Contemporary Debates In Epistemology

by Steup, Matthias; Sosa, Ernest

• ISBN13: 9781405107396
• ISBN10: 1405107391
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-02-04
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Summary

Eleven pairs of newly commissioned essays face off on opposite sides of fundamental problems in current theories of knowledge. Brings together fresh debates on eleven of the most controversial issues in epistemology. Questions addressed include: Is knowledge contextual? Can skepticism be refuted? Can beliefs be justified through coherence alone? Is justified belief responsible belief? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers.

Author Biography

Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (2001).

Ernest Sosa is Romeo Elton Professor of Natural Theology and Professor of Philosophy at Brown University as well as Visiting Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University. He is the co-author, with Lawrence BonJour, of Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (Blackwell, 2003). He replies to analysis of his work in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco (Blackwell, 2004).

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors	vii
Preface	xi
PART I KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM	1	(122)
Introduction
Matthias Steup	1	(12)
1 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment?	13	(34)
The Case against Closure
Fred Dretske	13	(13)
The Case for Closure
John Hawthorne	26	(17)
Reply to Hawthorne	43	(4)
2 Is Knowledge Contextual?	47	(25)
Contextualism Contested
Earl Conee	47	(9)
Contextualism Defended
Stewart Cohen	56	(6)
Contextualism Contested Some More	62	(5)
Contextualism Defended Some More	67	(5)
3 Can Skepticism Be Refuted?	72	(26)
The Refutation of Skepticism
Jonathan Vogel	72	(13)
The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism
Richard Fumerton	85	(13)
4 Is There a Priori Knowledge?	98	(25)
In Defense of the a Priori
Laurence BonJour	98	(7)
There Is no a Priori
Michael Devitt	105	(10)
Reply to Devitt	115	(3)
Reply to BonJour	118	(2)
Last Rejoinder	120	(1)
References	121	(2)
PART II FOUNDATIONAL KNOWLEDGE	123	(128)
Introduction
Matthias Steup	123	(8)
5 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?	131	(25)
Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem
Peter Klein	131	(9)
Infinitism Is not the Solution to the Regress Problem
Carl Ginet	140	(9)
Reply to Ginet	149	(4)
Reply to Klein	153	(3)
6 Can Beliefs Be Justified through Coherence Alone?	156	(25)
Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability
Catherine Z. Elgin	156	(12)
Why Coherence Is not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism
James van Cleve	168	(13)
7 Is There Immediate Justification?	181	(36)
There Is Immediate Justification
James Pryor	181	(21)
Doing without Immediate Justification
Michael Williams	202	(15)
8 Does Perceptual Experience Have Conceptual Content?	217	(34)
Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content
Bill Brewer	217	(14)
Perception and Conceptual Content
Alex Byrne	231	(20)
PART III JUSTIFICATION	251	(93)
Introduction
Matthias Steup	251	(6)
9 Is Justification Internal?	257	(28)
Justification Is not Internal
John Greco	257	(13)
Justification Is Internal
Richard Feldman	270	(15)
10 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal?	285	(28)
Truth Is not the Primary Epistemic Goal
Jonathan Kvanvig	285	(11)
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis
Marian David	296	(17)
11 Is Justified Belief Responsible Belief?	313	(31)
Justified Belief as Responsible Belief
Richard Foley	313	(13)
Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality
Nicholas Wolterstorff	326	(12)
Response to Wolterstorff	338	(4)
Response to Foley	342	(2)
Index	344