Comparative Corporate Governance in China: Political Economy and Legal Infrastructure

by Yu; Guanghua

• ISBN13: 9780415403078
• ISBN10: 0415403073
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 2007-04-16
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

With China already assuming its place as one of the world's biggest markets, both Chinese corporations and international corporations operating in China face the challenges of corporate governance. This insightful text explores a range of issues including: executive compensation, takeover markets, the securities market, insolvency issues, venture capital markets and their role in corporate governance models.

Author Biography

Guanghua Yu is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong and a Professor of Law in the School of Law, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, PR China

Table of Contents

Preface	p. ix
The relevance of comparative corporate governance studies	p. 1
The nature of the problem	p. 1
Agency costs and monitoring devices	p. 4
Comparative studies of monitoring devices	p. 13
The relevance for China	p. 23
Conclusion	p. 35
The problem with the transplantation of Western law	p. 37
Introduction	p. 37
The political goals of controlling the large SOEs	p. 38
The use of an English-style takeover law	p. 41
Weak enforcement of the law on securities fraud	p. 54
Conclusion	p. 64
The proper role of government in building a venture capital market	p. 66
Introduction	p. 66
Economic significance of developing a venture capital market	p. 67
Comparative study of two distinctive venture capital models in the world	p. 69
The significance of a developed stock market	p. 71
Developing a venture capital market	p. 76
Further steps in developing the venture capital market	p. 83
Conclusion	p. 89
The case against uniformity in corporate governance	p. 90
Introduction	p. 90
The search for a best model	p. 90
Transplantation and adjustment of an English-style takeover law	p. 95
Conclusion	p. 108
The regulation of executive compensation	p. 109
Introduction	p. 109
The development of, and restrictions upon, executive compensation	p. 110
Tax restrictions on executive compensation	p. 112
Legislative requirement of disclosure of executive pay	p. 114
The regulation of executive compensation	p. 118
Conclusion	p. 122
Towards a functional approach to comparative corporate governance studies	p. 124
Introduction	p. 124
The search for an optimal model	p. 124
A cautious approach to using economic performance as a judgement criterion	p. 130
Increased options and institutional competition within a country	p. 137
Conclusion	p. 145
Notes	p. 146
Index	p. 187
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