibetans' having access to them in China.

Beijing is also concerned that Pakistan could become a sanctuary for Islamist secessionists from Xinjiang. According to the Chinese government, members of the East Turkestan Liberation Organization use Pakistan as a hideaway and for rearming. As border trade with Pakistan expanded, local security services became concerned about the presence of Pakistani citizens connected to Islamist organizations like Tablighi Jamaat and the Jamaat-e-Islami. In 1999, an alleged religious militant from Pakistan was executed. In December 2000, Chinese security forces reportedly arrested over two hundred heavily armed militants near the Karakoram Highway. In addition, in 2003, Pakistanis were arrested in the Kashgar region for selling "illegal" copies of the Koran. In January 2004, China drew up a list of militants reportedly linked to Al Qaeda factions in Pakistan's tribal areas. Beijing has claimed that Muslim separatists in Xinjiang receive training in Pakistan and Kashmir from groups associated with Al Qaeda and afterward return to China, "where they carry out violent attacks on members of China's Han majority." In 2007, Chinese police raided an alleged terrorist camp in a western mountain region near the border with Pakistan and killed eighteen suspects. After retrieving so-called Uighur radicals from as far as Baluchistan, in southern Pakistan, Beijing became increasingly worried about the Talibanization of the Pakistani state and society. China started to fear that, if the political center weakens further, extremist Islamist groups will gain a free hand and form a permanent threat to the development of its far west.

The strip from the Irrawaddy to the Hindu Kush is fraught with peril. Chinese and Indian economic interests have faced various security threats. As mentioned earlier, China and India have similar economic interests, but do these shared interests, together with the increasing risks also outlined in the preceding, also lead to similar security interests? It turns out this is indeed the case. The religious extremism in Pakistan is a main concern for both. In Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar, the shared concern is the state's incapacity to control the volatile mixture of criminality, rebellion, and refugees. For both countries, these similar security interests are translated into three shared objectives. First, it is a matter of protecting their citizens or investment projects from becoming a target of xenophobic, frustrated mobs or terrorists. Second, there is the need to watch the intraregional movement of organized crime, terrorism, and rebellion. Third, and this is where the two former aspects come together, China and India need capable and stable states around them to allow economic expansion and the development of their remote, impoverished districts.

China and India share a similar vulnerability that has resulted in similar security interests. The question then arises whether similar interests also imply common interests. After all, it could be claimed that India's problem with Pakistani terrorists is not China's concern, despite the similarity as a security challenge. It has to be questioned whether security concerns are so closely linked that they can no longer be addressed separately. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to map the complex dynamics of instability in South Asia, but, for example, it is obvious that China and India will not be able to persuade the Pakistani government to end its support to terrorism without working together. Neither will the military junta in Myanmar feel encouraged to invest more in the domestic peace process if one of its neighbors supports the regime whatever position it takes in the process of national reconciliation. It will also be impossible for Beijing and New Delhi to curb the flows of narcotics, refugees, and terrorists without cooperation.

Security interdependence has thus become a pressing reality and resulted in a new subregional security complex. Instead of a cushion between the two East and South Asian security complexes, the increasing permeability of the traditional buffer states has blurred the barrier between the two regional security complexes. China and India must be ever more watchful of the situation in their shared neighborhood to maintain domestic stability. Even from inaccessible states like Bhutan, growing cross-border travel, smuggling, and trade will make it easier for rebels to penetrate onto Chinese or Indian soil. Economic interests have become a catalyst for expanding security interdependence. Myanmar, until recently negligible, has turned into a priority for New Delhi's foreign economic policy, as has Nepal for Beijing. In the past few years, both countries have become besieged by Chinese and Indian traders and investors. These interests go beyond the traditional realist appraisal of scholars like Garver. Neighboring states can no longer be considered solely as devices for old-fashioned balancing strategies as their interior stability in relation to the maintenance of regional balances of power becomes more important. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the new security interdependence will also lead to security cooperation.

Seeking Security Under Uncertainty

Nontraditional threats and transnationalization of informal violence have rendered problematic the conventional realist assumptions about regional security and require a resecuritization of regional policies. Securitization means that security issues become recognized as threats and thus form the starting point for conceiving security policies. The question, though, is whether this resecuritization is taking place. Are India and China's regional threat perceptions and security objectives shifting from counterbalancing each other to tackling nontraditional threats and maintaining economic security, and, consequently, is this evolution allowing them to translate similar security interests into common policies and cooperation? This section assesses whether this resecuritization has occurred, acknowledging that such an evaluation must focus both on political language and policies as variables.

The combat against terrorism has become one of the focal points in Sino-Indian cooperation. In 2002, the two countries initiated a bilateral counterterrorism mechanism that provides for an annual dialogue at the director level. Earlier, this issue was included in a joint security dialogue. In December 2007, India and China launched an unprecedented five-day antiterrorism training exercise in the Chinese province of Yunnan that involved more than two hundred troops. The same year, China, India, and Russia endorsed a joint communiqué on counterterrorism in which they vowed to coordinate action against "any factor that feeds international terrorism, including its financing, illegal drug trafficking and trans-national organized crime." In 2008, at a lecture in Beijing, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that "recent developments in our neighbourhood have brought home to us again the imperative need to collectively fight terrorism and extremism in all its forms." In private talks with his counterpart, Wen Jiabao, Singh particularly stressed the need to exert pressure on the Pakistani government to stop sponsoring Islamist terrorism.

Despite these new initiatives, Sino-Indian cooperation on terrorism tends to be declaratory. The issue appears to be brought to the fore to add relevance to the partnership rather than to developing operational synergies. India, for instance, has complained that the joint mechanism on terrorism lacks substance. According to an Indian official, the Chinese side "was satisfied with having such a dialogue," while New Delhi wanted to use it as a platform for mobilizing China to urge Pakistan to stop supporting terrorists in Kashmir and elsewhere in the region. "We tabled this a couple of times, and the Chinese took note, but no action followed," he explained. Reportedly, both sides have also had discussions on the role of Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh as incubators of terrorism, but they did not arrive at a common position. For India, the main objective is to raise the problem of neighboring countries' becoming stepping-stones for terrorists higher up on the regional and international agendas, but Beijing, for its part, remains opposed to the internationalization of such problems. "There is no progress on terrorism cooperation," an Indian expert has claimed, "India hoped to find an ally in the Chinese, but China prefers to deal with Pakistan unilaterally to keep extremists out of Xinjiang. While India castigated some neighbouring countries for supporting terrorism, the Chinese will simply not do this." Despite the spectacular picture of the joint exercise in Yunnan, cooperation between the two countries' security forces to combat terrorism has not been explored. There are virtually no links between the intelligence agencies or specialized offices in ministries, and there is no exchange of information.

With regard to cross-border criminality, China and India have agreed to joint efforts to combat the drugs trade. Their agreement on drug-control cooperation, signed in 2000, was aimed specifically at curbing the traffic via Myanmar. Officials have met regularly since the signing. In 2003, China and India held a roundtable with Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, which resulted in the Chiang Rai Declaration on drugs control. In 2006, the five convened to discuss a joint strategy, including intelligence sharing and training, for fighting the narcotics trade in the Golden Triangle. The two-day meeting was followed by a bilateral one between China and India. Again, at most, such discussions were more about fact-finding than laying the groundwork for joint action. There have been discussions about Myanmar and Afghanistan but not, for example, on the India-Nepal-China connection. While the two countries agree that the drugs trade should be eradicated, they differ on the strategy. China prefers a carrot-and-stick approach, offering alternatives to poppy production for farmers in northern Myanmar while sticking to a relentless crackdown on the traders. India opts for fencing its border and destroying the poppy fields. Similar to their relationship on terrorism, there are no specific programs or exchanges of information. Even on smuggling, the two countries have made little progress beyond putting their intentions on paper. In 2005, for instance, India signaled its frustration over Chinese smugglers' boosting trade in products from endangered species like ivory and Shahtoosh wool, but this fell on deaf ears.

In the long term, a secure environment depends on stable governments rather than stepping in where neighboring states fail. Several conditions are necessary for enhancing political stability. First, it demands a comprehensive rapprochement between the central political elites and political mutineers. Second, the central governments need to raise their legitimacy among the many societal entities. This implies transparent public finance and transparent governance. Notably, these prerequisites are more and more recognized by Chinese and Indian opinion leaders, and the two countries have the leverage to make a difference. But are they prepared to make use of it?

Apart from India's exclusive posture toward Nepal and Bhutan, China and India have traditionally insisted on not interfering in each other's domestic affairs. Historically this principle accorded with the struggle against "imperialist practices." It also served as a diplomatic modus operandi for improving trust and confidence in neighboring states. Beginning in the late 1990s, the primacy of sovereignty became a tool for economic diplomacy. Refraining from touching on delicate political issues facilitated business with many countries, especially when desiring concessions for natural resources or government contracts. Currently, the principle of noninterference is challenged by the regional context, where internal policies can have serious external consequences. China and India thus face a dilemma. Sticking to their traditional standards could aggravate the tensions between their political partners and rival factions. Distancing from them might encourage those same elites to turn to other, foreign friends. The degree to which China and India succeed in arriving at a common position on this challenge is a key determinant in assessing their cooperation in regional security affairs.

With regard to Nepal, India's immediate security concern has always been garnering the support of the Nepalese government in quelling Maoist factions. China's aim has been controlling the flow of Tibetan refugees. Initially, this resulted in diplomatic efforts to stay on good terms with Nepal's king. After 1972, King Birendra succeeded in utilizing his central role in the armed forces and domestic politics to position himself as the diplomatic gatekeeper in Nepal's diplomatic relations with its neighbors. Beijing and India alike sought to curry favor with the royal palace. Birendra's assassination in 2001 required India and China to revise their policies. From the beginning, India was reluctant to cultivate ties with Birendra's successor, his younger brother Gyanendra. In 2002, when Gyanendra sought consultations with New Delhi, the government put off his visit three times, fearing that the king's dismissal of the parliament and prime minister could lead to a total political meltdown.

China saw the tensions between Kathmandu and New Delhi as a chance to gain influence. In July 2002, Gyanendra was invited with all égards by Chinese president Jiang Zemin. The meeting resulted in a new trade agreement and the Chinese promise to side with the king's efforts to restore order. As a gesture, China also sent military officers to participate in trainings organized by the Nepalese army. Frustrated over the chilly ties with New Delhi, Gyanendra tried to force India into a more conciliatory position by hedging toward China and Pakistan. In April 2003, for the first time Nepal forced Tibetan refugees back into Chinese territory rather than allowing them to proceed to India, as it had over the years. In June 2004, following a weeklong visit to Beijing, General Pyar Jung Thapa revealed on state radio and television that China would step up its security cooperation with Nepal. The same month, Pakistani prime minister Shaukat Aziz called on Kathmandu and discussed the delivery of defense equipment, military aid, and security cooperation. In February 2005, after seizing absolute power, Gyanendra tried to ward off increased Indian pressure by moving even closer to China. He engineered the closure of the Dalai Lama's representative office in Kathmandu. The government stopped issuing exit permits to new refugees and halted the registration of marriages and births of Tibetans. Nepal also closed down the Tibetan Welfare Office. In March 2005, the king decided to open the Lhasa-Kathmandu Road, which had never been opened after its construction. That same month, after refusing to meet with the Indian ambassador and accepting aid from Pakistan, Gyanendra announced a meeting with Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing, in Kathmandu.

When Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao visited New Delhi in April 2005, he reportedly assured his Indian interlocutors that China would not take advantage of the flux in Nepal and that it would be prepared to work with India to maintain stability in the country. Nevertheless, the two countries kept to their opposite courses. The Indian government believed that the risk of prolonged anarchy and even a possible Maoist takeover would increase if the king sought to single-handedly take on the Maoists without broad political support. Therefore, its policy was to avoid legitimating the new monarch by keeping its contacts with the regime low profile and trying to strengthen its relations with other political entities, such as the democratic parties. India also decided to temporarily halt arms supplies.

China did not share India's views and took for granted that the king's grip on the army was strong enough to suppress Tibetan refugees. Unlike India's soft quarantining, Beijing openly backed Gyanendra and even counteracted India's policies by stepping up military cooperation. In June 2005, it supplied Nepal with five armored personnel carriers. In August, Nepalese foreign minister Ramesh Nath Pandey returned from Beijing with a pledge of U.S.$12 million in budgetary support. In October, China agreed to provide U.S.$1 million in military aid to Nepal, following a visit by the chief of the Royal Nepalese Army. In November, eighteen military trucks loaded with arms crossed the Nepalese border. In December, a high-level delegation from the PLA, led by the deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region, General Gui Quanzhi, paid a visit to Nepal. Indian defense minister Pranab Mukherjee said that the arms supply and military training provided by China were a "concern."

Only when Gyanendra's position started to weaken due to growing violence, persistent political opposition, American pressure, and the breaking up of the army as a solid royalist fortress did the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu gradually start reporting to Beijing that the king may not be able to maintain his power and that it should not put all its eggs in one basket. A marked shift came during the visit of State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan in March 2006. Tang separately called on the leaders of various parties such as Girija Prasad Koirala, president of the Nepali Congress, Sher Bahadur Deuba, another top leader of the Nepali Congress, and Communist Party of Nepal leaders Amrit Kumar Bohara and Bharat Mohan Adhikari. In a speech he clarified that China hoped "that all constitutional forces in Nepal would come closer in the best interest of the country and the people." After the parliament scrapped the major powers of the king in June 2007, China swiftly changed its position and established contacts with all constituents of the antiroyalist Seven Party Alliance. In November 2006, the vice-minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, Liu Hongcai, led a delegation to meet with all members of the alliance, expressing its "high appreciation of putting the interests of their country and people first." The Chinese ambassador, Zheng Xianglin, explained that his country would play an active role in Nepal's peace process. He added that China would not interfere in Nepal's internal affairs by making comments on the Maoists.

China's diplomatic maneuvering has been to deal with the government of Nepal irrespective of its format or political base. "Unlike the Indian establishment which talks different to different political parties, China suggested the Nepali leaders to improve the livelihood of the Nepali people through maintaining economic development and restoring a sort of permanent peace in the country." Interviews with Chinese experts and officials have revealed that China's indifference about who rules stemmed from the belief that whoever was in power would be obliged to foster contacts with China to check India's dominance.

While China does not openly contest India's political prominence, China's diplomatic pragmatism has allowed for a gradually changing economic status quo. Between 2003 and 2007, Nepal's imports from China grew faster than those from India. China has agreed to provide duty-free access to goods manufactured in Nepal. Nepal has produced a list of 1,550 items for export to the Chinese market at 0 percent custom tariffs. China has also invested in new railway connections. It is expected that, by 2010, 2.8 million tons will be carried to and from Tibet via a new railway. An extension of this artery to Nepal, combined with the improvement of the highway, could easily boost annual cross-border freight capacity from thirteen thousand tons to three hundred thousand tons. The Chinese ambassador in Katmandu has indicated that China is also ready to deliver petroleum products to Nepal, thereby undermining India's monopoly as oil supplier. China's expanding connections with local business communities has also strengthened its position within Nepal's civil society. On several occasions business leaders have pleaded for closer contacts with the People's Republic and mentioned China as a tool for pushing for a more favorable trade regime with India. China's posture has also resulted in more soft power. China's ambivalent attitude in contrast to India's meddling in Nepalese politics has strengthened Nepalese perceptions of India as an aggressive, hegemonic power. This has been the case particularly with the Maoist groups; although Beijing has maintained a distance and refrained from developing contacts, it has also never lashed out at them as the Indian government has done continuously.

Historically, Nepal has been considered a buffer state separating China from South Asia. Nepal is now becoming a porous corridor as natural barriers are overcome. More than ever, China and India have a joint interest in maintaining order and stability; yet, the domestic turmoil has been addressed in different ways. New Delhi, still confident of its influential position as a commercial gateway, has sought to defend its security interests by actively interfering in Nepal's political transition. Beijing has been well aware of the fact that regardless of who might rule the country, its leader will try to reduce Nepal's dependence on India. This has given China enough certainty that its security concerns, such as Tibetan refugees, will be taken care of. Consequently, it has taken a more ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis Nepal's political struggles while, at the same time, continuing to alter the economic balance of power. Impeded by distrust, China and India still deal with security challenges unilaterally: China with Tibetan exiles, India with the Maoists and other insurgents in the south of Nepal. The pressure for gaining influence means that the underlying economic and political dynamics of Nepal's continuing disintegration are scarcely addressed, and even less so the challenges that lie ahead.

In connection with Pakistan, the main challenge is responding to the alarming Talibanization of the country. Chinese and Indian officials or experts tend to have comparable interpretations of the domestic instability in Pakistan. They share the observation that political feudalism leads to predatory economic patronage systems and the marginalization of violent regions like Baluchistan. There is also awareness of the omnipotence of the military in politics and key economic branches, with the result that any kind of government will lack a grip on the armed forces and their links with Islamist extremists. None wants to see Pakistan develop into an Islamic state, using religion as the social and political glue to keep the country together. Interviews with Chinese officials have also revealed a rising concern over Pakistan's using Kashmir as a hub for sending out Islamist terrorists all over southern Asia. Two leading experts have even noted that, in the future, radical Tibetan secessionists in India, Nepal, and Pakistan could take the mujahideen as a model for their struggle.

Whereas it does not support India's territorial claims, Beijing moved from overt support of an independent Kashmir to consequent appeals to both sides to face the need for peace and stability above all. In its hierarchy of interests, Beijing still does not want to see India strengthening its grip on Ladakh, but over the past years, the need for stability moved higher up on the agenda. Finally, neither Beijing nor India takes for granted that the end of the military-based regime of President Musharraf and the emergence of a civilian political leadership would improve Pakistan's coherence or lead to a pacification of its several runaway districts. After all, not only the central leadership as such is flawed, it is believed, but also the political, administrative, and economic structures throughout Pakistani society.

Despite the fact that a looming collapse of Pakistan resulted in a convergence of direct security interests, China and India have pursued contradictory policies. While India perceives the Pakistani military establishment as a part of the problem, the Chinese government approaches it as a part of the solution. A Chinese scholar has stressed, "Although we talk to several parties in Pakistan, we cannot deny that the armed forces are likely to remain a pivotal partner for China to defend its security interests in the coming years." A Chinese official has added that, "for the coming period it is impossible that a civilian political government will be able to steer the army's policies in the region. Any government will rely on the army to restore domestic stability." Maintaining Pakistani generals' attention to China's security challenges is seen as a priority, rather than working with the Indian armed forces, which are not even able to safeguard their own borders. China also finds that limiting its relations with the army would benefit the American influence and steer it away from Chinese security objectives.

These pragmatic considerations explain China's continued support of the Pakistani military. It has maintained its traditional supply of all kinds of arms systems. Between 2001 and 2007, it sold hardware for a total of U.S.$5.1 billion. China has on many occasions delivered military aid. Since 2001, the emphasis has gradually moved to the fight against terrorism. In 2004 and 2006, joint antiterrorist exercises were organized. It is reported that the Chinese embassy in Islamabad maintains close links with the Inter-Services Intelligence and other military players in discussing cross-border threats and risks to Chinese citizens in Pakistan. The embassy partly rationalizes China's refusal to facilitate talks between Pakistan and India on the question of Kashmir, despite repeated invitations from New Delhi: Beijing wants to avoid pushing its Pakistani friends to stop its support of terrorism while sitting at the table with Indian interlocutors; it will never humiliate its long-standing partner in front of its archrival. It also clarifies why the Chinese government insists on military protection of its investment projects in Pakistan's volatile districts rather than mitigating local tensions by insisting on more transparency and a fair redistribution of taxes and other incomes.

This does not mean that the People's Republic has bet on one horse. In the run-up to the national elections in 2008, the Chinese embassy in Islamabad established informal contacts with the two main opposition parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League. After the parliamentary elections in February 2008, which led to the defeat of President Musharraf, China was one of the first to offer support to the new government. In March 2008 it announced a U.S.$500 million low-interest loan to help ease Pakistan's growing financial problems. Immediately after the appointment of the PPP's Yousuf Raza Gilani as Pakistan's prime minister and Shah Mehmood Quresh as the minister of foreign affairs, they were publically congratulated by their Chinese counterparts. Yet, at the same time, China reaffirmed its privileged relationship with the military. In April 2008, Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie invited President Musharraf to discuss the expansion of cooperation between the militaries of his country and Pakistan.

China's security interests in Pakistan are served in the same way as those in Nepal: it combines a close military relationship with political ambivalence. Knowledge of the complex nature of the domestic instability in Pakistan has grown, as has China's economic and diplomatic influences. Nonetheless, China is unwilling to side with India on terrorism or to address the root causes of violence and the long-term risk of a collapsing state. In part this is because Beijing is not confident that pressure will help in any case, and partly because it does not want to loose Pakistan as a pawn on the South Asian chessboard.

Violence in Myanmar has become a recurrent topic on the bilateral agenda. In 2003, Indian prime minister Vajpayee reportedly brought the stalled transition in Myanmar to the fore during his visit to China. In 2004, Beijing endorsed India's initiative to work more closely with the SPDC in order to impede cross-border rebel movements. During the crackdown on protests in several Myanmar cities in September 2007, the Chinese and Indian ministers of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi and Pranab Mukherjee, respectively, clarified their positions in the UN General Assembly. In October that year, the issue was tabled at the trilateral meeting with Russia in Harbin. According to an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the political transition was also discussed in meetings with diplomats from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. Yet, the official remarked that these talks did not go not beyond "fact finding and conveying official standpoints. We recognize the importance of the Convention [the National Convention, in which the junta and opposition have to work toward a new constitution], but did not consider ways to stimulate this process."

In terms of public declarations, Chinese and Indian positions have gone through a double convergence. First, Beijing and New Delhi have come to share the idea that the military junta has to commit itself to the seven-step path providing a new constitution and a multiparty democratic general election in 2010.Both states have expressed their support for reconciliation with the main opposition groups, including Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. After 2002, Beijing and New Delhi simultaneously became more vociferous. In September 2003, for example, President Hu Jintao made clear that "China hopes Myanmar will remain stable, its ethnic groups will live in harmony, its economy will keep growing and the Myanmar people will live in happiness." The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pleaded for "transition to democracy," which "offers the best possibilities for addressing problems both of political stability and economic development."

Second, they have arrived at the same position with regard to the way the military regime has to be approached. "Quiet diplomacy" is the channel through which the two countries convey their expectations. They also requested the United Nations take the lead in pushing the generals, within a narrow mandate and without intimidating sanctions. The corresponding diplomatic discourse left nothing to the imagination. Chinese politicians have been determined to respect Pauk Paw, the term that expresses the traditional Sino-Burmese friendship: "China opposes outside interference in Myanmar's internal affairs and all must respect Myanmar's sovereignty," President Hu Jintao affirmed at a meeting with Senior General Than Shwe, in April 2005, "China will never change her stand concerning Myanmar . . . China accepts that Myanmar has the right to choose and practise the most suitable system." At a meeting of the Greater Mekong Subregion in July 2005, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stressed: "China will continue to promote cooperation with Myanmar, no matter how the international situation fluctuates."

When India's External Affairs minister Natwar Singh visited Myanmar, he underlined his country attached "very high priority to its relations with Myanmar as a valuable neighbour and strategic partner" and that national reconciliation could continue with "the objectives set by Myanmar for itself." Likewise, during a recent visit to Myanmar, his successor, Pranab Mukherjee, made clear the country's "hands off" policy on the struggle for restoration of democracy going on in Myanmar. He asserted that India had to deal with governments "as they exist." "We are not interested in exporting our own ideology," the minister stressed, "we are a democracy and we would like democracy to flourish everywhere. But this is for every country to decide for itself." An Indian analyst explained that this convergence in discourse was the result of a rhetorical tit-for-tat approach by the South Block: "While several members of Parliament have kept pushing for a strong line on human rights in Burma, the government carefully adapted its posture to China's attitude." In 2006, China, India, and Russia blocked the proposal to establish a support team of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that would accompany the follow-up mission of special envoy Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro.

A wide gap remains between discourse and deeds. While China and India were adopting a critical tone and implicitly asking the generals to step aside, behind this rhetorical facade they continued strengthening the junta's position, in disregard of the main political setbacks. Both sides increased their military assistance. China reportedly sold up to fifteen hundred military trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, aircraft, artillery, small arms, and communication systems devices. All this hardware added together amounts to an annual average of more than U.S.$100 million. India started supplying arms to Myanmar in 2003 and has offered helicopters, tanks, artillery, naval systems, and counterinsurgency training to Myanmar's military. China has maintained close contacts with the military establishment, and India has been catching up. In the late 1990s, India and Myanmar launched Operation Golden Bird. Troops from the two countries chased Indian insurgents on the Mizoram border. In 2005, the Indian army launched operations against such rebel groups as the Karen National Union, Chin National Army, Chin National Front, Karen Freedom Fighters, and the Arakan Liberation Party. This reportedly led to the destruction of twelve camps and the elimination of eighty-two rebels. China and India also continued beefing up the military government's position as economic doorkeeper, despite the fact that corruption and a lack of redistribution of income is one of the main sources of secessionist struggles and political opposition. Chinese and Indian investments in the energy and mining sectors have become one of the main sources of income for the junta. Even though several of the purchased blocks are located in areas with ethnic minorities, these groups do not enjoy any of the benefits. Local communities are often forced out to make room for plants, roads, and dams.

Myanmar has become a focal point in China and India's neighborhood policies. Together with Nepal and Pakistan, the country offers a good example of the diplomatic schizophrenia with which Beijing and New Delhi approach security challenges: beneath the surface of rhetorical convergence, distrust and the fear of losing out inhibit substantial security cooperation.

Thus, despite the growing security interdependence, regional cooperation has remained superficial and unreliable. The declarations of peace remain in sharp contrast to the underlying competition. The security dilemma remains in place, as strategies are driven mainly by self-help and the fear of losing influence to the other. Rather than being mitigated by economic interests and tending toward a substantial resecuritization, commerce seems to add another dimension to the Sino-Indian contest. Sino-Indian relations are situated somewhere between conflict formation and a very loose security regime. While there is some collaboration, it has scarcely penetrated to the core of the security challenges, namely the impunity with which flawed regimes continue undermining stability in their countries. Behind a surface of cooperation, China is gradually altering the economic balance of power in its favor. If it succeeds in further strengthening its economic prowess in countries like Pakistan and undermining India's commercial stronghold in Nepal, it may soon alter the overall balance of power in South Asia.

***

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Published by Columbia University Press and copyrighted © 2010 Columbia University Press. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers. For more information, please e-mail or visit the permissions page on our Web site.

Acknowledgments	p. ix
Intro Sino-Indian Rivalry in an Era of Globalization	p. 1
Emerging Trading States	p. 9
The Evolution of Sino-Indian Relations	p. 32
Ricardo's Reality	p. 65
Shifting Perceptions	p. 103
The Military Security Dilemma	p. 120
Regional Security Cooperation	p. 142
Conclusion	p. 165
Notes	p. 173
Biblography	p. 205
Index	p. 219
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Rent More, Save More! Use code: ECRENTAL

Rent More, Save More! Use code: ECRENTAL

5% off 1 book, 7% off 2 books, 10% off 3+ books

China and India

9780231150422

0231150423

How To: Textbook Rental

Summary

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

Excerpts

Rewards Program

Rent More, Save More! Use code: ECRENTAL

Rent More, Save More! Use code: ECRENTAL

5% off 1 book, 7% off 2 books, 10% off 3+ books

China and India

9780231150422

0231150423

How To: Textbook Rental

Summary

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

Excerpts

Rewards Program

Digital License