Choice, Contract, and Constitutions

by Buchanan, James M.

• ISBN13: 9780865972445
• ISBN10: 0865972443
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2001-02-01
• Publisher: Liberty Fund

Summary

Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic thought is a legacy of James M Buchanan. In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary study of economics and to the work of James M Buchanan, Robert D Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the field of constitutional political economy... (His) insistence on the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics, and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become apparent." The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into these major subject categories: foundational issues; the method of constitutional economics; incentives and constitutional choice; constitutional order; market order; distributional issues; fiscal and monetary constitutions; reform. For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do, says Robert D Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be changed."

Table of Contents

Foreword	xi
Foundational Issues
Constitutional Economics	3	(12)
A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy	15	(13)
The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism	28	(14)
Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government	42	(18)
Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation	60	(8)
Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect	68	(11)
The Method of Constitutional Economics
A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory	79	(8)
Boundaries on Social Contract	87	(14)
Constitutional Design and Construction: An Economic Approach	101	(10)
The Use and Abuse of Contract	111	(16)
Incentives and Constitutional Choice
Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance and the Limits of Reason	127	(21)
Viktor J. Vanberg
James M. Buchanan
How Can Constitutions Be Designed So That Politicians Who Seek to Serve ``Public Interest'' Can Survive and Prosper?	148	(7)
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice	155	(17)
Viktor Vanberg
James M. Buchanan
Student Reyolts, Academic Liberalism, and Constitutional Attitudes	172	(13)
A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction	185	(16)
James M. Buchanan
Viktor Vanberg
Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility	201	(14)
Constitutional Order
Contractarianism and Democracy	215	(10)
Democracy within Constitutional Limits	225	(12)
Market Order
[Untitled]	237	(16)
The Minimal Politics of Market Order	253	(14)
Distributional Issues
Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design	267	(10)
Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution	277	(8)
James M. Buchanan
Winston C. Bush
Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules	285	(22)
James M. Buchanan
Roger L. Faith
Fiscal and Monetary Constitutions
Procedural and Quantitative Constitutional constraints on Fiscal Authority	307	(6)
Tax Reform in ``Constitutional''. Perspective: The Case for a Fiscal Constitution	313	(17)
The Relevance of Constitutional Strategy	330	(9)
Reform
The Economic Constitution and the New Deal: Lessons for Late Learners	339	(17)
Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform	356	(16)
Achieving Economic Reform	372	(12)
Pragmatic Reform and Constitutional Revolution	384	(14)
James M. Buchanan
Alberto di Pierro
Lagged Implementation as an Element in Constitutional Strategy	398	(19)
Prolegomena for a Strategy of Constitutional Revolution	417	(11)
The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy	428	(11)
Notes on the Liberal Constitution	439	(10)
Dismantling the Welfare State	449	(10)
Name Index	459	(3)
Subject Index	462