Classics in Game Theory

by Kuhn, Harold William

• ISBN13: 9780691011929
• ISBN10: 0691011923
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1997-01-17
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Classics in Game Theoryassembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication ofTheory of Games and Economic Behaviorby John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume. Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

Table of Contents

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Foreword
An Appreciation
Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games	p. 3
The Bargaining Problem	p. 5
Non-Cooperative Games	p. 14
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game	p. 27
Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form	p. 36
Extensive Games and the Problem and Information	p. 46
A Value for n-Person Games	p. 69
Stochastic Games	p. 80
Recursive Games	p. 87
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments	p. 119
A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy	p. 127
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games	p. 140
Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders	p. 170
The Core of an n-Person Game	p. 192
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model	p. 216
	p. 247
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game	p. 268
The Big Match	p. 289
On Market Games	p. 296
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games	p. 317
List of Contributors	p. 355
Index	p. 357
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.