Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

by McLaughlin, Brian P.; Cohen, Jonathan

• ISBN13: 9781405117609
• ISBN10: 1405117605
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2007-10-01
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Summary

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental content, and the nature of consciousness

Author Biography

Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.

Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors	p. ix
Introduction	p. xii
Mental Content	p. 1
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?	p. 3
Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions	p. 5
There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content	p. 20
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?	p. 35
Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent	p. 37
Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent	p. 53
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?	p. 67
Resisting Normativism in Psychology	p. 69
Normativism Defended	p. 85
Is There Non-Conceptual Content?	p. 103
The Revenge of the Given	p. 105
Are There Different Kinds of Content?	p. 117
Physicalism	p. 139
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?	p. 141
Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism	p. 143
The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism	p. 160
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?	p. 183
A Priori Physicalism	p. 185
On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism	p. 200
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?	p. 225
Causation and Mental Causation	p. 227
Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough	p. 243
The Place of Consciousness in Nature	p. 265
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?	p. 267
Dualist Emergentism	p. 269
Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness	p. 287
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?	p. 301
New Troubles for the Qualia Freak	p. 303
A Case for Qualia	p. 319
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?	p. 333
All Consciousness Is Perceptual	p. 335
Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)	p. 358
Index	p. 377
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